


Project on the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy in Europe
University of Trier
Chair for International Relations and Foreign Policy
Prof Dr. Hanns W. Maull
Universitätsring 15
D-54286 Trier
Germany
E-Mail: pafeproj@uni-trier.de
http://www.uni-trier.de/fb3/politik/liba/pafe/pafe_frames.htm



European Foreign Policy and National Identity: Detecting the Link

Henning Boekle, Jörg Nadoll, and Bernhard Stahl

Paper Prepared for Presentation at the Fourth Pan-European International Relations
Conference, Canterbury (U.K.), 6-10 September 2001
Panel 12-2: Identity and Foreign Policy in Europe

Draft – Comments most welcome!

1. Introduction¹

1.1 "Puzzles" of Foreign Policy Analysis in Europe

Foreign policy analysis in Europe is exposed to various empirical puzzles. The first one is to explain the mere existence of the phenomenon 'European Foreign Policy'² as such: Which factors further, and which impede, respectively, the development of a common European foreign policy? To answer this question, reference is usually made to the different European policies of EU member states' *in general* as an intuitively evident explanation (White 1999: 43). Recent empirical studies in different policy areas have also proven the relevance of national positions for an explanation of European foreign policy (Stavridis/Hutchence 2000: 61; Elgström 2000: 195). This shift of reference from the European to the national level, however, raises further questions: Why do European national states behave so differently in European policy, as well as more generally in foreign and security policy? With regard to foreign policy, one may ask: Why do some EU member states recommend a further institutionalisation of European foreign policy (e.g. the Netherlands) whilst others (e.g. France) stand by an intergovernmental structure? Without answering these questions, anything substantial about chances and risks of European foreign policy can hardly be said.

Established theories of international relations explain the variance of national foreign policies in different ways. Realist approaches, which explain state behaviour by reference to the material conditions of the international system, argue that small states gain "voice opportunities" (Grieco 1995: 34) and consequently more influence through the introduction of majority decisions concerning the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). But the underlying neorealist axiom, namely, that a state's position within the power structure of the international system determines its behaviour in foreign affairs (cf. Elman 1996; Waltz 1993: 45), fails with regard to the finding that states which are exposed to identical systemic incentives and constraints often behave very differently. This is illustrated by the Netherlands' and Denmark's European policy at the beginning of the 1990s: Whereas the Danish Maastricht referendum is regarded as a the clearest symbol of scepticism concerning European integration, the Netherlands' European policy, especially with regard to the (failed)

¹ This paper sums up some preliminary results of the "Project on Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policies in Europe" (PAFE). This project is financed by the German Research Association and the ASKO Europa-Stiftung and is headed by Bernhard Stahl. We would like to thank our colleagues at the Chair of International Relations and Foreign Policy at the University of Trier, especially Sebastian Harnisch, Anna Jóhannesdóttir, and Hanns W. Maull, for helpful comments. We also gratefully acknowledge the help of Tanja Friedrich with regard to the translation of a first German draft into English. For further information on the PAFE Project, see the internet at: http://www.uni-trier.de/uni/fb3/politik/liba/pafe/pafe_frames.htm.

² "European foreign policy" here refers to the sum of common activities of all or part of EU member states within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU (CFSP), of the external relations of

Dutch proposal for a 'one-pillar structure' of the EU including the CFSP in 1991, stands for an extreme pro-integration policy which also includes foreign policy. Such differences are also visible between large EU member states, as is shown by the CFSP policies of Germany, France and the UK (Wagner 1999a, 2001).

Most of the generalizing literature about the member states' foreign policies refers to *domestic politics* in order to explain these differences (cf. Hill 1996, Manners/Whitman 2000). Theoretically and analytically, the most important contribution to this approach has been made by Moravcsik, who sees European policy as interest-guided domestic politics (Moravcsik 1998). Without going into detail with regard to the shortcomings of this approach (cf. Stone Sweet/Sandelholtz 1998), it is obvious that phenomena like the Danish Maastricht referendum, and even more the latest Euro referendum, can hardly be interpreted as interest-guided policy: In Denmark, the most powerful interest groups and the government were doomed to failure in supporting a positive voting result, and the outcome of both referenda – obviously were at odds with all economic reason (Stahl 1999: 288f.).

