

## **Understanding the Atlanticist–Europeanist Divide in the CFSP: Comparing Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands\***

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### **I Introduction: ‘Puzzles’ of Foreign Policy Analysis in Europe**

The emergence of an EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the 1990s was met both with surprise and disdain. Some critics doubted that the CFSP could ever result in more than the European Political Cooperation (EPC) had achieved in the 1970s and 1980s. Others praised the CFSP as the frontrunner of a more coherent, stringent and effective European foreign policy still to come. Since the EPC as well as the newly inaugurated CFSP grappled with various crises – of which the worst have been the Yugoslavian wars – and the institutional innovations of the Amsterdam treaty remained cautious, most analysts were taken by surprise when the European defence efforts took off after the St Malo summit in December 1998. However, scepticism still prevailed concerning the sustainability of these efforts and their possible spill-over for the CFSP in general. After the events of 11 September 2001, some analysts already observed a renationalization of European security policies.<sup>1</sup> Two years later, the complete split and paralysis of the EU in the Iraq crisis demonstrated to many that the so-called *Common Foreign and Security Policy* is in shambles.

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<sup>1</sup> S. Duke, ‘CESDP and the EU Response to 11 September: Identifying the Weakest Link’ (2002) 7 EFA Rev, p. 169.

When addressing the problem of success and failure of the CFSP analytically, reference is usually made to the different European policies of EU Member States in general.<sup>2</sup> Hence, the convergence of their security policies, most visible in regard to the drafting of a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP), did not necessarily mean a substantial change of attitudes towards the CFSP in general. By and large, literature on the CFSP has identified three camps which adequately reflect the different Member State positions: Atlanticists, Europeanists and Neutrals. The latter will be omitted in the following analysis for practicability reasons only.<sup>3</sup> The difference between the Atlanticist and the Europeanist camp can easily be traced back to the 1980s<sup>4</sup> and has proven its persistence in the recent Iraq crisis and its aftermath: just after the victory of the Anglo-American forces, a 'Tervuren group' consisting of France, Belgium, Germany and Luxemburg pleaded for an autonomous European headquarter outside the NATO framework.

In the critics' view, the Member States are not yet able to make the CFSP as well as the CESDP a real success,<sup>5</sup> not least because they doubt that a common European security policy could work in the assumed absence of a common European *identity*. At this point, the question arises what an analytical approach which utilizes the concepts and methodological tools provided by identity theory can tell us about the substance of the Atlanticist–Europeanist divide: are there sufficient overlaps of the different national identity constructions in EU Member States to make a common foreign and security policy possible? Or, put another way, how substantial is the Atlanticist–Europeanist divide?

Besides seeking to provide a preliminary answer to this main question, this article also has a modest theoretical and methodological ambition in that it seeks to construct a workable approach in order to 'know a national identity if we see one' and to employ techniques to be able to complement traditional (positivist) analysis of foreign policy behaviour with a (constructivist) identity approach.

In the first part we will précis the empirical puzzle by systematically comparing the foreign policies of four countries (France, Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands, section II). We introduce some criteria in order to

<sup>2</sup> B. White, 'European Challenge to Foreign Policy Analysis' (1999) 5/1 *European Journal of International Relations*, p. 43.

<sup>3</sup> The recent irritations about the final wording of the Convention's articles on a mutual defence clause have revealed the importance of this group which basically consists of Austria, Ireland and Sweden. See 'EU still divided on plan for mutual defense pact', IHT (9 December 2003).

<sup>4</sup> B. White, *Understanding European Foreign Policy* (Palgrave, Houndsmill, 2001), p. 147.

<sup>5</sup> For example, J. Lindley-French, 'In the shade of Locarno? Why European defence is failing' (2002) 78/4 *International Affairs*, pp. 789–812.

‘measure’ behaviour. The result of this structured comparison serves as a reference point for the subsequent study. Section III contains our studies of historical discourses in the EU Member States under study which allow for the identification of the content of different national identity constructions. Furthermore, we relate our identity-oriented discourse analyses to the behaviour of the chosen EU Member States regarding the CFSP. We conclude with a brief outlook for the future of the CFSP.

It is important to note, however, that this article does not deal with the *effectiveness* of the CFSP. In other words, our aim is to explore as a pre-study whether the EU can acquire ‘actorness’ in security policy at all,<sup>6</sup> not whether it can do so successfully with regard to policy outcomes. Thus, we assume that the Atlanticist–Europeanist divide is not a big EU Member State issue only. Neither can we provide in-depth analyses for *all* current EU Member States. We have excluded the United Kingdom in our study since its course in foreign policy issues with regard to the CFSP has been examined intensively and its sustainability carefully addressed.<sup>7</sup> The four countries under study may be countries which are of some importance for the coherence of the CFSP, considering not only their resources (France, Germany) but also their reputation and record of out-of-area missions (Netherlands, Denmark).

## II Comparative Analysis of European Foreign and Security Policy: Atlanticists and Europeanists

In the following we proceed with a sketchy comparative analysis of French, German, Dutch and Danish security policies. It is important to note that, in contrast to the subsequent analysis of identity constructions, this behavioural analysis is ‘traditional’ in that it treats the state as unitary actor and does not problematize any causes, reasons or motives for the observed foreign policy behaviour. Inspired by Zartman’s taxonomy for behaviour in negotiations<sup>8</sup> we attempt to keep the description as short as possible. The four chosen heuristic criteria should suffice to classify the Member States’ foreign and security policy. In order to guarantee a valid measure of comparability the following analytical criteria are employed:

<sup>6</sup> C. Bretherton and J. Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor* (Routledge, London, 1999), pp. 233–236.

<sup>7</sup> S. Biscop, ‘The UK’s Change of Course: A New Chance for the ESDI’ (1999) 4 EFA Rev, pp. 253–268; J. Howorth, ‘Britain, NATO and CESDP: Fixed Strategy, Changing Tactics’ (2000) 5 EFA Rev, pp. 377–396.

<sup>8</sup> W.I. Zartman (ed.), *International Multilateral Negotiation. Approaches to the Management of Complexity* (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1994), p. 5.

- Preferred partner countries.
- Preferred type of cooperation in security policy.
- Positions on the development of a CESDP. This criterion is assessed according to the following categories of behaviour: ‘promoter’ signifies particular and unconditional support for progress in the strengthening of the CESDP. If support is less marked by own efforts and initiatives but still clearly visible, we speak of a ‘supporter’ of the CESDP. ‘Passive compliers’ are those states which show a neither supportive nor obstructive behaviour, while ‘reluctant followers’ are those which have aided CESDP strengthening but have at least occasionally resisted further steps of progress. Finally, ‘obstructor’ signifies active resistance against a further deepening of the CESDP.
- Position on the Anglo-American policy concerning Iraq (2003). Here, we refer to the most recent crisis in world politics. The position of the USA and the United Kingdom will be taken as given since our focus is on how the countries under study behaved vis-à-vis these two nations. Again, the same categories of behaviour apply as introduced above.

### 1. Preferred Partner Countries

In security policy, France and Germany, whose bilateral relations with regard to EU policy are highly institutionalized but have for long only marginally encompassed security issues, strengthened their cooperation during the last two decades. Recently, France – though from a rather reserved position – even intensified its security cooperation with the USA and the United Kingdom,<sup>9</sup> whereas Germany generally maintained close relations with the USA in security policy.<sup>10</sup> The Netherlands and Denmark also traditionally oriented their security policy towards the USA and the United Kingdom.<sup>11</sup> While the Netherlands also intensified its cooperation with Germany in recent years (e.g. by means of the German-Dutch Corps), Denmark, which still clings to its Atlanticist orientation, oriented its security policy towards the Baltic Sea region after the end of the Cold War.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>9</sup> J. Howorth, ‘Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative’ (2000) 42/2 *Survival*, pp. 33–54.

