German Foreign Policy in Dialogue

Newsletter - Issue 13

The European Security Strategy
Paper Tiger Or Catalyst for Joint Action?

Part I

Perspectives from Germany, France, Great Britain and the United States
German Foreign Policy in Dialogue

A Quarterly E-Newsletter on German Foreign Policy

Edited by Marco Overhaus, Hanns W. Maull and Sebastian Harnisch

Volume 5, Number 13
Trier, Germany
June 24, 2004
Deutsche-Aussenpolitik.De

This internet project on German foreign policy was established in 1998 at the Chair of International Relations at Trier University and is funded by the ASKO EUROPA-FOUNDATION. Its mission is to respond to the increasing interest in Germany's foreign policy by improving research, analysis and teaching in this field through the use of the internet. The project also aims at strengthening the democratic discourse on German foreign policy among researchers and analysts, decision-makers and the wider public. Our information services integrate media perspectives, official documents and sound secondary analysis.

The project is presently headed by Marco Overhaus. Current staff members are Kirstin Hein, Daniel Mierow, Solveig Mimler, Mario Stumm and Christof Zintel. Overall responsibility for the project lies with Prof. Hanns W. Maull.
Contents

I. The European Security Strategy – Paper Tiger or Catalyst for Joint Action

Editorial ......................................................................................................................................................3
By Marco Overhaus

A Secure Europe in a Better World – The European Union’s Security Strategy
A German Perspective ..............................................................................................................................7
By Jan Irlenkäuser

The Next Phase of ESDP and the Key Role of the Military - A French View .......................15
By Yves Boyer

Britain and the European Security Strategy ..................................................................................24
By Christopher Hill

Reflections in the Strategic Mirror:
The European Security Strategy and the U.S. National Security Strategy .....................32
By Esther Brimmer

II. Book Review: Comparative Study on European Foreign Policies

Joerissen, Britta/ Bernhard Stahl (Eds.)(2003): Europäische Außenpolitik und nationale
Identität. Vergleichende Diskurs- und Verhaltensstudien zu Dänemark, Deutschland,
Frankreich, Griechenland, Italien und den Niederlanden. Münster .............................................39
Reviewed by Antje Wiener

III. Online and Offline Resources Related to the Documents

1. General .............................................................................................................................................43
2. Links to Relevant Actors on the Internet ....................................................................................44
3. Selected New Publications on German Foreign Policy ............................................................45

IV. About the Authors .........................................................................................................................48
I. The European Security Strategy - Paper Tiger or Catalyst for Joint Action?

Editorial

By Marco Overhaus

In May 2003, the European Heads of State and Government asked High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, to draft a “European Security Strategy” (ESS). A first official draft was then tabled shortly afterwards in June and the revised, final version could be adopted by the European Council in December 2003. While the idea of such a strategy had been floated for some time, the actual impetus to publish the ESS was clearly provided by the Iraq crisis in 2002 and 2003. The crisis did not only reveal a profound transatlantic disagreement over the use of force and the identification of the most relevant security threats. More importantly, it demonstrated the inability of the member states of the European Union to act in a unified, or at least in a co-ordinated, fashion in such an important situation.

Against this background, the Strategy was designed as a means to improve policy coherence among EU member states. Its initiators hoped to promote, through the ESS, a common understanding within the European Union concerning the security risks and threats which Europe is facing today and the ways and means to confront these challenges. Beyond that, the ESS was also seen as a conceptual basis for a strategic dialogue with the United States which would prevent transatlantic disputes of the kind observed over Iraq break out again in the future.

Since the publication of the Strategy, policy-makers and analysts alike have debated whether the 14-pages-document is likely to achieve those two purposes to foster transatlantic cooperation and European unity in foreign affairs. Some commentators have hailed the document as an important step towards a more unified approach to European Foreign and Security Policy, because with it, EU member states could for the first time agree on a common threat assessment. Terrorism in conjunction with the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction is given top priority, followed by regional conflicts, failed states and organized crime. It is also seen as remarkable that the Union recognizes the global reach of these threats and the implications from this: according to the ESS, the new security environment demands a global strategic outlook of European security policy. Finally, the
document acknowledges that “hard power” (military force or economic sanctions) would have to become part of the Union’s toolbox, at least as an instrument of last resort.

On a more critical note, it has been pointed out that the document has introduced terms such as “preventive engagement” or “effective multilateralism” which leave considerable room for interpretation, and that the ESS does not offer criteria as to when and how “hard power” actually would be used. In this volume, Christopher Hill supports the ESS’ notion to coordinate different foreign policy instruments, but criticizes that it “blurs together crisis and more routine conditions” and warns that it might end-up coordinating “almost everything under the sun”. Yet a certain amount of ambiguity and vagueness will probably be inevitable when 25 national governments have to agree on a text. Moreover, given the short time span of the document’s existence, any assessment on the Strategy’s long-term impact must necessarily remain somewhat speculative. In the future, the Strategy’s impact and success will depend on whether it indicates (and promotes) a convergence of national perspectives, or wither it simply papers over long standing policy differences with woolly compromise formulas.

Thus, an important indicator for the ESS’ prospect for success is not only the text itself (in terms of its concreteness, binding character and vision of priorities) but also a comparison of how member states interpret the document’s content. Therefore, we have asked foreign policy experts from different European countries and the United States, first, to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the Strategy from their point of view and second, to evaluate how the Strategy’s provisions are emphasized and interpreted through the respective spectacles of member governments. To draw the net as widely as possible, we decided to dedicate this and the following issue of “Foreign Policy in Dialogue” to the European Security Strategy. In this first issue, we have contributions from Germany (Jan Irlenkäuser), France (Yves Boyer), the United Kingdom (Christopher Hill) and the United States (Esther Brimmer). The next issue will carry perspectives from Austria, Italy, Finland and Poland.

The overview of contributions of this first issue indicates that the Strategy’s immediate impact on member states’ foreign and security policies or on the prospects for the improvement of transatlantic relations should not be overestimated. While our authors do not represent official government positions, their contributions reflect divergent national perspectives on how member countries interpret the ESS. Jan Irlenkäuser points out that Germany has successfully
attempted to transfer its traditional preference for civilian mechanisms of conflict prevention and crisis management to the level of the Strategy. Moreover, Irlenkäuser stresses that Berlin has strongly pressed its partners to change the contested term “pre-emptive engagement” into the less offensive term “preventive engagement” and to qualify the eventual use of military force as an option of last resort. He acknowledges, however, that Germany did accept the introduction of hard power elements and wonders whether Berlin used the European strategy in this respect to circumvent uncomfortable choices on the national level.

Christopher Hill notes that the United Kingdom in its approach towards the ESS was cautious not to restrict its own freedom of action too much and more generally to make sure that the document’s language would remain intergouvernementalist rather than integrationist. Moreover, it was important to London that the EU would finally give the impression - mainly to an American audience – that the Europeans could talk the language of hard power, as Hill puts it. The desire to make Europe a more attractive partner to Washington by enhancing the EU’s military muscle had already been visible, when Tony Blair supported the launching of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in Saint Malo in 1998.

For French politicians and strategists, the concept of “Europe Puissance” has not only included a desire to see more military capabilities in European’s hands, but more importantly a larger degree of strategic independence from the United States. This notion is also clearly reflected in Yves Boyer’s contribution. From his point of view, Europe needs to put more emphasis on military power and capabilities which would enable it to act independently of the United States. He advocates a “second cycle” of European defense cooperation which would now, after relevant institutions and structures for the ESDP are in place, concentrate on the convergence of national military policies and doctrines. From this perspective, the ESS is, according to Boyer, a useful exercise, but not in itself sufficient to achieve such a convergence.

Finally, Esther Brimmer traces similarities between the ESS and the United States National Security Strategy (NSS), which was published by the Bush Administration in September 2002. She argues that with regard to the “big picture” – that is, the assessment of common threats to European and American security – similarities prevail. In fact, she finds it quite notable that the EU would even use a threat-based analysis at all. However, Brimmer also sees important differences on the premises on which the two Strategies are based (for Europe, the
premise is interconnectedness and vulnerability; for America, it is a position of overwhelming strength) and on the appropriate means each side prefers to face the security threats (while Europeans still place more weight on ‘soft power’, Americans stress ‘hard power’).