In the context of the so-called "third debate" in IR theory (Lapid 1989), some supporters of constructivist approaches have pointed to 'national identity' as an explanation for states' foreign policy behaviour (e.g. Aggestam 1999, Jepperson et al. 1996). Accordingly, they posit that EU member states' different national identities generate different European and foreign policies as long as the social construction of collective identity takes place on the national rather than the European level. Conversely, in these scholars' view, a European foreign policy takes shape inasmuch as identity is constructed on the European level and as the EU gains "actorness" in international politics (cf. Bretherton/Vogler 1999: 233-236).

1.2 Organisation of the paper

In the following, the question is addressed to what extent the EU member states' different behaviour in the context of the European foreign and security policy is shaped by specific forms of national identity. After some more remarks about the theoretical and methodological foundations of this paper (section 2), the general patterns of foreign policy behaviour of four selected EU member states (Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Denmark) in security policy and in European policy will be analysed according to the method of structured, focussed comparison³ (George 1979). On the basis of a catalogue of criteria, general

the EC as regulated by the EC Treaty, other international organisations or bi- or multilateral ad-hoc-cooperation with EU participation.

³ In our view, the selected states sufficiently represent the EU's heterogeneity not only with regard to material factors such as demographic size, economic power, geographic location, etc., but also with regard to such factors

behavioural profiles of these states will be drawn up (section 3). In a second step, the relevant foreign policy discourses in the particular member states will be analysed (section 4). Discourse analysis is methodically central to the analysis of the interrelation between identity and behaviour (cf. Wæver 1995; Larsen 1997: 3-33; Milliken 1999).⁴ The basic assumption is that national identity takes shape in discourses and so – by way of the intra-societal discourse – indirectly influences a state's foreign policy behaviour. Discourse analysis thus may serve to sharpen our understanding of the differences in the behaviour of the selected EU member states.

The country-specific discourse profiles are drawn up by reference to secondary literature on historical foreign policy discourses. First, they serve the determination of the particular discourse structures and discourse formations. The term *discourse structure* denotes the formal way which a discourse takes within a society, i.e. it identifies the persons, groups and institutions involved. The structure is formed by the essential participants of the discourse – i.e. those persons or institutions which actively influence the discourse and thus the (re)construction of identity by their argumentation and activity – as well as by other participants. Since the examined states are exclusively Western European democracies, it can be assumed that discourses will be decisively influenced by the particular government and that the constitutional system provides a basic orientation with regard to the relevant discourse participants. The term *discourse formation* denotes an identity-based pattern of argumentation which involves directions for action. Discourse formations reflect basic elements of a society's construction of identity which have been communicatively confirmed in former discourses – which are viewed here as historical phases within a discourse formation – and are thus quite stable. Therefore, the discourse profiles serve the identification of elements of national identity.

In examining relevant discourses on European foreign policy, it will be shown which discourse turns out as dominant and how a discourse hegemony could be reached which legitimates particular foreign policy behaviours. The distribution of functions among different institutions can vary from state to state. Therefore, potentially idiosyncratic discourse structures necessitate reference to different basic sources for different states: For instance, parliamentary debates in Germany have another function and meaning as in France, and

which shape the structure of intra-societal discourses and which therefore are significant in the context of our research design (e.g. political system, constitutional traditions, basic social values etc.).

⁴ Assuming that "social facts" such as national identity are created via discourses, our analysis gives priority to identity-related intra-societal discourses about options or demands of foreign policy behaviour. We thus dissociate ourselves from methodological individualism in that we reduce the relevance of social actors to that of participants in discourses. For the difference between "social facts" and "objective facts", see Searle (1970): 50ff., and Kratochwil (1989): 21ff.

public opinion polls are more significant in Denmark than in Germany because of the frequent Danish referenda. As relevant text sources for discourse analysis, press statements of the governing party or coalition and of the opposition, parliamentary debates and party programmes are particularly important. In addition, further text sources such as public opinion polls, leading articles etc. are considered inasmuch as they seem to be essential with regard to the system of rule and in particular the legitimation of policies (e.g. weak/strong position of the parties, possibility of referenda, position of the constitutional court etc.).