<sup>10</sup> H.W. Maull, ‘Germany and the Use of Force: Still a “Civilian Power”?’ (2000) 42/2 *Survival*, pp. 56–80 at p. 69 et seq.

<sup>11</sup> J.J.C. Voorhoeve, *Peace, Profits and Principles: A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy* (Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1979), pp. 145–150; T. von Handel, *Die dänische Ostpolitik in bezug auf die baltischen Republiken und die russische Föderation* (Philosophische Fakultät. Kiel, Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel, 1997), p. 24.

<sup>12</sup> Udenrigsministeriet, *Principper og perspektiver i dansk udenrigspolitik* (Kopenhagen, 1993).

## 2. Preferred Type of Cooperation in Security Policy

French security policy is generally characterized by a preference for the WEU and the EU as frameworks for security and defence cooperation, while the Netherlands and Denmark have pursued a clearly NATO-oriented security policy. Whereas Denmark still holds on to this policy and thus stands aside of military cooperation within the EU,<sup>13</sup> the Netherlands recently made certain compromises between NATO and the EU.<sup>14</sup> Germany, whose security policy had been clearly transatlantic during the cold war, has turned more European since unification, in particular in the wake of the wars in the former Yugoslavia.<sup>15</sup>

## 3. Positions on the CESDP

After France had come to support the establishment of the CFSP, it can be regarded as the decisive promoter of the CESDP. Since the CESDP emerged as a late consequence of the Maastricht treaty, Germany supported it. Yet it was only together with France that it became a promoter during its Presidency over the European Council in the running-up to the Nice summit in 1999.<sup>16</sup> The Netherlands – although a promoter of the WEU – was very sceptical about the CESDP for a long time but did not actively obstruct it. Since about 1994, a gradual increase in Dutch support for the CESDP can be noticed. This was proved during the negotiations on the Amsterdam Treaty, in the course of which the Netherlands also changed its attitude concerning the integration of the WEU into the EU framework.<sup>17</sup> Denmark, which was an obstructor at the time of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, thereafter only reluctantly fell in line with the development of the CESDP, which is also covered by the ‘opt-out’ sections that were passed as a result of the Maastricht referendum. Up to the present, Copenhagen does not take part in any military cooperation with a view to the development of the CESDP.<sup>18</sup> It strongly disagreed with

<sup>13</sup> H. Larsen, ‘Denmark and the European Defense Dimension in the Post-Cold War Period: Opt-out or Participation?’ in B. Heurlin and H. Mouritzen (eds), *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2000* (DUPI, Copenhagen, 2000), pp. 87–120 at p. 113.

<sup>14</sup> K. Homann, ‘A Dutch Hope: Towards a Greater Coherence’ in G. Bonvicini, T. Vaahtoranta and W. Wessels (eds), *The Northern EU: National Views on the Emerging Security Dimension* (Kauhana, Helsinki, 2000), pp. 183–193.

<sup>15</sup> Maull, note 10 above, p. 73.

<sup>16</sup> U. Schmalz, ‘German Ambitions and Ambiguities: EU Initiatives as a Useful Framework’ in G. Bonvicini, T. Vaahtoranta and W. Wessels (eds), note 14 above, pp. 216–236 at p. 228.

<sup>17</sup> M. Kwast-van Duursen, ‘The Dutch Debate: A Shifting Policy on Europe’ in A.C.-G. Stubb, L. Cohen-Tanugi, S. Fagiolo and M. Kwast-van Duursen (eds), *The 1996 IGC-National Debates* (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1996), pp.46–60 at pp. 53–55.

<sup>18</sup> Larsen, note 13 above.

the plans of the Tervuren group and disliked the NATO blockade by Belgium, France and Germany.<sup>19</sup>

#### 4. *Position on the Anglo-American Policy Concerning Iraq (2003)*

When the negotiations in the UN Security Council intensified in early 2003, the mainstream position in the EU – of course the United Kingdom notwithstanding – was to avoid a clear positioning. The only exception was Germany which had adopted a very outspoken anti-war stance as early as September 2002. Since Chancellor Schröder had ruled out any participation in military action against Iraq even in the case of a UN mandate, Germany – though a member of the Security Council at that time – found itself completely marginalized in the following negotiations.

Yet all Member States had welcomed resolution 1441 and the EU initially spoke with one voice when demanding that another council resolution would be necessary for going to war. Denmark avoided any clear position but insisted that the UN inspectors were to have free access to Iraq and Saddam needed to fully comply with resolution 1441.<sup>20</sup> But when war became more and more likely and the Security Council could not agree on a new resolution, the Danish government jettisoned its hesitating position and declared its firm support for the Anglo-American policy. It signed the ‘letter of the eight’, demanded an ultimate deadline for the UN inspections, and even joined the ‘coalition of the willing’ in military terms:<sup>21</sup> a submarine and a destroyer with a total of 160 troops were sent to the Persian Gulf and 510 troops were deployed in Iraq to take part in the protection force.

The Netherlands has been more prudent than Denmark in its support of the Anglo-American proposal. Though it did not sign the famous letter, its political support for the war against Iraq was declared. Yet this did not mean any military engagement in the ‘hot’ conflict.<sup>22</sup> However, in June 2003, The Hague took part in the stabilization force with 1100 troops.

The most prominent position was undoubtedly held by France. After her pro-active drafting of resolution 1441, France grew more and more sceptical

<sup>19</sup> ‘PM delivers blunt message on European defence’, *Copenhagen Post*, 25 March 2003; ‘Danish politicians at odds over NATO split’, *Copenhagen Post*, 10 February 2003, <[www.cphpost.dk](http://www.cphpost.dk)> [14 February 2004].

<sup>20</sup> See Press stakeout with Danish Prime Minister Anders Rasmussen, Federal News Service, 25 March 2002, *Iraq Watch Bulletin* <[www.iraqwatch.org/government/Denmark/denmark-rasmussen-032502.htm](http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/Denmark/denmark-rasmussen-032502.htm)> [14 January 2004].

<sup>21</sup> See ‘Politicians react to Blix report’, *Copenhagen Post*, 10 March 2003, ‘It’s now official – we’re at war’, *Copenhagen Post*, 28 March 2003, <[www.cphpost.dk](http://www.cphpost.dk)> [14 January 2004].

<sup>22</sup> Brief statement by Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende following the start of the armed conflict in Iraq, 20 March 2003, <[www.regering.nl/Images/42\\_14867.pdf](http://www.regering.nl/Images/42_14867.pdf)> [8 February 2004].

towards an ultimatum to Saddam which was so strongly desired in Washington and London. Instead, the French argued the UN should extend its inspections in order to find the alleged weapons of mass destruction. When the USA, Britain and Spain pushed for a new resolution, France organized a counter-coalition in the Security Council comprising China, Russia and Germany. French impact on the negotiations reached its peak when foreign minister Dominique de Villepin rhetorically outperformed his counterpart Colin Powell in the Security Council and received unprecedented applause from the audience. Eventually, President Chirac announced his veto under all circumstances and blocked all Anglo-American efforts to gain a majority in the Council.