In conclusion, all our authors agree that the European Security Strategy certainly is an improvement in European Foreign and Security Policy. For the first time, the member states agreed on a rather concise, concrete and clearly articulated definition of those threats and risks which could seriously affect the security of the European Union, and have jointly identified some avenues of how to deal with them. The similarities in strategic outlook between the NSS and the ESS could also provide a better basis for transatlantic cooperation in the future. However, the fact that diverging national filters in Germany, France and the United Kingdom still play an important role in the interpretation of the Strategy’s provisions points to the limits of policy coherence among national foreign policies so far. For sure, such an assessment would be incomplete without consideration of other member countries and regions in Europe, which we will do in the next issue of this publication. Moreover, it would be unfair to assess the ESS exclusively on the basis of an eventual convergence of national strategic outlooks. Should the ESS in itself contribute to such a process, this would be only in the long run. This is the reason why the Strategy is designed as a working document which will have to be adopted and amended as new circumstances occur. In the short term, however, successes in tackling today’s pressing security problems in concrete ways might be even more important to forge a new European and transatlantic consensus on the most crucial aspects of contemporary security policy. The reconstruction in Iraq and Iran’s nuclear ambitions will be the next test cases. The ESS might be more than one of those many paper tigers which the Common Foreign and Security Policy has already produced in the form of “Common Strategies” or Joint Statements. Still, it remains to be seen whether it really will be able to serve as a catalyst for joint action when the next foreign policy crisis breaks.
A Secure Europe in a Better World – The European Union’s Security Strategy
A German Perspective

By Jan Irlenkäuser

First and foremost one has to state that the European Union’s Security Strategy (ESS) is an improvement in itself, whether one agrees with every single point in this document or not. It shows that the EU has the political will to cooperate in security and defense policy. Furthermore the document gives an overview of the EU’s strategic challenges ahead (most notably terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction), the Union’s political priorities (e.g. effective multilateralism) and their policy implications for Europe. According to official German reading, the ESS should enable the Union to speak in unison and therefore offer the opportunity for a strategic dialogue with its major partners, especially the U.S.

The ESS is a reaction of the disastrous experience before and during the Iraq War in 2002 and 2003. It can be seen as an effort to increase or resume (depending on the perspective one takes on the issue) coherence in security and defense affairs. With the Strategy, member states commit themselves to high objectives in their foreign, security and defense policy: “Europe should be ready to share the responsibility for global security and for building a better world”.1 The central question now is, whether the ESS will in fact improve the ability of the EU to act adequately and timely in the face of new challenges or whether it will simply remain declaratory without real impact on policy making.

The German Approach to the ESS

From the German point of view the ESS performs three core functions: to provide the basis for a transatlantic dialogue, to deepen European integration, and to substitute for the lack of a German national strategy. Firstly, for Germany the ESS is an important step towards an advanced integration of the European Union in this field. This document and the policies to be based on it are expected to enable the European Union to conduct a strategic dialogue with its partners, especially with the United States. This shows how deeply the transatlantic rift of the recent past has influenced German foreign policy making. The U.S., and not potentially threatening states like Syria, Iran or North Korea, is the main addressee of the Strategy.

1 This and in the following contributions will refrain from individual references when a passage is quoted from the European Security Strategy.
Secondly, for the German government the ESS presents clear guidelines for the EU towards crisis management and for more strategic clarity in principal questions about the use of military power. It is probably very much due to German insistence that the Strategy defines the use of force as an option of last resort which can only be legitimized through the UN-Charta. This has always been an important argument for the Schröder government before and during the Iraq War and therefore could be seen as subliminal criticism of the U.S. and its allies. In its public statements the Foreign Office emphasizes the fact that preventive diplomacy, trade policy and development aid are repeatedly mentioned in the document as an integral part of the EU’s crisis management instruments.

Thirdly, so far there is no equivalent to the ESS in German strategic planning. The lack of such a national security strategy has less to do with an incapacity of relevant ministries or the Federal Chancellery, but with the of lack political will to clearly define national interests. The Defense Policy Guidelines (DPG) published by the Ministry of Defense (MoD) in May 2003 are a step in the right direction. However, they are only valid for the area of responsibility of the MoD. The German government has failed for years now to publish a new defense white paper. The last one is from 1994 (Weißbuch zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage und Zukunft der Bundeswehr). Therefore, the ESS could be perceived as a European substitute for a German national security strategy. This policy of shifting critical issues to the EU is not uncommon for German politics.

German governments - conservatives and social democrats alike - have always spoken out in favor of deepening European integration in foreign and defense policies. In contrast to other major European powers like France or the UK, Germany seems to be more willing to integrate its national policy into ESDP. Several reasons should be mentioned in this regard: historical, political, financial, and military ones. The legacy of World War II is still vivid and deeply influences the ways and means of German foreign policy making. Germans show a crystal clear preference for every policy which is not implemented by force. The EU gives Germany an opportunity to gain influence on the international level which it would otherwise not have. A deeper integration in the field of ESDP is also expected to reduce costs for the armed forces by multilateral cooperation in areas such as research and development, acquisition and logistics.
From a German point of view, four aspects of the ESS deserve special attention:

- the general approach to security;
- the threat perception of the ESS;
- international order and transatlantic relations;
- the use of military power.

**The Strategy’s General Approach to Security**

Of course, security is more than just military power. The ESS clearly states that none of the new and present threats are of a purely military nature nor can they be tackled by purely military means. The strategy is based on a broad concept of security for the EU and its member states. This means that political, economic, social and ecological aspects are taken into consideration and are seen as global challenges with an impact on the EU. The ESS states: “In much of the developing world, poverty and disease cause untold suffering and give rise to pressing security concerns”. At the same time, security is identified as a “precondition of development”. The current situation in Iraq can be seen as a good example for this assumption, since, due to the precarious security situation, the process of rebuilding state institutions has not really made progress. Breaking the “cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty some countries and regions are stuck into” is an objective for the policy of the member states as stated in the ESS.

Consequently, conflict prevention and civil crisis management play a prominent role in the document. This broad approach is nothing new to the international strategic community but nevertheless very important for the current German government, especially for the Green Party of Joschka Fischer. In a speech delivered before the German parliament in December 2003 on the ESS, Fischer stressed the document’s civilian aspects. Measures such as “contributing to better governance through assistance programs, conditionally and targeted trade measures”, overseas development aid, strengthening civil society abroad etc. are considered to be cornerstones of Germany’s foreign and security policy. In this regard it can be assumed that strengthening the importance of preventive diplomacy, trade and development aid in the final version of the ESS were important to Berlin because they reflect the foreign policy priorities of the red-green coalition.

---

Threat Perceptions of the ESS

When it comes to strategic challenges, the ESS’ threat perceptions are clearly in the mainstream of today’s strategic thinking and writing. Terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, regional conflicts, failed states and organized crime are seen as major problems in the security environment at the beginning of the 21st century. However, not all threats are considered equally important. Proliferation is given top priority (“[it] is potentially the greatest risk to our security”) in threat assessment, followed by terrorism (“it poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe”) and organized crime (“Europe is the prime target for organized crime”). It is remarkable, however, that the document addresses today’s most pressing regional conflicts (e.g. in the Balkans, the Middle East or on the Korean peninsula) only in a quite vague fashion: “Violent or frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders, threaten regional stability”.

In some important ways, the European Security Strategy’s threat assessment parallels the German DPG while in some aspects, the DPG list of risks seems to be more concrete, e.g. with respect to the threats caused by information warfare and against routes and means of foreign trade. Most notably, what the ESS and the DPG have in common is their global strategic outlook. With the Strategy, the EU assumes responsibility for international crisis management not only in Europe but in more distant regions as well. This is of importance in the intra-German discussion process, where it is still highly debated whether missions abroad (especially in Afghanistan or in Africa) actually improve Germany’s security. Nowadays, more than ten years after the first German participation in U.N. peacekeeping – and after the Kosovo Campaign and Afghanistan - Germany seems to be ready to take its share of responsibility in cooperation with its European and international partners.
International Order and Transatlantic Relations

The EU wants to strengthen its position within the international community and the ESS is a first step towards this aim. Effective multilateralism is seen as the way to enhance global security and economic well-being not only for the members of the EU but for all countries of the world, with a special focus on the EU’s strategic periphery (“geography is still important”). Multilateralism is the only chance for the EU to gain influence in the international arena, because it is obvious that neither the EU nor its member states have the soft and hard power to act unilaterally on the same scale as the U.S. had since the end of the Cold War. The sobering experiences of the Third Gulf War once more made this plainly clear.