Since the empirical examination of our research design has not yet been completed, this paper confines itself to two discourses which will be analysed profoundly as examples. These are, firstly, the German discourse about the participation of armed forces in out-of-area operations, and secondly, the French discourse about the ratification of the Maastricht treaty (section 4). It should, however, be kept in mind that the purpose of this paper is not the derivation and stringent test of hypotheses. Rather, it takes a heuristic approach, combined with a plausibility probe (cf. Eckstein 1975: 104-113). Therefore, the conclusions to be drawn in the final section (section 5) will only be of a preliminary character.

2. National Identity and Foreign Policy Discourse

2.1 Identity as a Basis of Foreign Policy Behaviour

In the following, national identity is understood as a relatively stable social construction which involves the self-image of a nationally constituted society.⁵ The development of a specific identity and the possible modification of its content is always a product of social interaction and communication (Mead 1973: 222, 244f., Preston 1997: 7, Weller 1999: 4). National identity consists of active and inactive elements and poses a framework within which a certain behaviour is regarded as appropriate by all members of the society. However, this framework is defined very widely and principally permits different behaviours in different situations. Which behaviour prevails is subject to identity-related, intra-societal discourses, in which reference can be made to different elements of identity. National identity therefore represents the framework of reference which is communicatively activated in the discourse (cf. Cruz 2000: 277). The discourse is the medium by which meaning is attached to identity in

⁵ National identity – supposed to represent a specific form of collective identity – is based on a people's self-definition as a "nation" with a common history. The emergence of national identity presupposes that the perception of the social world held by the members of the "nation" is shaped by a specific categorisation which has great significance for the social identity of the individual. It follows from our understanding of national identity that it is not the state which we define as the carrier of national identity but the collectivity of human individuals who define themselves as the "nation" and identify with the institutions of the state as the political expression of the nation's collective identity. For the differentiation of social and collective identity, as well as the different concepts of identities in international relations in general, see Weller 2000: 10.

a specific situation. In a discourse, it is determined which elements of a society's collective identity become 'active', i.e. give meaning to a concrete situation.

In a democratic society, it can be assumed that all past or future decisions accord with national identity because they must be legitimised vis-à-vis the population and thus accord to its interpretation of its self-image. In this context, a discourse concerning a specific behaviour does not have to temporally precede the behaviour, but it can also emerge post factum in order to legitimise past actions. However, we assume that foreign policy decision-makers in democracies do not exceed the range of behavioural options covered by the referential framework of national identity, even if the concerned discourse emerges only afterwards. In this context, national identity is not the direct "cause" of behaviour. Rather, national identity provides "reasons" (and justifications) for different behaviours.⁶ The way in which national identity concretely effects a state's foreign policy behaviour depends on the situation-specific factors and on the development of the discourse.⁷

2.2 The Significance of Foreign Policy Discourses

The term *discourse* here refers to a communicative interaction that argumentatively seeks to link the elements of identity and behavioural preferences in accordance with the societally accepted logic of appropriateness,⁸ based on national identity.⁹ In democratic societies, political discourses have various functions: they explain political events, justify political actions, (re)interpret historical memories and (re)construct identity.

A discourse can develop a certain (and limited) momentum of its own; but discourses do not generate themselves. The inception and progress of a discourse is affected considerably

⁶ For the differentiation between "cause of action" and "reasons for action", see Kratochwil/Ruggie 1986.

⁷ Of great importance for the course of discourses are so-called "discursive events", i.e. such events which are made the subject of a broad discourse. Events such as a nuclear disaster or an election result do not become significant unless a discourse about them emerges. Only if this happens, the event becomes part of social reality. The "real" and the discursive event do not need to correspond with regard to their extent and significance: If a nuclear disaster is concealed, it will not become a discursive event, no matter how many lives it costs (Jäger 1993: 157). Thus, discourses do not simply reflect objective reality, but the social interpretation of 'reality' (Milliken 1999:236). If a real event becomes discursive, we call it "formative" inasmuch as it becomes an issue of a societal discourse in which reference is made to concrete elements of identity.

⁸ The logic of appropriateness posits that „behaviors (beliefs as well as actions) are intentional but not wilful. They involve fulfilling the obligations of a role in a situation, and so of trying to determine the imperatives of holding a position. (...) Within a logic of appropriateness, a sane person is one who is, in touch with identity' in the sense of maintaining consistency between behavior and a conception of self in a social role“ (March/ Olsen 1989: 160f.). See also Finnemore 1996: 28-31.