### 5. Summary

In short, the Member States' security policies might be sketched like this:

*Table 1. Conspicuous patterns of security policy*

	Netherlands	Denmark	Germany	France
preferred partners	UK, USA, (Germany)	Nordic states, USA, UK	France, USA	Germany
preferred security cooperation (general)	NATO, WEU/EU membership	NATO, WEU observer, opt-out for hard security issues in EU	NATO, WEU, EU	WEU, EU does not participate in the military part of NATO
position on the CESDP	from reluctant follower to supporter	from obstructor to reluctant follower (due to opt-out)	promoter	promoter
position on Iraq	passive complier	supporter	obstructor	reluctant follower to obstructor

The sketchy analysis reveals the usefulness of the traditional taxonomy 'Atlanticist' and 'Europeanist'. Indeed, from a behavioural point of view, Denmark clearly belongs to the Atlanticist camp whereas the Dutch position can be characterized by 'the weakening pull of Atlanticism'.<sup>23</sup> Germany's former

<sup>23</sup> A. Pijpers, 'The Netherlands: The Weakening Pull of Atlanticism' in C. Hill (ed.), *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy* (Routledge, London, 1996), pp. 247–267 at p. 251.

*Sowohl-als-auch-approach* seems to have faded away and been substituted by a more European stance – in particular when we take into account its obstructive position in the Iraq affair. The French Europeanist position by and large remains rather critical vis-à-vis the USA.

Beyond the rather crude Europeanist–Atlanticist taxonomy, the specific behavioural patterns of the four examined states appear to be idiosyncratic to some extent: the Danish example suggests at first sight that a preference for NATO in security policy is incompatible with the acceptance of, and integration in, a European scheme of defence cooperation. However, the Dutch example proves that this need not be the case.<sup>24</sup>

Despite a good amount of observable continuity, there also was considerable change in some instances. In security policy, there is a general trend towards more Europeanism with the notable exception of Denmark. German foreign policy has undergone the most drastic change which demands explanation. In order to better understand these patterns let us turn to an identity approach.

### III Towards an Empirical Analysis of National Identity through Discourse Analysis

Scientific interest in concepts which have so far been taken as given by both IR theory and foreign policy analysis has been a major thrust of the constructivist research programme. One of these concepts is ‘identity’, broadly defined as ‘images of individuality and distinctiveness (“selfhood”)’ held and projected by an actor and formed (and modified over time) through relations with significant ‘others’.<sup>25</sup>

The construction of identity, as well as its invocation in justification of policies, is essentially a phenomenon which involves human communication, hence language. Many constructivists have therefore stressed the importance of discourse analysis for the study of identity and its impact on foreign

<sup>24</sup> This finding corresponds to a large extent with that of Ben Tonra in his monographic study of Dutch, Danish and Irish policies with regard to the CFSP in which he concludes that ‘each state did indeed bring a unique set of ideological baggage with it to the common European Foreign and Security Policy table’; B. Tonra, *The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union* (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2001), p. 279. Similarly, some of the contributors to Ian Manners’s and Richard Whitman’s edited volume on the foreign and European policies of all current EU Member States except Luxembourg reach similar conclusions; I. Manners and R.G. Whitman (eds), *The Foreign Policy of EU Member States* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2000).

<sup>25</sup> R. Jepperson, A. Wendt and P.J. Katzenstein, ‘Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security’ in P.J. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1996), pp. 33–75 at p. 59.

policies.<sup>26</sup> A useful approach to the study of identity constructions by means of discourse analysis has been elaborated by the so-called Copenhagen School in a recent work on national identity and the European policy of the Nordic states.<sup>27</sup> As Lene Hansen states, discourse analysis with a view to identity constructions is concerned with justification of foreign policy rather than its causation.<sup>28</sup> In the conceptualization of the Copenhagen School, identity provides the deepest discursive layer on which argumentative legitimizations of foreign policy are based. Thus, its effect on policy is that of a constitutive frame of reference for discourses about foreign policy, providing argumentative resources for legitimizations of foreign policy. Consequently, if one takes Wendt's distinction between causal and constitutive analysis into consideration, discourse analysis with a view to identity constructions falls mainly into the latter category.<sup>29</sup>

Discourse analysis serves two purposes in research on the connection between identity and foreign policy. First, it is a necessary tool to determine the substantial content of social constructions of identity in terms of 'wenness' and its demarcation from 'the other', shared values and behavioural dispositions of a collectivity which holds such a collective construction of identity. Since deductive operationalizations of identity are not feasible, such an inductive substantial identification of the content of identity constructions is a necessary first step in analysing the connection between identity and foreign policy. Second, however, in the longer run of identity-related analysis, discourse analysis sheds light on exactly this connection; whereas identity is a concept of constitutive rather than causal theorizing, discourse analysis at least can show which argumentations, based on specific interpretations of identity elements, were finally successful in legitimizing foreign policy.

Our theoretical and methodological framework has been developed in depth elsewhere.<sup>30</sup> Here it suffices to say that a nation holds only one 'national' identity but that this identity comprises a variety of different facets which, for convenience, we call 'identity elements'. These identity elements are 'ultimate arguments' in the discourses – arguments which are not challenged any more since they are consensual. Not all such identity elements are necessarily

<sup>26</sup> O. Wæver, 'Identity, communities and foreign policy: Discourse analysis as foreign policy theory' in L. Hansen and O. Wæver (eds), *European Integration and National Identities: The Challenge of the Nordic States* (Routledge, London and New York, 2002), pp. 20–49.

<sup>27</sup> L. Hansen and O. Wæver (eds), *ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> L. Hansen, 'Introduction' in L. Hansen and O. Wæver (eds), note 26 above, pp. 1–19 at p. 8.

<sup>29</sup> A. Wendt, *Social Theory of Foreign Policy* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999), p. 77.

<sup>30</sup> B. Joerissen and B. Stahl, *Europäische Außenpolitik und nationale Identität. Vergleichende Diskurs- und Verhaltensstudien zu Dänemark, Deutschland, Frankreich, Griechenland, Italien und den Niederlanden* (LIT Verlag, Münster et al., 2003).

relevant in all policy contexts and issue areas. Yet our assumption is that the most important identity elements could be identified in intense domestic debates on security issues. Most interestingly, the subjects and occasions of such debates vary from country to country – in itself a strong argument in favour of identity theory. When identity elements and argumentative patterns are discursively linked to recommendations for action and become stable over time, we speak of ‘discursive formations’.

Let us now turn to selected historical discourses that reveal identity elements and discursive formations.

### *1. Denmark: Free on the Atlantic, Bound to Europe*

*a) Identity: from the accession to NATO (1949) to Maastricht (1992/93).* When the Danes rejected the Maastricht treaty in June 1992, they said no to further integration in the field of a CFSP. The opt-out for security and defence issues which was negotiated thereafter at the Edinburgh summit revealed the failure of Danish identity reconstruction and up to now ties the hands of Danish governments in strongly limiting the scope and ambitions of its foreign policy. Consequently, in order to comprehend the identity construction which had been re-affirmed by the outcome of the Maastricht debate, we need to look back to Denmark’s last successful identity reformation in security affairs: the accession to NATO in the late 1940s.