The strong commitment of Germany to international law and the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for international peace and security is reflected in the federal government’s approach during the finalization process of the ESS. Berlin’s clear commitment to continue with transatlantic relations is a rebuff to all proposals to balance the U.S. But nevertheless the EU and its member states seek a partnership of equals on both sides of the Atlantic. This very much reflects the perspective of the German government on the issue. On the one hand there is no disagreement about the fact that the U.S. is indispensable to European and global security but on the other hand the leadership of the U.S. is no longer unchallenged. To some extend, this middle position reflects the traditional German approach to strengthen European integration while continuing close cooperation with the United States. This is also supported by a broad majority of the German population. As Viola Neu recently published in a survey for the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation, 68 per cent of the persons questioned favored a continued cooperation with the U.S., but in addition wanted a stronger European role in international affairs.³

From the German perspective, the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO, especially in regard to crisis management operations according to the “Berlin Plus” arrangement is of vital importance. Therefore, the quite vague formulation of the ESS in this respect (“Acting together, the European Union and the United states can be a formidable force

for the good in the world”) is clearly the result of a compromise among the different perspectives on the further development of the ESDP in France, Germany and Great Britain.

The Use of Military Power

Military aspects are not in the foreground of the ESS concept, but still are an important and controversial aspect of it. This is probably due to the well known shortcomings in the field of military capabilities in the context of ESDP. The German government has repeatedly stressed that the use of military power could only be the last possible option and has to be in accordance with the UN Charter.

The ESS states that Europe should “develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary robust intervention”. This would be a great improvement if put into practice and would help to make ESDP more flexible and credible. The formulation “pre-emptive engagement” in the draft of June 2003 was controversially debated in the German media. It was read as something like the U.S. concept of pre-emption, which was published in the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2002. If implemented, this would mean a clear departure from traditional concepts of German foreign and security policy. The Schröder government did not show any sympathy for the concept of pre-emption when it was published by the Bush administration and argued strongly against a new interpretation of international law. Consequently, the change in the wording of the final version of ESS, from “pre-emptive engagement” to “preventive engagement” was also among the “demands” of Berlin (as was officially stated by the Foreign Ministry). The use of military power is seen as an option of last resort if all civil mechanisms have failed. Despite of these constraints, the EU wants to have the capabilities at its disposal to conduct more than one military operation at a time. In this regard, the new structure of the Bundeswehr, which is to improve the ability of Germany to deploy forces abroad, can be seen as a clear sign of support for the new tasks of the EU.

In recent years, cooperation between the armed forces of the member states and combined military operations became an ever more important aspect of German defense policy. For example, the DPG of 2003 explicitly state that Germany will only conduct military missions in collaboration with its partners except for evacuation missions. The lack of real criteria for when and where to employ military power could be seen as a deficit of the ESS, but from a German perspective it is an advantage, because it gives the federal government room to
manoeuvre in its internal and external relations. This has to be seen in context with the reluctance of the German general public to support military operations other than UN peacekeeping and the strong position of the German Bundestag within the decision-making process when it comes to force deployment. European partner countries like France and Britain show both greater willingness and ability to engage more rapidly in military action.

**What Will Be Next?**

A security strategy only makes sense if it is backed by other policy and planning documents on various strategic and operational levels. A “family of strategies” is needed that covers the different aspects of security, ranging from homeland defense to space policy. The European Strategy for non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction is a good example. Is the right step towards a more comprehensive policy to deal with the new security challenges. The European Council asked the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana, at its meeting in December 2003 to provide it with further documents on the implementation of effective multilateralism, terrorism, and policies towards the Near and Middle East and the Balkans. This could be a further step towards a broader foundation of the European Security Strategy, even though a lot of work still has to be done. Hopefully, the EU Defense White Paper, which is in the process of making, will improve the coherence of EU policy making further.

**Concluding Remarks**

Will the ESS improve the EU’s ability to act in practice? A clear ‘maybe’ has to be the answer. First, all the European partners have shown their ability and their willingness to at least reach a compromise regarding the most elementary threats and a strategic vision of how to deal with them. But if the member states are not willing or not able to cooperate on important issues in practice, like those of war and peace, the strategy will be a dead letter. The German government has managed to get several important issues, like pre-emption, to be altered in the final version of the ESS. This is a success for the policy of the Schröder government.

Imagine the ESS would have been published one or two years earlier. Would it have been helpful in the intra-European and transatlantic dispute over Iraq? No one can give a definite
answer, but due to its compromise character it is reasonable to believe that it would not have helped to any major extent. While Germany and France could have referred to the overall responsibility of the UN for world peace and the civil mechanisms to counter proliferation of WMD, as stated in the ESS, Great Britain and Spain would probably have argued according to the postulate of “early rapid and when necessary robust intervention”. It is difficult to tell who is right or wrong. Both interpretations can be read out of the document. Therefore, the recent agreement on a European Security Strategy will not be enough to make the EU a coherent international player, but it is a starting point. If the Strategy could at least induce a joint threat perception, it would be more than one could have hoped for just a few years ago.
The Next Phase of ESDP and the Key Role of the Military
A French View

By Yves Boyer

There is a deep rooted feeling in most of Europe that after the severest consequences of the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the Balkan crisis of the early 1990’s have been digested, no pressing danger faces Europe from a military standpoint anymore. Of course, terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are often mentioned as preoccupying factors. However, the former is mainly seen as an issue for police and intelligence services, while the latter appears less immediate after the unfortunate episode of the Iraq War (where no Weapons of Mass Destruction have been found) and the progressive normalization of the political relationship of the western world with Libya, Iran and, possibly, North Korea. This state of affairs explains in large part the limited financial resources currently devoted to defense spending in Europe, with the exception of a very few countries such as France or the UK.

From the perspective of threat perception, there is a widespread feeling that Europe has now entered a period of “strategic pause”. Since 1998, the European Union gave birth to its Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and created appropriate permanent military structures to carry it out. In December 2003, the Heads of State and Government approved the Union’s first European Security Strategy (ESS) to define common threats and challenges. Yet today there are pressing needs within the EU’s construction process to give flesh to the nascent common defense policy in terms of converging national military policies, doctrines and structures. Given its compromise character and general approach, it is questionable whether the ESS can in its present form contribute to this process.

The Development of ESDP

The growing interdependence within the European Economic Community, the transformation of the international scene and the strategic upheavals of the early 1990’s led to treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam which transformed qualitatively the European project into a full political project aimed at creating an unprecedented type, in historical terms, of a confederation/federation among sovereign states. In the field of security and defense both treaties defined in broad terms the scope and the purpose of the future policy. Even though the
purpose of European defense policy was already laid out in the early 1990’s, the project appeared initially deadlocked due to political and strategical divergences among member states. The real start of ESDP was actually initiated at the Franco-British summit in Saint-Malo in December 1998 which paved the way for a first cycle of European defense integration. Unfortunately, this first impetus came to an end during the Iraq crisis in 2002 and 2003. In that first phase it was acknowledged that in military affairs the EU has to acquire the capacities and the capabilities, at the strategic level, to independently assess a crisis, assess its potential military implications, to plan military operations and to execute them using European assets. These objectives were laid out in the final document of the EU’s Council meeting in Helsinki on December 10/11, 1999:

“(…) we are convinced that the Council should have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management (…). This requires a capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military capabilities and appropriate decision making bodies (…) the EU will need a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning”.

The emphasis on autonomous action led EU members towards developing appropriate political-military structures as well as military tools to fulfill the goals assigned to ESDP. In December 1999, at the Helsinki Summit of the EU, concrete objectives of ESDP were thus defined:

- to set-up a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) capable from 2003 on to be deployable sixty days after its activation, for at least a year, comprising about 60 000 troops, at a maximum distance from Brussels of 5000 km;
- the creation of permanent political-military structures aimed at providing the EU with political and strategical guidance of military operations.
The following Diagram shows how these structures operate within the framework of the European Council and the national headquarters:

European Council
\[\downarrow\]
PSC
(Political and Security Committee)
\[\downarrow\]
EU Military Committee
\[\downarrow\]
European Military Staff
\[\downarrow\]
National Headquarters at Strategic Level
CPCO (Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Opérations, Fr) / PJHQ (Permanent Joint Headquarters, UK) / EinsFüKdo (EinsatzFührungsKommando, Ger)
\[\downarrow\]
Force Headquarters (FHQ)

These new political-military structures have been tested at the occasion of two military operations so far: Concordia and Artemis. Concordia has been an EU military operation with recourse to NATO assets launched in the western part of Macedonia. In the case of Artemis, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the operation was fully controlled and managed by the Europeans alone. In the context of Artemis, it is especially remarkable that Sweden sent, for the first time, its special forces to an African conflict. Swedish policy highlights the present dilemma facing many medium sized countries in the EU. Here, strong tendencies still exist to maintain traditional defense policies which do not favor multilateral military interventions. Despite of this, in Stockholm a growing sense is felt that Sweden cannot stay out of the current developments in European Security and Defense Policy for much longer.