⁹ In our definition, discourses only comprise identity-related argumentations. In contrast, the term "debate" here refers to a general controversy over a particular issue. As a generic term, a "debate" includes all statements on a specific issue. Debates often carry on for a long time and can include several discourses on a particular issue. They thus also reflect controversies between different discourse patterns. For instance, the general German debate about the participation of German armed forces in out-of-area operations carried on from 1991 until 1999. Irrespective of other argumentations, at least two discourses can be discerned within that period, one about the Bosnian conflict from 1991 until 1995 and another one about the Kosovo conflict in 1998/1999.

by the main participants of the discourse. The relationship between the discourse participants, the discourse and its structural and substantial context is a "dialectic" one: On the one hand, the discourse is subject to the influence of the context, and on the other, it itself contributes to the shaping of the context. Depending on their social power position, the participants of the discourse can influence its progress more or less strongly, but are in this capacity themselves influenced by actual or former discourses. Discourses define those actors which are authorised to speak or act and therefore can influence the communicative construction of systems of meaning. This occurs in practice, for instance, when a person, a group or an institution has an exposed position according to the particular state's constitution (e.g. office-holders). Such actors are called "privileged storytellers" (Milliken 1999: 236). Therefore, discourses are not non-hierarchical:

„Keeping in mind that words, expressions, propositions, etc., change their meaning according to the positions held by those who use them, and the corollary logic of discourses as hegemony-seeking, it is not surprising that the government narrative strives to monopolize the meanings of the above terms.”

(Bach 1999: 144)

Within a discourse, various groups seek to achieve a *discourse hegemony*, i.e. they seek to assert themselves and their identity-related pattern of argumentation and thus to establish a dominant discourse pattern. Townson calls this "linguistic dominance".¹⁰

In order to convince the population that they act 'appropriately', the participants of the discourse seek to create an argumentative link to a particular element of identity. This can also be a previously passive element which is then reconstructed in the discourse, is provided with a new meaning with reference to the specific behaviour and is thus 'activated'. However, a discourse participant has more prospects for being argumentatively persuasive when he links the intended behaviour with an active identity element, i.e. when he refers to an already existing discourse formation. This existing construction is already internalised, it can be even institutionalised and thus appears 'normal' to the major part of society.

¹⁰ "Linguistic dominance means that a discourse has established a dominant perception of reality, a narrative in which the meanings of terms are defined by their relative space in the dominant story, (...)." Townson 1992, quoted from Hoffman/ Knowles 1999: 15. According to Townson, three fundamental aspects are central for the struggle for linguistic (discursive) dominance (Townson 1992: 25-33): "naming", i.e. the establishment of new terms in a discourse, e.g. "peace-keeping forces"; "referencing", i.e. seeking to establish linkages with existing terms which have positive connotations but are not ideologically contingent (e.g. morality, responsibility, etc.); and "signifying", i.e. being able to dominate a particular discourse and being the only one who knows the "true" meaning of the term. The actor who is able to dominate these three aspects within a discourse controls the attachment of meaning to specific terms (linguistic dominance) and therefore controls the discourse (discursive dominance or discourse hegemony). The resulting dominant discourse concurs most with common experiences and other indicators of "truth", rendering it with a "veil of normality".

By means of discourse analysis, it can be shown which values and elements of identity are basic for a society's self-conception and which values or elements of identity are significant in certain contexts. Discourses create a common sense with which a large section of the population concurs. Thus, discourses – inasmuch as they have been established – reduce the possibility for societal resistance against particular state actions but, on the other hand, also impose limits to state action. Discourse analysis can show why an analysed system structures and limits political options in a way that leaves only particular options to decision-makers.