After World War II, Denmark found itself at a critical juncture with a view to its future foreign and security policy. The turning point in an intensive debate which lasted from 1945 to 1949 occurred in Spring 1948 when the so-called ‘Easter crisis’ (most importantly the events in Czechoslovakia, but also the conclusion of the Soviet-Finnish Treaty of Friendship shortly thereafter) destroyed all prospects of collective security within the UN framework. An important shift occurred as to the dominant discursive formation. For decades, the dominant argumentative pattern had been that little Denmark had better ‘lie low’<sup>31</sup> and conduct a policy of accommodation to the great powers. But German occupation had demonstrated that neutrality had failed to keep Denmark out of the war. The lesson learned, ‘never again 9 April!’<sup>32</sup> demanded more active Danish involvement in international affairs up to the point of advocating participation in multilateral defence cooperation.<sup>33</sup> This implied a break with Denmark’s long-standing tradition of isolated

<sup>31</sup> This term was coined by the former Foreign Minister Munch (1920–1940) in Danish *ligge død*; P. Villaume, *Allieret med forbehold. Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig: En studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949–1961* (Eirene, Copenhagen, 1995), p. 96.

<sup>32</sup> The date of the German invasion in Denmark, 9 April 1940. In Danish, the slogan reads *Aldrej mere den 9. april*.

<sup>33</sup> N. Petersen, ‘Abandonment vs. Entrapment: Denmark and Military Integration in Europe 1948–1951’ (1986) 21 *Cooperation and Conflict*, pp. 169–186.

neutrality.<sup>34</sup> This at that time new discursive formation was supported by those who were supportive of Denmark's accession to a Western defence alliance mostly for pragmatic reasons. After the plans for a Nordic security community had failed, the only other option available, a return to isolated neutrality, was considered to have disastrous consequences. In the face of its vulnerability and Soviet expansionism, the survival of the country was seen to be at risk. NATO membership was further supported by a more idealistic discourse pattern which emphasized that Denmark belonged to the Western democracies. Also starting from the viewpoint of Denmark's vulnerability, the proponents of this argumentation advocated that Denmark 'owed' it to the other European democracies to do whatever it could to prevent itself from being such an easy target and thus a potential Soviet stepping stone into Europe.

The Nordic security arrangement, however, remained the preferred option all along. Based on common history, language and culture, the Nordic countries share a sense of belonging and common destiny. Furthermore, it was argued that the Nordic option would contribute to strengthening the Nordic 'Third Way', i.e. the progressive welfare system, especially important to the ruling Social-Democrats.<sup>35</sup> In terms of foreign policy, the Third Way referred to a pacifist and internationalist policy which was seen to offer an alternative to bloc rivalries by emphasizing bridge-building and confidence-building measures, thus contributing to an international system based on 'right not might'. Most importantly, the Nordic option had the crucial advantage of being consensual. Only after the Nordic option had fallen apart because of Norwegian-Swedish differences on whether the Scandinavian Defence Union should have more Atlantic or neutral inclinations was the perspective of Danish membership in NATO openly considered. Thus, Denmark had to join NATO *faute de mieux*.<sup>36</sup>

Opponents to Danish NATO membership mostly argued that it would be incompatible with Nordic identity. A first argument was based on a pacifist and anti-militarist mentality, a remnant of neutrality. Membership in a military alliance, it was argued, would undermine Danish credibility in bridge-building, disarmament and détente. Furthermore, the inherent obligations which could lead to automatic involvement of Denmark in a conflict were heavily criticized. A second line of argument portrayed NATO membership as a threat to the welfare state, since alliance obligations would necessitate a shift in public spending away from social services towards military expenditures.

<sup>34</sup> C. Holbraad, *Danish Neutrality: A Study in the Foreign Policy of a Small State* (Clarendon Press and Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York and Toronto, 1991), p. 103.

<sup>35</sup> K. Molin and T.B. Oelsen, 'Security Policy and Domestic Politics in Scandinavia 1948–1949' in T.B. Oelsen (ed.): *Interdependence versus Integration: Denmark, Scandinavia and Western Europe 1945–1960* (Odense Press, Odense, 1995), pp. 62–81 at p. 74.

<sup>36</sup> N. Petersen and C. Thune (eds), *Dansk Udenrigspolitik 1990* (DJOF Publishing, Copenhagen, 1991), p. 43.

Until the end of the cold war, Danish security debates were marked by these competing discursive formations, the dominant instrumental argument of necessity often being seriously challenged by the contrary argumentation of incompatibility, resulting in Denmark being qualified as a 'reluctant ally' and in the so-called 'footnote policy' of the 1980s.<sup>37</sup> The Maastricht debate and the resulting Edinburgh opt-out concerning policies with defence implications was a confirmation of the traditional discourse pattern that NATO, though contested, remained the only possible and necessary security provider. Denmark was thus again relegated to the position of a reluctant ally, this time in European affairs.

*b) Identity and behaviour: the Atlanticist stuck in the European legitimacy trap.* Provided that the Atlantic option in the 1940s had been the least preferred, Denmark's behaviour in the Iraq affair revealed a remarkable plainness. Among all other EU members, only the United Kingdom mobilized more resources for the war. Neither the missing Nordic consent nor the lack of a UN mandate prevented the Danish government from clearly taking the Anglo-American side. But this was not without sacrifices, since the broad and common consensus in foreign policy which had lasted for 15 years vanished due to the government's decision to go to war.

For Denmark, however, severe problems are foreseeable, since its national identity construction relevant to foreign policy resisted any change with a view to its image of European integration. In our view, its increased contestation seems inevitable in the future, despite the observation that the public and the political élite seem entirely exhausted by struggling over the future of Danish policy in this context. Due to the rather strong demand for legitimation on the part of the Danish public with a view to European affairs, the room for manoeuvre for Danish governments is comparatively narrow and contrasts with the proactive stance in the Iraq crisis. In European issues, governments feel compelled to cutting foreign policy options all the way down from the self-degradation of Denmark in the newly established EU Military Committee to the curtailment of competences and functions of the Danish EU presidency.<sup>38</sup> After the referendum on the Euro in which the population

<sup>37</sup> M. Heisler, 'Denmark's Quest for Security: Constraints and Opportunities within the Alliance' in G. Flynn (ed.), *NATO's Northern Allies: The Security Policies of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway* (Rowman & Allanheld, New Jersey, 1985), pp. 57–112 at p. 97.

<sup>38</sup> Under pressure from the Danish Parliament, the *Folketing*, the Danish Government decided in Spring 2001 not to take part in decision-making in the EU Military Committee. This development came about after Denmark's representative, General Hvidt, despite the general non-participation of Denmark in the CESDP, had cast the decisive vote for the Finnish General Häglund against his government's and the *Folketing's* preference of the more NATO-minded Italian candidate, General Arpino. The Danish EU Presidency has been limited because when the Council adopted measures in areas that are covered by the opt-outs, Denmark handed over the Presidency to Greece, which was the next Member State to hold the EU Presidency.

once more made clear that it disapproves of full participation in European integration, the ministers of foreign affairs and defence collectively resigned: the Danish people, to put it bluntly, was voted down by its own government. The mass split of the Danish élite is as evident as perpetual. All too often, Danish politicians sold the European project to their domestic public as a market concept only, refraining from linking it to other more normatively laden identity elements. This may become highly problematic when the next critical juncture comes along. The change from a NATO to an EU command on the Balkans, for instance, might evolve at such a critical juncture, for example when the Danish opt-out in European security and defence issues will force Copenhagen to withdraw its troops from the peace mission. Thus, the public peace in Danish security policy is not likely to last for long.