After the completion of the first phase of ESDP, the Europeans now have to confront difficult challenges in order to keep going the process of building a potent ESDP. It should be noticed
that what really is at stake is the development of a truly common European military policy and apparatus. To be sure, this is a process that will only lead to concrete results in the long run. However useful the new European Security Strategy may be, it does not provide adequate guidelines to develop a genuine European military policy. The wording of the ESS remains too general to lead to a convergence of the various military policies and structures. The document represents a useful exercise in the sense that the Europeans agreed on general security issues to be dealt with by the EU. Still, it is far from representing a “road map” to guide the various Ministries of Defense to define common doctrines, equipments and command structures.

**The Future Course of ESDP**

The first challenge for the Europeans is to remain able to cope with the ongoing military-technological revolution: New complex weapon systems are needed particularly in the field of intelligence, the planning of military operations and information processing. In order to reach that capability in the context of low defense spending, EU member states will have to find ways to pull together national military R&T resources. Limits on defense spending in combination with the military-technological revolution will exert significant pressure on national governments to push towards a pooling of resources and later even towards force specialization including common doctrines and operational guidance.

These efforts would have to be carried out in the context of a new cycle of deepening ESDP in the future. In the face of the complexity and the costs of future new weapon systems, there is simply no other option left to the individual EU member states. Given the very limited resources each spends on defense (18 of them spend less than 5 billion Euro on defense) most of them will no longer possess any potent military capabilities. Without the pooling of policies, structures and resources, the idea of an ESDP would become “a land of fantasy”.

European countries will also be confronted with the question of compatibility of their force posture with the United States. If Washington is moving towards the “transformation” of its military forces, what shall the Europeans’ response be? Should they, for the sake of interoperability, follow the U.S. lead when no single European nation has enough resources to develop a full “transformational” force? Would it be satisfactory to occupy only "niches" in the U.S. "system of systems"? Would it be compatible with the place and the role which the
EU wishes to play on the international stage if it remains only capable of providing forces, mainly on the ground, depending on intelligence and flows of data processed by U.S. forces? This would be a situation close to what was the status of foreign troops serving in British and French armies during the colonial period.

The central question with respect to the transformation of European military policy is not so much linked to the future characteristic of armed conflicts but to the political significance of military-technological choices. That is to say that the modern weapons systems encompass more than the function for which they have been created. They increasingly are part of a complex set of systems embodied in a “system” whose rules and parameters are centrally controlled. The authority that runs the overall system controls its subcomponents, possesses the “awareness” of a situation and thus has a total freedom of political-military manoeuvre. The system’s master can provide only bits of information to its allies and control the activities of their armed forces. Thus they are in a situation of dependency which seems unacceptable when thinking about European security. Indeed, already today EU member states have gathered enough know-how and experience with the various types of military operations (from peace-keeping to high intensity warfare) to develop a military posture within ESDP which does not need to mirror the U.S. posture but, more fundamentally, relates directly to the political and strategic needs of the EU. This includes the capacities of the EU to respond to yet unidentified threats which can bear directly or indirectly on the EU’s security and to respond to that threat in a way which corresponds to the “Culture of Warfare” which is common to Europeans. The current situation in Iraq clearly reflects how different the U.S. and Europeans envisage high intensity warfare and the fighting of a guerrilla war.

Gradually the Europeans are, either nationally or collectively, developing tools which will be of paramount importance in order to reach the goal of strategic autonomy. The domain of intelligence satellites is a case in point, where European countries will acquire some 15 reconnaissance satellites (including dual-use ones) in the next 5 years. In the area of navigation systems, the development of the Galileo satellite system will enable European forces to carry out a new range of tasks in the future - from pure navigation to the planning of long range strikes. Step by step a truly autonomous European defense policy is thus about to take shape.
Another challenge of ESDP will be to deal with the military heterogeneity throughout the European Union. The central question is how it will be possible to advance ESDP when European countries differ considerably in manpower, in defense budgets and in capabilities? While theoretically, each nation of the EU has an equal say in the development of the common European defense policy, the reality offers a different picture. In military affairs, only very few member states have the cloud to plan and execute military operations on the strategic and operational level. Most of them have so few resources that they can, at best, act at the upper level of tactical engagement but certainly not above. This situation leaves most of the burden on a very limited number of countries to develop the EU’s potency on the whole spectrum of military activities.

Because heterogeneity in the field of high tech industries, military power etc. will prevail for a certain period of time to come, the emergence of a “pioneer group” will be almost inevitable. The Brussels meeting in April 2003 of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg which among other things decided to create a strategic headquarters of the EU (this decision was watered down during later negotiations on the European level) is a foretaste of that evolution. Britain is now responding positively to move into that direction, too. Officials in London acknowledge that "structured cooperation", as it is outlined in the European draft constitution, should be possible in defense affairs. During the negotiations on the Nice Treaty in December 2000 the British government had still fiercely opposed the idea. At the September 2003 meeting between Gerhard Schröder, Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair the three leaders agreed that “[t]he European Union should be endowed with a joint capacity to plan and conduct operations without recourse to NATO resources and capabilities. Our goal remains to achieve such a planning and implementation capacity either by consensus with the 25 [members states] but also in a circle of interested partners”4.

Such cooperation would allow a group of member states to go ahead with defense initiatives without waiting for the agreement of non-participants. Such an introduction of more flexibility in European decision-making could initiate a second cycle of European defense construction. In this scenario, only few countries initially take part in the game but sooner than later the others will have incentives to join too. In the process, most member states – within the EU framework - regain their lost capacity to think strategically, to understand a

crisis strategically and if necessary to protect the collective interest of the EU with an unprecedented efficiency. This, too, greatly enhances the overall capacity of the Atlantic Alliance based on a genuine partnership with the U.S. which is not based on one-sided dependency. From a purely military perspective, it is of the greatest importance for the Europeans to maintain the cooperation with Washington. However, NATO is no longer necessarily the best vehicle for that cooperation. A multilateral body like the Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) offers, from a military point of view, better perspectives for Germany, the UK and France, the three key West European military players. In fact, MIC is the key channel for the German high command, for the French *Etat-Major des Armées* and their British equivalent to reflect on new modes of warfare and, accordingly, prepare the development of the military segment of ESDP. Within the MIC, the four countries, plus Canada and Australia, participate in joint, complex exercises involving national high command structures.

*The United States and Europe: Towards a New Military Partnership*

U.S. views on the future of warfare are strongly influenced by what is often referred to as “Network Centric Warfare”. At the core of this notion is the processing of combat intelligence and information in a revolutionary manner. These views are supposed to become the standard views in Europe, too. When technology is emphasized as the main driver of military action, it is easy to highlight the significance of an apparent gap between the two sides of the Atlantic. Indeed, Western Europe is outspent by a ratio of almost 1 to 4 in favor of the U.S. in terms of military R&D expenditure (the U.S. numbers in 2002 surpassed Germany’s entire defense budget).

West Europeans were recently urged by Washington to close the capabilities “gap” between their armed forces and those of the United States, a song as old as the Atlantic Alliance itself. At the NATO summit in Prague in November 2002, the Europeans were offered by Washington to radically transform their military posture according to “visions” elaborated by the U.S. military. These “visions” see the Atlantic Alliance as a unified strategic zone under American leadership. In Prague, technological progress replaced the former Soviet threat as a vehicle to push military integration within the Atlantic area to a magnitude never seen even during the Cold war period. That is to say that if the Europeans unconditionally follow the U.S. leadership they will occupy “niches” in the U.S. military “system of systems”.
Accordingly, they will become completely dependent on the U.S. for their defense, because the “system” is fully controlled by Washington while the Europeans would have no possibility to share part of its management.

In fact, the Europeans have the military competence and most of the technological know-how to develop high tech military systems by themselves, just as they were able to compete efficiently on world markets in civilian high tech goods. However, to be successful, they will have to invent a model of warfare “made in Europe”. This model would not only be different from the U.S. mode of warfare which over-emphasizes the role of technology. It would also be specifically tailored to the needs of the European Union with respect to the ability to autonomously identify a crisis, to plan military operations of a greater amplitude, and finally to conduct this operation. The pressure stemming from the complexity of expensive high tech weapons systems in combination with low public acceptance of higher defense spending forces European states to acquire these capacities collectively. The common development of these “enablers” will not only provide ESDP with adequate means to conduct military operations on a large scale, they will also highly facilitate the emergence of a new “grammar of warfare” made in Europe. In other words, the EU’s military strategy and capacity for planning military operations will have to be fully compatible with the nature of modern warfare as understood in Europe. This has to be done in such a way as to foster cooperation within the ESDP framework among a considerable diversity of participants: the former neutral countries, former members of the Warsaw Pact, and the “old” members of NATO.