3. General Profiles of Foreign Policy Behaviour

In this section, the most important results of the general profiles of foreign policy behaviour of the four examined states are summed up briefly. It thus gives an overview of the guiding principles of these states' foreign policy behaviour from 1945 to the mid-1990s. In order to guarantee a good measure of comparability and to keep the description as short as possible, the behavioural profiles are not specifically presented for each state but according to selected analytical criteria. These criteria are:

1. Prioritisation of policy areas: This refers to how the particular states establish priorities, especially between security and European policy, and which further policy areas they view as significant.
2. Preferred partner countries: Here, the central bilateral relation patterns in the security and European policies of the examined states are assessed.
3. Preferred type of cooperation in security policy: This criterion refers to unilateral versus multilateral actions in security policy on the one hand, and to the preferred institutional framework for security cooperation on the other. In a rather simplifying manner, we distinguish between "Atlanticists" (states with a clear preference for NATO) and "Europeans" (states with a preference for EU- or WEU-based frameworks for security cooperation).
4. Instruments of security policy: Here, we deal with the particular states' attitudes towards military action and their general repertoire of instruments of foreign and security policy.
5. Behaviour with regard to the implementation of EC/EU law: This concerns the willingness of the examined states to implement regulations and directives of the European Commission.

6. Positions on EU integration: This criterion – above all referring to the ‘deepening’ of European integration in terms of further supranationalisation – is assessed for four distinctive historical turning points of European integration, namely, the Single European Act (SEA), the Maastricht Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty and the Nice Treaty. We distinguish between several categories of behaviour: "Promoters" are states which took great efforts in supporting the progress of EU integration; "supporters" are those states which were in favour of the deepening process without taking such great efforts; "passive compliers" are states which neither supported nor impeded such progress; "reluctant followers" are states which generally complied with the deepening of EU integration but at least temporarily and/or subliminally resisted it; finally, the category "obstructors" refers to those states which actively resisted the deepening process.¹¹ However, it should be kept in mind that the ascription of these categories is very summary. Especially, it cannot do justice to possible changes within a particular state's policy over time (e.g. support before, but resistance after, the passing of a specific treaty on EU integration).

7. Positions on EU Enlargement: This criterion also refers to the ascription of the categories developed in the context of the deepening of EU integration. Here, we again distinguish four temporal observation points, namely, the first Northern enlargement (the U.K., Ireland and Denmark, 1973), the Southern enlargement (Greece, 1981, and Spain and Portugal, 1986), the second Northern enlargement (Sweden, Finland and Austria, 1995) and the aspired Eastern enlargement (Poland and other possible candidate countries, not before 2004).

8. Positions on the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP): This criterion is also assessed according to the categories of behaviour and temporal observation points as developed for the deepening of EU integration.

9. Positions on the development of a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP): Here, we again refer to the same categories of behaviour. Temporal observation points are the treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice.

3.1 Prioritisation of Policy Fields

In comparing the relative significance of the policy areas of "security" and "Europe", two results stand out. The first one concerns French foreign policy which is characterised by the

¹¹ These categories which, following Zartman (1994), initially were established as role ascriptions within the context of the research project on "civilian powers" at the Chair for International Relations and Foreign Policy of

primacy of security policy over European policy. This distinguishes France sharply from Germany whose foreign policy priorities are inverse. The second striking result refers to the two "small" EU member states, the Netherlands and Denmark. Both seek to maintain a balance between security and European policy and to attach the same significance to both.

3.2 Preferred Partners

Despite their different priorities, France and Germany traditionally represent a euro-political tandem, the so-called "motor" of European integration. As a consequence of the Treaty of Friendship of 1963, the German-French relations became the most institutionalised bilateral relationship in the world (Ziebur 1997; Woyke 2000). Both states jointly launched numerous initiatives concerning European policy, directed especially by Helmut Schmidt and Giscard d'Estaing as well as Helmut Kohl and François Mitterand (Paterson 1993). Nevertheless, there were occasionally also considerable differences and frictions between both partners, e.g. concerning qualified majority decisions in the Council of Ministers ('Empty Chair policy') and, recently (in Nice), concerning the distribution of votes in the Council.

On the other hand, the Netherlands and Denmark stand out for their special relationship to their immediate neighbours. Accordingly, Dutch European policy is marked by frequent common initiatives and positions with the other Benelux countries (Coolsaet/Soetendorp 2000:139f.), whereas Denmark cooperates particularly intensive with Sweden and Finland in European affairs since the latter two countries' accession to the EU in 1995, however mainly limited to traditional "Nordic" policy fields such as environmental and social policy (Pagell 2000: 32).