## 2. *The Netherlands: The Modest Change from Status to Role*

a) *Identity: from decolonization to ‘Hollanditis’*. In the literature on Dutch security policy since World War II, it is commonly agreed that Dutch foreign policy in this issue area was marked by a clear commitment to the transatlantic alliance. The foundations for this Western security orientation, which replaced traditional Dutch neutrality (‘aloofness’) in the wake of the war and German occupation, were laid in the late 1940s when the major issue for debate in the Netherlands was the loss of its South-East Asian colonies. However, in the 1980s, the heated societal debate about the deployment of ballistic nuclear missiles on Dutch soil revealed that the Dutch commitment to NATO was apparently not sufficiently shared among the population as a constitutive feature of Dutch national identity.

When the question of the decolonization of Indonesia arose, the Netherlands was just recovering from the deepest trauma of its history, namely, the German occupation of the Dutch *moederland* (motherland) during World War II. When German power in Europe and the Japanese imperial extension, which had also led to Japanese occupation of Dutch Indonesia, collapsed in 1944/45, the future of Dutch security policy was discussed alongside its future colonial status, whereby the latter issue attracted much more interest and active participation on the part of the larger public, especially economic actors and private interest groups.<sup>39</sup> The most serious identity-related question at stake in the decolonization debate<sup>40</sup> was the future status of the Netherlands, both

<sup>39</sup> See especially A. Lijphart, *The Trauma of Decolonization: The Dutch and West New Guinea* (Yale University Press, New Haven/London, 1966), pp. 90–105.

<sup>40</sup> This analysis of the decolonization debate mainly draws on: Lijphart (note 39 above); L.G.M. Jaquet, *Minister Stikker en de soevereiniteitsoverdracht aan Indonesie. Nederland op de tweekopprong tussen Azië en het Westen.s* (Martinus Nijhoff, Gravenhage, 1982); H.W. van

in terms of political and military power and of international trade. Supporters of the maintenance of Dutch status as a colonial power mainly based their argumentation on two identity elements, namely, *the Netherlands as a middle power* (with regard to political-military issues) and as a leading *salesman* in the world (with regard to trade). The discourse patterns related to these identity elements held that the Netherlands had to keep their colonial possessions in South-East Asia in order to maintain both their status as a middle power and as a leading trading nation. These rather interest-based arguments were complemented by discourse patterns that were related to two more idealistic identity elements. The element of *the Netherlands as a pilot state* in terms of law and ethics showed up in the discourse pattern which held that any transition of Indonesia from colonial status to independence had to conform with Dutch and international law and the granting of self-determination to all ethnic groups.

In fact, the Dutch domestic discourse showed a clear superiority of the proponents of colonialism. But the longer the debate went on and the more the situation in Indonesia escalated, the more the Dutch felt the pressure of the international community, most notably the USA and the UN. This pressure considerably affected the validity of the pro-colonialism arguments. As the USA explicitly threatened to exclude the Netherlands from the Marshall Plan if it carried on its attempts to re-establish colonial rule in Indonesia by force, the argument that the maintenance of the colonies was necessary for economic purposes lost most of its value. And the fact that the majority of the international community sharply criticized Dutch colonial policy put the Dutch at odds with their self-ascribed role as the pioneers of international law and a just world order. Thus, the identity elements of the Netherlands as a salesman and as a pilot state also gave rise to argumentative patterns which countered those related to the same identity elements and employed by the supporters of colonialism. In addition, the new identity element of *the Netherlands as a part of the West* helped to promote a strong perception of a need to concur with the expectations of the Western partner countries. Thus the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia was mainly a result of international pressure and its domestic discursive reception. However, the Dutch quickly accommodated their identity to their new situation, and when West New Guinea was transferred to Indonesia in 1962, there was little domestic debate.<sup>41</sup>

den Doel, *Afscheid van Indië. De val van het Nederlandse imperium in Azië* (Prometheus, Amsterdam, 2001); and J. van Doorn, *Indische lessen. Nederland en de koloniale ervaring* (Bakker, Amsterdam, 1995).

<sup>41</sup> A.E. Kersten, 'Decolonization of Dutch New Guinea: The Luns Plan' in P. Everts and G. Walraven (eds), *The Politics of Persuasion: Implementation of Foreign Policy by the Netherlands* (Avebury, Aldershot, 1989), pp. 219–230.

The debate about the deployment of nuclear missiles on Dutch soil in the late 1970s and early 1980s<sup>42</sup> unveiled much more stability of the prevalent national identity construction and a decreased, though still significant, influence of external pressures and expectations. Again, the identity elements of *pilot state* and *a part of the West* figured prominently in discourse patterns. While the former was employed by both supporters (expectations of NATO partners, treaty obligations) and opponents (international pacifism, disarmament), the latter again served as an inroad for external pressures exerted particularly by the USA and West Germany. The *middle-power* element also was employed by supporters (Dutch influence to be exerted via NATO) and opponents (independence and autonomy) of deployment, but its relevance for the course and outcome of the debate was markedly smaller than it had been in the decolonization debate. The Dutch government and parliament finally found themselves thrown in between the mostly anti-deployment domestic public and the pro-deployment pressures exerted by its international partners. The result was a stalemate in that a final decision on deployment was repeatedly delayed until it became obsolete in the wake of the renewed East–West détente from 1986 onward.

In the end, despite the fear of a new neutralist abstentionism arising in the Netherlands ('Hollanditis'), the Dutch sense of belonging to the Western world was reaffirmed, as was the self-perception as a pilot state of international law and order. However, this analysis reveals that, in contrast with the general verdict to be found in the literature on Dutch security policy, the Western orientation of the Netherlands appears to be unquestioned with a view to Dutch national identity only inasmuch as it is reflected in the pertinent, societally shared identity construction.

*b) Identity and behaviour: the weakening pull of Atlanticism despite growing Euroscepticism.* While the Netherlands, like Denmark, has traditionally pursued a NATO-based security and defence policy, The Hague has over the 1990s gradually developed a much more positive position on the construction of a CESDP and can today be seen as a cautious supporter of this project. However, this policy change has not gone unquestioned among Dutch policy-makers and the larger public, and NATO has remained the cornerstone of Dutch security and defence policy.<sup>43</sup> When Germany, France and Belgium

<sup>42</sup> This account of the missile debate mainly draws upon studies by: P.P. Everts, *Public Opinion, the Churches, and Foreign Policy: Studies of Domestic Factors in the Making of Dutch Foreign Policy* (Institute for International Studies, University of Leiden, Leiden, 1983); A. van Staden, 'Goals and objectives' in P.W. Everts and G. Walraven (eds), *The Politics of Persuasion: Implementation of Foreign Policy by the Netherlands* (Avebury, Aldershot u.a., 1989), pp. 26–38; and B. Soetendorp, 'The NATO "double track" decision' in P.P. Everts and G. Walraven (eds), as above, pp. 149–160.

<sup>43</sup> B. Soetendorp and R. de Wijk, 'A Dutch policy reversal towards ESDP' in G. Müller-

blocked NATO support for Turkey in the Iraq crisis, it was the Netherlands which delivered missiles to Iraq's neighbour, demonstrating that it did not appreciate their European partners' move. However, the Dutch uneasiness at signing – though requested – the famous 'letter of the eight' may serve as an example for Holland not subscribing to an unequivocal Atlanticism. Yet as the deployment debate reveals, the mass split of the élite has been characterizing Dutch foreign policy for a long time. Evidently, in the Iraq case, the coalition government – though split in itself – felt again more inclined towards the US position than the Dutch people.