Regarding the construction and modernization of equipment, the priorities of the Europeans should be the following:

- the acquisition of proper means of command, control and communication for giving the EU the capacity at the strategic level (development of the new HQ), the operative level (military telecommunication satellites) and the tactical level (digitalization and modernization of telecommunication systems);
- development and modernization of intelligence gathering systems with new reconnaissance satellites, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs; medium endurance) and new Elint/Commint capabilities.
Conclusion

Now that with the new permanent military structures and the emergence of a broader strategic thinking on European and international security the “architectural” phase of the ESDP has made considerable progress, European governments have to face the difficult questions concerning concrete military means and operational doctrines to fill the structures with a meaningful capacity to act. The Europeans have to invent a model of warfare “made in Europe” specifically tailored to the needs of the European Union. As compared to the U.S., such a model would probably put less emphasis on technology. On the one side, there is a necessity for the Europeans to avoid any capability gap which would render impossible the cooperation of their forces with those of the U.S.. On the other hand, a line has to be drawn between this imperative and the unacceptable political consequences of technological choices that create dependencies. The new European Security Strategy is surely a good way to improve strategic thinking in Europe. To put flesh on the bones of newly created structures and to forge a truly common European military policy, it is surely not sufficient by itself.
Britain and the European Security Strategy

By Christopher Hill

The European Security Strategy (ESS) has been given a good deal of attention by foreign policy professionals in the UK but has passed almost unnoticed even by informed public opinion. There is no doubt, however, that it has been taken seriously within the official machine, with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and even Number 10 Downing Street all seeing it as significant for the evolution of the EU’s external role.

The Strategy itself, as is well-known, went through several drafts and internal arguments. Its final version was more cautious than the first, robust document, notably in its reference to the need for ‘preventive’ rather than ‘pre-emptive engagement’. The FCO’s tradition of prudence over public statements probably meant that it was happy with this change, which distanced the Europeans from President George W. Bush’s own National Security Strategy (published in September 2002) but the Prime Minister and his advisers may have been less concerned. It should be noted that the main drafter of the ESS in Mr. Solana’s office was Robert Cooper, who used to be Tony Blair’s foreign policy adviser, and who shared with his boss a willingness to envisage a greater commitment to humanitarian intervention, or what some have called ‘liberal imperialism’. Other member states were surely far more unhappy than Britain about being associated with the American doctrine of pre-emptive defense.

Let us examine the key elements of the ESS, first in relation to British views of what the EU can and should do in the contemporary international system, and then in the context of the UK’s own, distinctive, foreign and security policies.

Conflict Prevention Is Better Than Ex-Post Intervention

This notion is now so unexceptionable as to be on a par with motherhood and apple strudel in Europe. If achievable, conflict prevention saves lives, money and political imbroglios. Only an eccentric, for example, would not think that a strategy which could have avoided conflict in the Balkans, even if it meant keeping Yugoslavia together, would not have been worth some considerable investment. Indeed, this was the EU’s strategy right from the time, in the late 1970s, when it became clear that Tito could not survive for long. Britain is now an
enthusiastic supporter of the doctrine, but the rub comes over how to achieve prevention, and how far to invest (and where) against what degree of uncertainty about possible future troubles – which may never in fact ensue. Britain has been willing to commit itself seriously to the long-term prevention measure which is EU enlargement, but this is because it coincides conveniently with the other major UK goal, of diluting the process of integration. Other issues, such as the Barcelona process, where the link to conflict prevention is more tenuous, produce much more luke-warm responses in London. Britain’s own interest is in shouldering a greater share of the cost of foreign operations, without relinquishing its own freedom of manoeuvre. It therefore judges each conflict prevention strategy on its merits, with a general presumption in favor. But support is much more likely when other motives also come into play.

Early, Rapid and Robust Intervention

Although ‘preventive engagement’ is now part of the litany of European foreign policy, the ESS’ use of the term ‘engagement’ is significant in comparison to the bland generality of conflict prevention, a strategy which reached its apotheosis in the ‘EU Programme for the prevention of Violent Conflicts’ endorsed by the Goteborg Council on June 16, 2001, but was subsequently eclipsed by events in New York three months later. The ‘war on terror’ has led the EU to reduce the element of meliorism, or idealism, in its approach to conflict. This was one of the very reasons why the ESS was produced: to adapt to new circumstances and to convince the United States that Europe was not totally mired in delusional ‘soft power’ thinking. Certainly the British saw the ESS’ original formulation of ‘pre-emptive engagement’, with its implications of military actions to forestall possible catastrophes, as having some realistic applications – Kosovo being the proof. Another phrase cut from the ESS’ first draft, was the view that ‘we should have tackled Al Qaeda much earlier’, and it is unlikely that the Prime Minister would dissent from that thought. It should not be forgotten – even if words after the event are cheap – that Tony Blair has said that had he been in power in 1994, he would have felt the need to send troops into Rwanda. He did send troops into Sierra Leone in 2000, a success which was to shape his subsequent thinking on Iraq.
Carrots and Sticks Towards Rogue States

The key paragraph in the ESS here states:

‘A number of countries have placed themselves outside the bounds of international society. Some have sought isolation; others persistently violate international norms. It is desirable that such countries should rejoin the international community, and the EU should be ready to provide assistance. Those who are unwilling to do so should understand that there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union.’

This form of expression has British fingerprints all over it. As a middle-range power the UK has come to believe in the importance of the idea of international community or society, something the U.S. (as a superpower) has been far more ambivalent about, even before the current Bush administration. And as a country itself still wholly engaged in global politics, the UK is uncomprehending of those who might seek isolation or withdrawal. It has an even longer (if not uncomplicated) history of hostility to those we now call ‘rogue states’, i.e. those who jib at the rules of the international community, usually shaped by the more powerful states like Britain. Turkey, North Korea, Egypt, Libya and Iraq have at various times been disciplined by Britain under this heading. The Third Way’s attachment to multilateralism in a globalized world strengthens the view in London that universal membership of the international community is desirable in itself and as a form of conflict prevention. This is where the EU’s soft power can prove indispensable, through mediation, bribes and training. As an example, Britain has worked recently with its European partners and with the Commission (as with the U.S.) to reward Libya for its willingness to renounce terrorism. Prime Minister Blair was characteristically the first to embrace Colonel Ghaddafi in person.

Yet the sting in the last sentence of the above paragraph, about the price to be paid for refusal to embrace multilateralism, ‘including [sic] in their relationship with the European Union’, is also typical of British views – even if, naturally, it does not apply to the United States, deemed by some of the sharper critics in Europe as the biggest rogue state of all. The UK is willing to envisage sanctions of various kinds to punish recalcitrants, and naturally thinks that
collective EU action would be most effective. On the other hand, ‘including’ represents a hint over the kind of military intervention which the EU is not yet capable of, and which many other states would be always reluctant to envisage. After a short historical reaction to the pains of decolonization, the UK is back in the habit of being willing to consider limited military actions, especially in conjunction with the United States, almost anywhere in a very expanded (i.e. including Africa and the Middle East) version of its ‘near abroad’.

Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear proliferation has come back into the center of the West’s field of vision, after decades of trusting in a combination of deterrence and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in parallel with the concern about rogue states and the growing belief that perhaps some interventions in the internal affairs of states are, after all (and contrary to Article 2[7] of the UN Charter) justifiable and necessary. This was the case well before September 11, 2001, even if the events of that day greatly accelerated the trend. Concerns about Saddam Hussein’s inherent unreliability, about North Korean hostility, and about the evident interest of states such as India and Pakistan in nuclear weapons (not to mention Israel) produced the new wave of anxiety about ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’ (WMD). A few security professionals were also concerned about a little-known group named Al Qaeda.

In Britain the New Labour government showed a surprising degree of concern about nuclear proliferation, perhaps encouraged by the United States, and took a firm line from the outset with Iraq, engaging in the Desert Fox bombing campaign of December 1998. It is therefore not surprising that the ESS should state that ‘in an era of globalization, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand’, citing ‘nuclear risks’ of various kinds in North Korea, South Asia and the Middle East. The UK was almost certainly a prime mover ensuring that such phrases were prominent in the final draft. London has always been a prime target for international terrorism, by virtue of its size, high profile, cosmopolitanism and position as a route center, even before Tony Blair decided to align British foreign policy with that of George W. Bush. The UK now has a genuinely vital interest in keeping nuclear materials out of the hands of terrorists or states which might furnish terrorists with their weapons. Yet, in this respect, it cannot protect itself alone and relies on both the International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Union for standard-setting, monitoring, and in the last resort enforcement – or rather the legitimization of enforcement by smaller groups of states.
The ESS statement builds on the work which the EU has done in encouraging peace-building in the Korean peninsula via the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), but in truth neither the EU nor its individual member states (including Britain), can expect to be able to influence trends in proliferation far from their own geographical area, where their ‘power of attraction’ is not at work.