Another aspect deserves attention. The deep public trauma caused by the role of Dutch peace troops in the context of the Srebrenica massacre of 1995<sup>44</sup> has led to a less favourable public attitude towards manpower contributions to international peace operations. Even though human rights, international law and peace have remained consensual among the Dutch as overall foreign policy goals, it is questionable whether The Hague's enthusiasm for peace operations in the framework of the CFSP will be very high.

To sum up, Dutch security policy in the future will probably subscribe to a *sowohl-als-auch* approach serving Europeanists and Atlanticists simultaneously – a moderator role not deliberately inherited from Germany.

### 3. *Germany: Extended Possibilities and the Likelihood of Change*

a) *Identity: from rearmament to participation in out-of-area operations.* With its history of aggression and crimes against humanity, the need to reconstruct its national identity and to invest it with positive connotations and perceptions of self was more urgent for Germany than any other country.<sup>45</sup> The (at that time) newly constructed identity element *the responsible Germany* was taking into account neighbours' fears of a German rearmament – the *German question*. This reconstruction of identity was most of all marked by a strong commitment to multilateralism; unlike in the past, the maxim '*Never alone!*' was to become a basic element of West German post-war identity, together with the conception of *Germany as part of the West*. German rearmament and accession to NATO were the final confirmation of this new German identity. However, at the same time, a strong pacifist orientation emerged as, in the

Brandek-Bocquet (ed.), *Europäische Außenpolitik* (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2002), pp. 82–96 at p. 82.

<sup>44</sup> When the UN 'safe area' of Srebrenica fell into the hands of Serb forces in summer 1995, the Dutch peace troops were unable to protect more than 7 000 Bosnian Muslim civilians from being massacred. Early in 2002, a study on the role of the Dutch in this context was published. Subsequently, the cabinet under Prime Minister Wim Kok collectively resigned.

<sup>45</sup> T.U. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 1998), p. 68.

view of the German élites and most of its population, militarism had been totally discredited by the German past. Thus, the maxim *'Never again war!'* accompanied the reconstruction of Germany as a part of the West, rendering its commitment to NATO as of a strictly defensive character and precluding all German military activity except for territorial and collective self-defence.

During the cold war, the prevalent reconstruction of German post-war identity remained unchallenged. However, the German discourse on the participation of German Armed Forces in combat missions outside the alliance territory (1991–1995) revealed a conflict between opposing elements of identity and discursive formations which was solved through their reconstruction.<sup>46</sup> Principally, two argumentative patterns emerged in the 1990s, both of which were grounded in the discursive formation of Germany's special international responsibility as a historical lesson of World War II. While one side argued that this lesson had to be self-restriction and multilateralism (restraint discourse), the other side demanded an 'appropriate' and 'more determined' international appearance of Germany (normalization discourse<sup>47</sup>).

Even though the Federal Constitutional Court, by its judgement of 12 July 1994, formally ended the controversy over the constitutionality of participation by the German Armed Forces in out-of-area missions, the political discourse continued, mainly involving the political parties. Large parts of the Christian Democrats and the Liberals supported German Armed Forces missions in foreign countries whereas large parts of the Social Democrats and the Greens rejected them. However, the argumentative division went across the parties.<sup>48</sup> The oppositional sub-discourse reconstructed an element of identity which could be characterized as 'Never again!'. For a large part of the Greens, this meant 'Never again war!', principally proscribing any participation of German soldiers in military conflicts. Above all, Joschka Fischer put this element of identity into question and, against the background of the massive violations of human rights in Bosnia, derived 'Never again Auschwitz!' as the concomitant lesson of the past.<sup>49</sup> Subsequently, a discourse pattern emerged in which, with reference to the mentioned element of identity, missions of UN soldiers were

<sup>46</sup> For detailed accounts of the German out-of-area debate, see: J.P.G. Bach, *Between Sovereignty and Integration: German Foreign Policy and National Identity after 1989* (St Martin's Press, New York, 1999); N. Philippi, *Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten Deutschlands* (Peter Lang, Frankfurt a.M., 1997); H. Müller, 'Military Intervention for European Security: The German Debate' in L. Freedman (Hrsg.), *Military Intervention in European Conflicts* (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1994), pp. 125–142.

<sup>47</sup> G. Hellmann, 'Nationale Normalität als Zukunft? Zur Außenpolitik der Berliner Republik' (1999) 44/7 *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, pp. 837–847.

<sup>48</sup> H. Müller, note 46 above, p. 139.

<sup>49</sup> N. Philippi, note 46 above, p. 134.

propagated by several representatives of the Greens, while a part of the SPD even spoke in favour of combat missions under a UN mandate.

In the end, the supporters of German participation in out-of-area operations achieved hegemony in the discourse. Their arguments were also anchored in the discursive formation of restraint and emphasized the necessity and moral obligation of maintaining Germany's capacity and credibility as a loyal ally. The allegation that everyone speaking against German participation in a mission endangered the efficiency of security alliances and made Germany untrustworthy and unqualified as an ally eventually overcame most reservations.<sup>50</sup>

This comparison shows that in spite of the far-reaching change in German foreign policy behaviour with regard to participation in military operations, the prevalent construction of German national identity has remained remarkably stable. The elements of 'Never alone!', 'Germany as part of the West' and 'the responsible Germany' were basic in both discourses. However, the analysis reveals how the same identity elements and discursive formations can be reconstructed so as to lead to diverse, almost contrary, justifications of foreign policy behaviour.

*b) Identity and behaviour: the responsible Germany – whatever it means.* For a long time, Germany has been a moderator in security affairs. This *Sowohl-als-auch* approach enabled Germany to promote a strengthening of the CFSP, to re-launch the European defence project, and to support NATO and US foreign policy at the same time. As the conspicuous patterns of security policy behaviour have revealed Germany is no longer everybody's favourite: in the Iraq crisis, Germany held the most radical position of all countries strongly resisting the Anglo-American proposals in the Security Council. In addition, they did not hesitate in paralysing NATO when their most principal stance concerning Iraq clashed with Turkey's security demands. Moreover, it joined the Tervuren group just after the Iraq war, deepening the divide between Atlanticists and Europeanists in the EU even further. What can identity theory tell us about this tremendous change?

Let us start with the observation that the discursive adaptation to the new international environment and its changed challenges with a view to security and defence was highly successful in the 1990s. Thus, when Germany's new identity construction with a view to participation in military operations was put to a hard test in the Kosovo crisis in 1999, Germany lived up to the expectations of its partners and stood by their side. The firm Iraq policy of the Schröder government proves the remarkable strength of the identity element 'the responsible Germany' now dominating 'Germany as part of Europe', 'Germany as part of the West' and 'the German question'. At first glance, by

<sup>50</sup> J.P.G. Bach, note 46 above, p. 138 et seq.

its decision not to join the attack on Iraq, Germany seemed to return to its 1991 position when the Kohl government had refrained from participating in the war over the liberation of Kuwait. Yet now, the situation is different since Germany no longer faces constitutional constraints as the international obligation in Afghanistan and the Balkans demonstrate. The successful re-framing of Germany's identity in the 1990s enabled an unexpected re-joining of the formerly antagonistic discursive formations, normalization and restraint: 'A Germany that could say 'no' served both in the Iraq crisis.<sup>51</sup> For the adherents of restraint – the pacifists in particular – this meant 'no' to the war; for the normalists, this meant that Germany has emancipated itself from American or European patronage and finally left the post-World War II era. Most interestingly, the identity element of 'the responsible Germany' has by far proved to be the strongest in the discourses: In 1990/91, Germany was used to staying aloof but contributing financially; in the 1999 Kosovo crisis, it justified the action of war; and in 2003, it served as the ultimate argument against the war, a possible UN mandate and NATO solidarity.

#### 4. *France: Identity Uncontested, Promoter Unchallenged*

a) *Identity: from the rejection of the EDC to the approval of the Maastricht Treaty.* After the end of World War II, two discourses on foreign policy were of special importance in France, namely, the one on the European Defence Community (EDC) in the 1950s and the one on the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) in 1992.

The debate about the EDC turned out to be the fiercest since the Dreyfus affair had shattered French society.<sup>52</sup> At that time, the Fourth Republic was in a state of instability. Governments came and went, and sometimes the country lacked leadership for several months. In addition, France was confronted

<sup>51</sup> It is notable that Chancellor Schröder invoked a 'new German *Sonderweg*' in order to justify his refusal to join the US-led anti-Iraq alliance in Spring 2003. His usage of that term was harshly criticized by many, even though the overwhelming majority of the German public supported his policy of non-involvement in the Iraq war. Most interestingly, representatives of the CDU and FDP introduced the terminology of the 'German way' in the out-of-area debate. This fact illuminates the reconstruction of an element of identity: by pointing at the danger of a *neuer deutscher Sonderweg* – i.e. isolation in international politics – arguments in favour of German participation in military missions outside NATO territory were raised. By contrast, in earlier times, it had precisely been such German military activism which had been associated with the (old) *deutscher Sonderweg*. See W. Wette, 'Sonderweg oder Normalität? Zur Diskussion um die internationale Position der Bundesrepublik' (1996) 4 *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, pp. 61–70.

<sup>52</sup> R. Aron, 'Esquisse historique d'une grande querelle idéologique' (1956) 80 *Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques* (La querelle de la C.E.D. Essais d'analyse sociologique), pp.1–23 at p. 9.

with external challenges, among which the decolonization issue, the German question and the beginning of the cold war stood out. In the wake of the Korean War, French Premier René Pleven presented a plan for a European Defence Community in order to enable controlled German rearmament and check the Soviet threat. However, though already signed by six European countries, the treaty was eventually voted down in the National Assembly on 30 August 1954. As a consequence, German rearmament was embedded in the transatlantic alliance, and European defence remained an enigma for the decades to come.

In the debate, the political class was totally split and the attitudes did not follow party lines – with the exception of the communist party. The so-called *cédistes* pleaded in favour of a sovereignty transfer in defence issues while the *anti-cédistes* rejected the idea of a European defence. The idealist discursive formation<sup>53</sup> portraying *France as part of the Christian Occident* and *Europe as a common destiny* proved rather weak. Foreign Minister Robert Schuman did not succeed in finding much support when he argued that the EDC would contribute to the overcoming of nationalism and may lead to a revival of the West. Communists and Gaullists heavily criticized his arguments by calling its supporters ‘Vichyists’, ‘Munichois’ and ‘foreign countries’ party’.<sup>54</sup> Gaullists as well as the Jacobin-minded partisans of the Socialists and Radicals were afraid of the ‘death of the French nation’<sup>55</sup> and pleaded in favour of a ‘Europe of nation-states’. In this perspective, France should serve as a model in Europe.

Even among the *cédistes*, a rather realist<sup>56</sup> view was more pervasive. For instance, the Atlanticists argued that the Soviet threat and the control of Germany required France’s integration into the West.<sup>57</sup> The communists denied the necessity of German rearmament altogether and interpreted the Stalin notes as a good sign for coming to terms with Moscow. Since German rearmament seemed inevitable to many, the EDC appeared as the ‘lesser

<sup>53</sup> Supporters were first of all members of the Christian MRP but could also be found in other parties like the socialists around Guy Mollet and among the *Indépendants*; E. Paul Reynaud Bjol, *La France devant l’Europe: La politique européenne de la IV.ème République* (Munksgaard, Copenhagen, 1966), p. 187 et seq.

<sup>54</sup> Rioux, ‘Französische öffentliche Meinung und EVG: Parteienstreit oder Schlacht der Erinnerungen’ in H.-E. Volkmann (ed), *Die Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft: Stand und Probleme der Forschung* (Boppard a. Rhein, 1985), pp. 159–176 at p. 165.

<sup>55</sup> F. O’Neill, *The French radical party and European Integration* (Westmead, Gower, 1981), p. 76.

<sup>56</sup> We borrow the terms ‘idealist’ and ‘realist’ discursive formations from Raymond Aron, note 52 above, p. 12. Realist denotes an argument which is based on threats, relative gain seeking and the balancing motive.

<sup>57</sup> S. Hoffmann, ‘Les oraisons funèbres. Du vote du 30 août du 30 décembre 1954’ (1956) 80 *Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques* (La querelle de la C.E.D.), pp. 59–91 at pp. 74–76.

evil', as Schuman's successor Georges Bidault put it. The EDC, serving as an instrument to tie Germany to the West, would help to dampen the re-awakening of German nationalism and would prevent any temptations of a new Rapallo. Another line of argument which was particularly popular among socialists was based on the identity element of a *Europe as a third force*. The EDC should contribute to a strong Europe which could balance the two emerging superpowers.<sup>58</sup> But these different motivations in favour of European defence faced a dilemma: The more the USA and the United Kingdom were linked to the EDC framework following the demand of the Atlanticists, the less autonomous an EDC would become and the less it could serve as a third force.<sup>59</sup> The Gaullists and the vast majority of the military agreed to German rearmament but refused to combine French and German forces which would split and therefore weaken the French army.<sup>60</sup> In the minds of the *anti-cédistes*, only a strong and autonomous France would be in a position to deal with post-war problems.

Eventually, the *anti-cédistes* carried the day. It was not until 40 years later that Europe found itself on the testing bench again with regard to developing its own defence. Admittedly, the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) was not about defence in particular. But once more, the question of sovereignty and the entire relationship between France and Europe was at stake. This time, the debate ended with a slim victory for the treaty supporters. What was different from the EDC debate? There is not the space here to discuss the TEU debate at length, but two aspects deserve attention. The main discourse participants were in agreement that the French state and the nation generally had to be preserved. But how this was to be guaranteed was rather controversial. The Maastricht opponents perceived the Treaty as a threat to French values and argumentatively exploited the term 'sovereignty' which would, in their view, be destroyed by EU citizenship and the European Central Bank.<sup>61</sup> The supporters emphasized that French values were exportable and that the EU provided a perfect framework for this. In this argument, the EU was portrayed as a vehicle for a *mission civilisatrice*.<sup>62</sup> In comparison to the EDC debate, this

<sup>58</sup> D. Zeraffa-Dray, 'Le Mouvement Républicain Populaire et la construction de l'Europe' in G. Trausch (ed.), *Die Europäische Integration vom Schuman-Plan bis zu den Verträgen von Rom* (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1993), pp. 231–241 at p. 238.

<sup>59</sup> W. Loth, 'Die EVG und das Projekt der Europäischen Politischen Gemeinschaft' (1995) 21 *Historische Zeitschrift* (Europa im Blick der Historiker), p. 195.

<sup>60</sup> P. Guillen, 'Die französische Generalität, die Aufrüstung der Bundesrepublik und die EVG, 1950–1954' in H.-E. Volkmann (ed.), *Die Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft: Stand und Probleme der Forschung* (Boppard am Rhein, 1985), pp. 125–158 at p. 146.