The Need For a Mix of Policy Instruments

Until December 1998 Britain stood firmly against the idea that the EU as such should have any of the key instruments of national foreign and security policies. Since the St. Malo agreement that position has been modified, even if NATO retains its central importance and the use of its instruments (with the concomitant U.S. oversight) is seen as being far more likely than any large-scale autonomous European action. Nonetheless, Tony Blair came to the conclusion that Europe lacked credibility while it had no military teeth of its own, and also needed to reinsure against the possibility that the United States on occasion might not wish to commit its own troops to causes which Europe thought vital. This reasoning in London and other European capitals led to the ‘headline goals’ to create – among other things - a European Rapid Reaction Force of 60,000 men by 2003.

The ESS prescription of a mix of policy instruments must be understood in the context of the aforementioned commitments to both conflict prevention and a strategic culture fostering the occasional use of ‘robust intervention’. There is no general preference for the military instrument, nor indeed the political or financial capabilities to develop it significantly. Britain is absolutely at one with its partners on this point. Moreover, the one seriously neuralgic point for London in this area would be any suggestion that national military or intelligence resources should in some sense be compromised through a process of European pooling. Given the confidence in London in British skills in these areas (notwithstanding recent intelligence failures) such a move would produce uproar among the professionals themselves and among their allies in the press.

What British decision-makers are looking for, however, and which is reflected in the language of the ESS, is an acceptance that if the EU is to act seriously in foreign policy (meaning that it will command the attention of other major players) then it will need more than mere diplomacy, or the limited availability of admittedly large economic resources for political
purposes. It will need occasionally to show that it can do tough and dangerous things, and that it can act with discretion and realism. In short, that it can play power politics (when required) on more or less equal terms. The ESDP operations in the Congo (July 2003) and now in Macedonia, of which the UK is wholly approving, are meant as a demonstration of this. The same holds true for the limited but significant moves to improve coordination between European security services in the monitoring of terrorist threats across the ever-larger and freer-moving European civil space.

The Unity of Purpose and Action

The ESS makes considerable play (in Section III, headed ‘Policy Implications for Europe’) with the need for EU activities in international relations to be more coherent and decisive. In this it echoes almost all the foundational documents of European foreign policy since the Single European Act – achieving coordination is clearly an uphill struggle. Nor is this just the familiar issue of getting the member states to speak with one voice, or harnessing their capabilities to those of the Union. The issue of coordination also refers to different issue-areas and the great diversity of EU external actions: ‘the challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from member states and other instruments (…). Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda. In a crisis there is no substitute for unity of command’. Better coordination is also desirable between external action and Justice and Home Affairs.

This is one of the more loosely drafted sections of the ESS, in that it blurs together crisis and more routine conditions, and gets carried away by its own language in calling optimistically for the coordination of almost everything under the sun. British pragmatists, let alone Eurosceptics, would be quick to say that not everything needs coordinating, and that in any case there will often be tensions between the logic of EU cooperation and that of cooperation with other partners outside the EU. Nonetheless, the British government could hardly find these calls for coordination objectionable, in that they echo the language of intergovernmentalism, not integration. They also imply the primacy of politics and thus foreign policy in the EU’s international role, rather than allowing too much autonomy to the treaty-based common policies run by the European Commission. London would be perfectly happy to see, for example, EU development policy to become more subject to political strategy, both
for itself, and because that would strengthen the role of the Council. The phrase ‘unity of command’, however, seems to have slipped by the usual hawk-like British scrutineers of documents like this. It has uncomfortable resonances of the proposals to create an independent EU military planning cell, and a headquarters, which proved so controversial with the United States once the EU began to absorb the Western European Union (WEU), and which the UK accordingly also opposed. Perhaps in war-time the British would accept the need for a unified command, but just as the Americans insist on their being the means by which unity is achieved when they participate in an operation, so Britain (and France) would expect to call the shots in any significant European military commitment.

**Strategic Partnerships With Third Countries**

The ESS document states that the EU should concentrate on its relationships with a range of third countries, of which only Russia, Japan, China, Canada, and India are listed by name. This recommendation, near the end of the ESS, is redolent of decision-making by committee. Why these countries, and in particular why Canada and India? Why not also, if considering ‘pivotal’ states, Brazil, Nigeria, Indonesia, South Africa, Australia? Russia, Japan and China are states which all EU members would agree are important both to foreign policy and to foreign economic policy. But Canada and India look like additions which the British slipped in while the French were not looking and the Germans were indifferent. What, in any case, is a ‘strategic partnership’? The EU has had special dialogues and shared declarations, it is true, with the U.S., Canada and Japan, but it also enjoys ‘political dialogues’ with a very wide range of states and regional groupings. Indeed, this is a strange time for the EU to become discriminating in its diplomacy, given that hardly any other member of the international system wanting a relationship with Brussels in recent years has been turned away. Now even Colonel Ghaddafi has been received there – admittedly after Tony Blair had first blazed the trail with his visit to Tripoli.

The UK is probably willing to see ‘strategic partnerships’ develop in EU foreign relations. It is, after all, a term taken from the flabby managerial language of the Third Way. But it will not attach too much importance to the individual countries mentioned. London knows very well that the EU’s famous ‘Common Strategies’ only extended in practice to Russia, Belarus and the Mediterranean, and none of those amounted to a row of beans, so bland and abstract were they. It is not going to follow the ESS in this, or possibly any other detail. What the UK wanted, and why it took such an interest in the drafting, was to give the impression –
especially to its American audience – that the EU could finally talk the language of hard power in this age of terrorism, and that some practical measures of cooperation in the defense of the West, using the many instruments at the EU’s disposal, could be prefigured. The Security Strategy will therefore be regarded in London as a rather more serious document than most of its predecessors in the area of European foreign policy, but it still represents far more a broad statement of intent than a set of binding commitments.
Reflections in the Strategic Mirror:
The European Security Strategy and the U.S. National Security Strategy

By Esther Brimmer

At the December 2003 summit meeting, the European Council adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS). In less than a year, the EU had elaborated a strategic concept and approved it at the highest level. The document entitled, “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, outlined a distinct perspective on international affairs. The document was intended to keep the European Union in the international game of defining strategic threats and challenges. In April 2003, amid the acrimonious debate about the war in Iraq that consumed many capitals, the Council had charged High Representative Javier Solana with the task of developing the strategy. European leaders wanted to delineate a distinct perspective from which to engage the United States in a strategic dialogue.

The ESS raises many themes that can also be found in the United States National Security Strategy (NSS) published in September 2002 by the administration of George W. Bush. These similarities provide fertile ground for sowing the seeds of transatlantic security cooperation. However, even if the ESS were fully implemented, there would remain important differences between the strategic views of the U.S.-Administration and that of the European Council as detailed in the strategy document. The ESS presents a world view that places European strategy in the context of long term global trends on the basis of a broad definition of security that includes fighting poverty and disintegration. In contrast, the NSS builds on the Bush Administration’s version of a “distinctly American internationalism” that emphasizes defending against threats, while promoting economic development to sustain the international market economy.

The differences reflect strategic outlook and political climate. Published only a year after the traumatizing terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the NSS is infused with an assertive imperative to forestall attacks on the United States and its partners and to elicit good international behavior by providing increased foreign aid through the Millennium Challenge Account. The ESS was shaped by the debate on Iraq and reflects a desire to advance a strategic view that placed the campaigns against terrorism and the proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMD) in the context of shaping a world that prevents the social collapse that failed states and terrorism express.

**The Big Picture: Similarities Between the Strategies**

The ESS and NSS are remarkably similar in their analyses of threats to the European Union and United States respectively. That the EU would even use a threat based analysis is notable. Defining strategy in terms of threats is very similar to the U.S. approach that emerged in the last decade. With the end of the Cold War and no permanent enemy to counter, U.S. strategy has focused on developing capabilities for a range of potential threats. In contrast, the language of the EU’s nascent Common Foreign and Security Policy expressed the EU’s desire to combine “hard” and “soft” power to advance European policy objectives rather than an ability to counter threats.