<sup>61</sup> C. Mazzucelli, *France and Germany at Maastricht: politics and negotiations to create the European Union* (Garland, New York, 1997), p. 224.

<sup>62</sup> U. Holm, 'The French Garden Is No Longer What It Used To Be' in K.E. Jørgensen (ed.), *Reflective Approaches to European Governance* (MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1997), pp. 128–145 at p. 133.

argumentative pattern is new and enabled the pro-Europeans to counter the loss-of-sovereignty argument.

Secondly, the German question and *France as a great power* still remained important. The relevant discursive formations again differed as to whether further integration or the balancing and containment of Germany would be the more successful strategy. Extremist opponents of the Treaty denounced a 'yes' as collaboration with Germany, but the supporters were this time better prepared than in the case of the EDC. The *intégrationnistes* argued that, on the one hand, the Euro would become an important counterweight to the US Dollar and, on the other hand, a common Central Bank would end the dominance of the German Federal Bank in European monetary policy.<sup>63</sup> By this line of argumentation, the identity elements of 'Europe as a third force' and 'France as a big power' were ingeniously combined – this time in favour of ratification.

*b) Identity and behaviour: the cost of Europeanism.* The shift of France's security policy in the 1990s was probably the one least visible, but it turned out to be central to the CFSP and its latest offspring, the CESDP. In the 1980s, France had rejected a European defence scheme in cooperation with NATO, as well as one established within the EU framework. Both changed in the 1990s, putting France at the centre of the efforts to build up institutions and resources for a viable CESDP. However, France's most recent efforts in favour of a Defence Union in Brussels have demonstrated that the project of an autonomous European defence has remained first choice.<sup>64</sup> The Tervuren-group experiment looks like a return to the 1980s and might have been triggered by France's firm stance in the Iraq crisis.

The autonomy of the European reaction force from NATO, and hence from US hegemony, serves the identity element of 'Europe as a third force'. As long as the CFSP remains largely intergovernmental, the '*preservation of France*' does not seem to be at risk, and French values easily appear, via Brussels, propellable to the global level. Even for the rather weak identity element promulgating '*Europe as a common destiny*', the CFSP and European defence fit nicely in the common argumentative pattern. Only if German preponderance in military and political terms threatened France's self-attributed position in the international system could an identity crisis come about. It seems more likely that France runs the risk of a further deterioration of the Franco-US relationship, a scenario which is currently debated in neo-conservative US think tanks. Yet for the time being, France can be regarded as not having any identity problem – neither in its relationship with the USA nor with the CFSP.

<sup>63</sup> P. Buffotot, 'Le Référendum sur l'Union Européenne' (1993) 1/3 *Modern and Contemporary France*, p. 281.

<sup>64</sup> cf. 'Entretien avec Gilles Andréani, du Quai d'Orsay', *Le Monde*, 16 June 2003.

However, the straight-forward Europeanist approach of Tervuren collapsed and in both the relationship with the USA as well as the debate on European defence in the Convention negotiations Paris seeks to soothe the tone. The price France had to pay for her rhetorical triumph in the Security Council was the European split. If Paris keeps on playing a trade-off game between Washington and Brussels she will probably lose both. Hence, tactical rapprochements to NATO and the United Kingdom in particular might be an option – in this respect the 1990s are likely to repeat themselves.

#### **IV Conclusions and Outlook: National Identities and the Future of European Security**

We have claimed that the proposed methodology can help us to understand foreign policy continuity and the probability for change. First, by using positivist tools of comparative foreign policy analysis as a reference point for our exploration of the relevant constructions of national identity in the countries of analysis, we have sketched the patterns of behaviour of the Member States. These patterns show whether an Atlanticist or Europeanist attitude has marked the respective country's foreign policy behaviour. Secondly, by analysing identity-related discourses, we have been able to unveil deeply rooted identity elements and discursive formations. Identity elements generally account for continuities of foreign policies. They frame the scope of what a society considers appropriate under certain circumstances. The more situation-specific argumentative patterns which we have analysed, in contrast, embody seeds of change. In times of critical junctures – most commonly military, political or economic crises – a country's identity may be challenged with a view to foreign policy. A discursive battle arises in which traditional and modified interpretations of the nation's identity compete with each other, striving for discursive hegemony.<sup>65</sup> When traditional arguments carry the day – as in the Danish case – continuity prevails. By contrast, when identity elements are discursively re-framed in a way that can legitimize new policy options, change is possible. The German example has illustrated this point: although German identity remained unchanged over time with a view to identity elements, the interpretations of what a reasonable ally is and what the German *Sonderweg* means changed dramatically in the 1990s and – as we suggest – in the Iraq crisis. As a consequence, the scope for German foreign and security policy was extended considerably and enabled substantial change.

<sup>65</sup> Please note that this 'contingent pathway' only serves as a premise and not as a result of our studies. Still, our insights from 12 discourse studies (Joerissen and Stahl, note 30 above) and completed case studies in our project (France and Greece in the Kosovo War, Germany and France in the Uruguay Round) clearly supports our line of argument.

Thus, we are confident that identity theory (and the method of discourse analysis) can enhance our understanding of continuity and change in foreign policy. For instance, in the light of our identity approach, the Iraq breach between the countries under study was not really surprising. The only case which deviates from the traditional Atlanticist–Europeanist taxonomy is Germany (and we proposed some preliminary reasons for this). However, the German case also reveals the limits of an identity approach. Only with the help of a detailed discourse analysis we would better understand how the identity element ‘responsible Germany’ could successfully be re-framed and the formerly antagonistic discursive formations – restraint and normalization – could partially fuse in their recommendations for foreign policy action concerning Iraq.

Returning to the empirical question concerning the substance of security policies in Europe, our answer would be that significant differences in the identity constructions do not suggest easy going regarding the future coherence of the CFSP. Yet looking at the Netherlands, Germany and France, there seems to be enough overlap to enable gradual reinterpretations of national identity constructions which are amenable to a further Europeanization of their security policies. The notable exception of Denmark from this judgement deserves attention.

However, some recommended strategies for the CFSP will hardly be successful considering our findings. For instance, a *directoire* strategy would probably challenge the Dutch identity elements as a ‘middle power’ as well as a ‘pilot country’. For Denmark, a Franco-German supremacy would undermine any effort to positively link Danish values to the European project. It would therefore jeopardize the Danish identity elements of being ‘Nordic’, being a ‘bridge-builder’, and of Denmark as a ‘small (and vulnerable!) country’. Consequently, the Dutch and Danish reflex would probably be a transatlantic one as in the Iraq crisis, reaffirming NATO while remaining distant and becoming more sceptical towards the CSFP and CESDP respectively.

As we have seen above, the French element of ‘Europe as a third force’ does not have any complement in the other identity constructions. Thus an autonomy strategy placing the CFSP/CESDP question outside the transatlantic institutions so strongly desired by France is not at all likely to gain acceptance in the EU.

In terms of national identity constructions, the civilian power strategy – evidently including military means – promises to be the most consensual. The Dutch case illustrates this: The identity element of the ‘Netherlands as a middle power’ can be served by a certain contribution to personnel and resources, the identity elements ‘the Christian Netherlands’ as well as the ‘pilot country’ will be satisfied, and neither belonging to the West nor to Europe appear to be challenged. The same applies to the other countries under

study: only if the CFSP largely follows the civilian power strategy will there be the chance to bridge the Atlanticist–Europeanist divide.