Both documents identify the nexus between terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction as the most dangerous security threat. The ESS states: “The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorists acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction. In this event, a small group would be able to inflict damage on a scale previously possible only for states and armies”. Similarly, the NSS asserts, “[t]he gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking Weapons of Mass Destruction (…)”. The documents discuss the need for action against the spread and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction. However, neither discusses the differences between the threats posed by nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons in detail.

The ESS goes on to list not only terrorism and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction as significant threats to European security, but also regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime. The NSS also discusses the need to “diffuse regional conflicts” and makes the connection between social implosion and terrorism and the exporting of chaos noting “(…) poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders”.

However, military security alone is not the sole objective of either text. Just as the ESS’ title proclaims that the goal is “A Secure Europe in a Better World,” the NSS notes that “The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better”. The NSS bases greater
security on “building the infrastructure of democracy” by increasing aid to countries that “have met the challenge of national reform.” The ESS explains “[c]ollapse of the State can be associated with obvious threats, such as organized crime or terrorism”. The EU document sees the mix as volatile and dangerous. “Taking these different elements together—terrorism committed to maximum violence, the availability of Weapons of Mass Destruction, organized crime, the weakening of the state system and the privatization of force—we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed.”

**Context and Consequences: Differences Between the ESS and NSS**

The European Security Strategy and the National Security Strategy frame similar pictures of the world, but emphasize different themes, which could impede aspects of cooperation. They begin from different premises. The NSS is written for one country, which is the sole remaining superpower, a global hegemon. It begins from a position of strength and presents the NSS as a way to channel American power. In his cover letter introducing the NSS, President George W. Bush states that “Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence” and that the United States seeks to use its power “to create a balance of power that favors human freedom…”. In contrast, the ESS begins by noting Europe’s connections to the world and its consequent vulnerabilities. In each case, the documents are acknowledging the widely held views of relative power on either side of the Atlantic. Yet, the ESS is distinctive because it expresses the strategic outlook, not of one country, but of an entity composed of member states, but also bound by supranational elements.

While both documents are threat-based analyses, the NSS focuses its threat analysis on terrorism asserting, “[t]he enemy is terrorism—premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.” In contrast, the ESS opens with a discussion of global challenges that “have increased European dependence—and so vulnerability—on interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields”.

The Bush Administration document tends to stress hard security and military solutions, while the ESS, in tones consistent with numerous EU statements, sees the merits in soft power that combines political, economic, diplomatic as well as military assets. The EU text is explicit in this respect: “none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely
military means”. The NSS does say that the U.S. will “wage a war of ideas,” but even that phrase betrays a difference of view. Whereas Americans use the term “war” for a serious, sustained campaign of actions, Europeans tend to shun the word associating it with the devastating world wars of the 20th century.

Within the context of military action, the most controversial issues in the NSS and the ESS would be their respective analyses of preemption and conflict prevention. The National Security Strategy asserts the legitimacy of preemptive action: “The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of each enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively”. This explicit statement of the NSS which was published during the fall 2002 run-up to the war in Iraq was widely seen as the Bush Administration’s effort to make a case for preemption against Saddam Hussein.

The ESS heralds a preventive approach because, “[c]onflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.” The EU’s “preventive engagement” is a more comprehensive concept than just military preemption. The ESS places preventive engagement in the context of forestalling deterioration within countries or acting when humanitarian emergencies appear because “preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future”.

Whereas preemption focuses on decisive military action to halt or destroy a perceived physical threat, conflict prevention entails comprehensive involvement to forestall the factors that lead to an emerging threat. “Preventive engagement” is sufficiently vague to allow a range of actions from diplomatic dialogue to economic sanctions to military force, thereby accommodating EU member states that are willing to project military power and those that are officially neutral.

A challenge for the future will be figuring out whether the EU and U.S. positions on prevention and preemption can be complementary in practice even though they are not in theory. A willingness by leaders to find common ground would be crucial for bridging the gap and deploying U.S. and EU resources to forestall a threat. If a military threat were seen as a challenge to international order as well as to the United States directly, the EU and the U.S.
could agree on preventive action involving military force. In 1999, the U.S. and its NATO allies agreed to use force in Kosovo to stop an on-going humanitarian disaster. From that point, it would be a big, but not insurmountable step to advocate U.S.-European action before the next humanitarian crisis erupts. In a sense trying to bridge the gap between prevention and preemption would be resuming the policy debate raised by Kosovo and other complex emergencies in the 1990s. However, the lingering acrimony over Iraq means that it is unlikely that the current office holders could (or even would want to) resume that debate about the preventive use of force in support of international order. Moreover, for the United States there will always be an issue of when to engage Europeans through NATO, via the EU or on an ad hoc basis, making NATO-EU relations a continuing transatlantic issue.

Looking beyond the military issues, the NSS is implicitly quite pessimistic. It draws a negative picture of traditional foreign aid, “[d]ecades of massive development assistance have failed to spur economic growth in the poorest countries”. Instead it touts the Millennium Challenge Account and rewarding countries that have already reformed. “The Millennium Challenge Account will reward countries that have demonstrated real policy change and challenge those that have not to implement reforms”. Thus, the MCA would provide aid after a country has changed rather than assistance to help the country reach the goal. The EU also connects the internal management of states to their external impact arguing that if a country cannot handle the inevitable social disputes equitably and peacefully, it will export crises in the form of refugees and violence, often engendering regional instability. The EU strategy document comments: “The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states”. For the EU, foreign aid helps to shape a better world - not only to reward the righteous.

**Prospects for Transatlantic Cooperation**

Both documents naturally lend themselves to being foundations for concerted action. Both are activist in tone. The ESS looks beyond member states’ territory to see that “[w]ith these new threats, the first line of defense will often be abroad”, while the NSS comments, “[i]n the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action”. Even though the NSS does allow for unilateral preemptive action it also calls for cooperation with allies, partners, and key states on regional and global issues.
Areas of U.S.-EU strategic cooperation should include combating the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, constraining terrorism, providing aid to the few states that they can agree are failing, and providing development assistance to foster good governance and respect for human rights among recipient countries.

Yet even on WMD there are important differences. The Bush Administration focuses on constraining rogue states, whereas the EU advocates adherence to international regimes to govern state behavior. Neither document explains that the threats from nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons need to be treated differently. For example, human beings are the prime vectors of disease making the movement of people a factor in countering bioterrorism. This feature is different from chemical weapons, which are usually localized, but whose affects may be spread by wind and weather. Preventing different types of WMD attacks may require a menu of resources that exacerbate the dissimilar aspects of the U.S. and EU approaches to hard and soft power. Sometimes more soft power may be needed; other times more hard power is needed. For example, hard power might be necessary to maintain the nuclear balance, whereas soft power influence might be more useful when working with the public to enhance biosecurity.

Furthermore, the U.S. and EU disagree on the importance of the United Nations. The EU grounds its action in “effective multilateralism.” In its Security Strategy, the EU places greater emphasis on working with the UN than does the Bush Administration document.

The European Security Strategy and the National Security Strategy agree on a threats-based analysis and on what the major threats are; both highlight the danger of Weapons of Mass Destruction harnessed to terrorism. However, the documents diverge in emphasis. These cleavages differentiate the Bush Administration’s view not only from the European view, but also from that of many Americans. A change of political party in the White House would soften—but not eliminate—the policy differences, change the tone, and reduce the preeminence of preemption doctrine. In the near term, the most fruitful ways to build on the ESS and the NSS would be to focus on specific and practical measures to curtail WMD and to promote law enforcement cooperation in the anti-terrorism campaign.

There is significant scope for complementary action based on the ESS and NSS. However, we only can build on the ESS if EU member states implement the policies presented in the
Therefore, a basic practical step would be for the EU members to implement their existing plans. Indeed at the March 2004 summit, the European Council called on its member governments to enact the national legislation necessary to activate the EU arrest warrant and other measures agreed after September 11, 2001. The Council understood that after the March 11 Madrid bombings the sense of urgency has grown and a threat-based analysis has become all the more relevant.\(^5\)

\(^5\) Draft Presidency Conclusions of the European Council on March 25-26, 2004,
II: Book Reviews


Reviewed by Antje Wiener

This edited volume brings together a group of scholars who all share the educational experience at the Chair of International Relations and Foreign Policy of Professor Hanns W. Maull at the University of Trier, Germany, working in the auspices of the Research Project on Comparative Foreign Policy in Europe (PAFE, 1999-2001). The volume literally provides insight into the procedures involved in studying foreign policy in a comparative perspective including the preparation of the field work, the questionnaires, and the rationale for applying both positivist and constructivist research methods (Introduction and Chapters 1 and 2). The book thus presents the rare opportunity for students to obtain a detailed report of how to set up, manage and design a research project. This feature makes it particularly relevant for the classroom both in undergraduate and graduate courses. The authors take an approach they call ‘moderate constructivist’ and ‘more sociological-holistic than methodologically individualistic’ (p. 3). This mixed approach offers a ‘heuristic’ take on foreign policy dubbed ‘configuratively disciplined’ by the authors (p. 3). It translates into a twofold research design including a descriptive comparative analysis of state foreign policy behaviour in Part I, and discursive studies on societally generated motivations for such behaviour in Part II of the volume (p. 14). The comparison is conducted with a focus on the two policy sectors of European and security policy, respectively.

This dual approach is based on the twofold hypothesis that first, successful European foreign policy depends on the convergence of member states’ interests and second, foreign policy behavior is an indicator for societal readiness [“innere Bereitschaft”] to participate in the process of Europeanizing foreign policy (p. 2). Methodologically, the authors conceptualize ‘domestic readiness’ as ‘identity’ and seek to establish national identities based on the analysis of historical discourses on foreign policy (p. 2). Accordingly, in Part I all chapters conduct stock-taking based on a positivist approach with a focus on each state’s foreign policy behavior. In turn, in Part 2 all chapters follow a constructivist research design which is interested in identifying motivation (not causes) as a basis for privileging some types of
particular foreign policy behavior over others (p. 4). This motivation, it is held, is generated on the societal level of states. The assumption is that national identity is coined by discourse which, in turn, informs state behavior (p. 4). The case studies involve Denmark, Germany, France, Greece, Italy and the Netherlands, all of which have held European Union member state status for twenty years or more.

In addition to the empirical research on comparative foreign policy, the volume makes a point of aspiring to contribute to theory-building and empirically derived knowledge based on a ‘heuristic’ approach. The theoretical contribution unfolds along three issues including first, application and revival of European comparative foreign policy research, second, presentation of a theoretical concept for foreign policy analysis which establishes a relation between national identity, discourse analysis and foreign policy behavior, and third, inductively hermeneutic establishment of national identities (p. 5). The entire volume is presented as developing a ‘pre-study’ [“Vorstudie”] (p. 5) without, however, providing any further detail regarding a full-blown study to which it is intended as precursor.

The volume offers impressive insight into project planning and design; including the pre-research stages of project meetings, bibliographical research, project planning presentation within a larger framework of researchers and experts, establishment of an international advisory board; including an extended annex with interview questionnaires and questions (p. 6). All these factors sustain a remarkable clarity of approach, research interest and goal. The book therefore comes as a most valuable addition to a relatively limited choice of literature on EU foreign policy. The outstanding achievement lies not only in the transparency but also in the consistency of comparison offered by the all pervasive methodological approach to all case studies. Nonetheless the reference to existing literature could have been more inclusive (a shared pitfall of foreign policy writings which often appear to work with the assumption of being singular in their own approach) if to engage in critical dialogue with other evolving projects. E.g. work developed in the auspices of a generation of Gunther Hellmann’s group at the University of Frankfurt/Main, Harald Mueller’s group at the Hesse Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, Thomas Risse’s group when at the University Institute in Florence, and Knud Erik Jørgensen’s group in Århus, among others, all of which are grappling with degrees and types of constructivist foreign policy analysis including pragmatist, normative, liberal and critical foreign policy analysis, could have received more detailed attention.
The volume applies the concept of ‘discourse’ as a core analytical category which ultimately has the potential to reveal the motivation for foreign policy decisions. Accordingly, it is stated that ‘discourse is so important for our research design because it entails the interrelation between national identity and concrete behavioral standards and legitimation for a particular foreign policy’ (p. 4, see also p. 14; translations by A.W.). Despite this strong emphasis on discourse, the volume’s conceptualization of ‘discourse’ as well as the operationalization and application in the empirical research remain subject to further precision. For example, the case studies writ-large lack the documented reference to specific discourses. In its stead, the case studies offer summarized points of view that build on secondary literature which is then summarized and presented as discourse, as the main case material. While this may be due to the volume’s explicit qualification as a ‘pre-study’, this somewhat thin and inconsequent application of a central constructivist research category is likely to leave the reader unconvinced. Moreover, the case material on which the discourse analysis draws remains usually restricted to a limited number of secondary sources at that. The German case study may serve as one example to sustain this observation. It states that “[T]he discursive structure was … marked by a broad circle of participants. Next to members of government and leading party politicians, the public participated in the discourse based on marches and citizen movements mediated by churches and the media.” (p. 354; emphasis added A.W.). At this point the boundaries between analytical category and research object are blurred. The analytical category of ‘discourse’ as a narrative or a text that is generated through the input of a variety of factors, on the one hand, and the research object of societal actors who contribute to the generation of such a discourse by participating in a variety of interactive practices e.g. dialogues or conversations, on the other, are both considered on the same – phenomenological – level of discourse as conversation. A second example further illustrates this analytical irregularity, where it is stated that ‘[T]he allocation of particular parties to the respective patterns and elements of identity is difficult to accomplish as the substantive inconsistencies were generally located across party lines.’ (p. 354). This observation sustains insights gained by other constructivist research on identity formation (Marcussen et al. 1999) or legitimacy (Jachtenfuchs et al. 1997) in the EU which have been conducted prior to the project documented by this volume. It is hence not surprising. What is somewhat surprising however, is that despite the lack of party-specific argumentative patterns stated earlier, the general analysis continues to refer to just such selected party-specific statements.
In sum, the concluding Chapter 9 offers a reference to ‘discourse’ that is considerably tuned down compared to the analytical aspirations laid out in the introductory chapter. The observation that the case studies included in the project ‘mainly work with available secondary literature and are therefore no more (and no less) than focused reconstructions of foreign policy crises’ (p. 368) comes as a rather revealing statement. While this is, no doubt, a legitimate research goal, it does add a sobering touch to the rather ambitious aims laid out in the introductory chapter’s twofold hypothesis. In light of the consistent absence of discursive case material throughout the book, the observation that ‘the discourses capture important, if not the most important, periods of foreign policy identity construction of west European states’ (p. 368) again leaves the reader wondering which concept of ‘discourse’ the authors apply. Indeed, the reference to the concept of ‘discourse’ where truncated discourses are revealed at best undermines the volume’s quite meticulous and analytically ambitious introduction and hence its overall message. In the end, the volume’s case study section does no more (and no less) than a carefully conducted comparative analysis of foreign policy behavior based on societally generated positions on foreign policy. Thus far, it coincides with and elaborates on the liberal intergovernmentalist plea for linking societal preference formation with governmental decision making. The volume’s overall message, however, does aim much farther both in analytical and in empirical terms. This message might have gained more persuasive weight if expressed in the concluding part of the book as a hypothesis generated by the book’s ‘pre-study’, and laying the ground for a much more detailed and less truncated discursive analysis which would stand up to the authors’ ambitious goal of linking comparative behavioral analysis with in-depth discursive analysis to understand and explain changing foreign policy decision-making in Europe. Despite these perhaps expected pitfalls of a pre-study framed in an ambitious and rigorous theoretical approach, the volume does offer a very rare and much needed addition to textbooks on foreign policy analysis. The authors are to be congratulated for the concise and transparent demonstration of case study design and theoretical choices. The book is highly recommended for classroom use in particular. It will be interesting to see the authors’ conducting the consecutive proper study following the pre-study documented in this volume.
III. Online and Offline Resources related to the documents

This section contains the relevant documents which our authors refer to in their respective contributions. We do not claim to give a full compilation of all relevant sources on the issue at hand.

1. General


2. Links to Relevant Actors on the Internet

European Institute For Security Studies (ISS) http://www.iss-eu.org/

Foreign Commonwealth Office http://www.fco.gov.uk

German Foreign Office http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/

German Ministry of Defense http://www.bmvg.de/

British Ministry of Defence http://www.mod.uk
3. Selected New Publications on German Foreign Policy


IV. About the Authors

Yves Boyer is Deputy Director of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris, and Associate Professor at the French Army Academy.

Esther Brimmer is Deputy Director and Director of Research at the Centre for Transatlantic Relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University and a DAAD fellow at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS) in Washington.

Christopher Hill is Professor at the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Jan C. Irlenkaeuser is Research Fellow at the Institute for Security Policy at the University of Kiel (ISUK).

Marco Overhaus is Research Fellow and Project Manager at the Chair for German Foreign Policy and International Relations at the University of Trier.

Antje Wiener is Professor of International Relations at the School of Politics and International Studies at Queen’s University, Belfast.