In security policy, France and Germany strengthened their cooperation during the last two decades. Recently, France – though from a rather reserved position – even intensified its security cooperation with the U.S. and the U.K. (Howorth 2000), whereas Germany generally maintained close relations with the U.S. in security policy (Maull 2000: 69f.). The Netherlands and Denmark also traditionally oriented their security policy in particular towards the U.S. and the U.K. (Voorhoeve 1979: 145-150; von Handel 1997: 24). While the Netherlands also intensified its cooperation with Germany in recent years (e.g. by means of the German-Dutch Corps), Denmark oriented its security policy towards the Baltic Sea region after the end of the Cold War (Udenrigsministeriet 1993).

3.3 Preferred Way of Cooperation in Security Policy

the University of Trier (cf. Frenkler et al. 1997), are not used as role ascriptions here but only as taxonomic

In accordance with its general priorities in foreign policy, France is the only state examined here to have taken unilateral military action even in fairly recent times (e.g. in Chad 1983).¹² But in recent years, French security policy was also characterised by a trend towards more multilateral military action (above all in the Gulf crisis and in the Balkans; s. Saliou 1993: 687ff.). For the other examined states, however, multilateralism was absolutely dominant in security policy.

French security policy is generally characterised by a preference for a "European" framework for security and defence cooperation, while the Netherlands and Denmark pursued a clearly "Atlanticist" security policy. Whereas Denmark still clings to this policy and thus stands aside of military cooperation within the EU (Larsen 2000: 113), the Netherlands recently made certain compromises between a "European" and an "Atlanticist" orientation in security policy (Pijpers 1996: 251; Homann 2000). Germany, after having been clearly "Atlanticist" during the Cold War, turned more in the "European" direction since unification, in particular in the wake of the wars in the former Yugoslavia (Maull 2000: 73).

3.4 Instruments of Security Policy

Whereas the other examined states regard military action as an ultima ratio in security policy (Honig 1994: 142; Maull 1999: 4; Jakobsen 2000: 177), France had little reservations against military action as an instrument of security policy, as it is shown by its aforementioned unilateral military actions of the past.

It is conspicuous that the Netherlands' and Denmark's participation in military operations – with, and recently even without, the mandate of the UN Security Council – is over-proportional in comparison with their respective resources (Honig 1994; Everts 1997). Still in the 1990s, Germany refused to join military operations, and only after the clarification of the legal situation concerning German participation in out-of-area operations by the Constitutional Court in 1994, Germany increasingly took part in military operations (cf. Baumann 2001; Maull 2000).

3.5 Implementation of EC/EU Law

Out of the states examined here, Denmark shows by far the highest willingness to implement regulations and directives of the EU Commission (97 per cent implementation rate average for the period 1990-1997; data here and in the following according to Peters 2001: 31). Dutch

categories for observable foreign policy behaviour.

implementation policy is also marked by high compliance (94.1 per cent), but in the context of the so-called *Securitel* affair of 1996, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for the first time stated that the Netherlands had violated an EU directive (Pijpers 1997/98: 355f.).¹³ Compared with these two countries, ECJ judgements against Germany and France are more frequent. Germany's implementation rate (92.2 per cent) is even a bit lower than that of France (92.7 per cent). It is conspicuous that the already high implementation rate of the Netherlands showed the highest increase at the end of the 1990s (+3.1 per cent), and that even the Danish rate increased further (+0.7 per cent), while the German and in particular the French rates are decreasing (-1.1 per cent and -2.2 per cent, respectively).

3.6 Positions on the Deepening of EU Integration

As far as the further supranationalisation of the EU is concerned, the four examined states are divided into two camps. Denmark pursued an integration-sceptical European policy, oscillating between the categories of "passive complier" and "obstructor" over all temporal observation points. The same applies to France, with the exception of the Maastricht Treaty. The characterisation of Denmark as an "obstructor" in connection with the Maastricht treaty is less a consequence of an integration-sceptical governmental position during the negotiations but rather a product of the negative referendum on the ratification of the Treaty. However, the so-called "national compromise" in European policy between the Danish parties and the population, hastily negotiated after the referendum, had a hindering effect on the Danish policy in Amsterdam and Nice (Petersen 1999: 48).

In contrast, Germany and the Netherlands generally pursued strongly pro-integration European policies. This applies even more to the Netherlands than to Germany, especially concerning the CFSP which, according to the Dutch 1991 draft treaty for Maastricht (which was, however, rejected by all EC member states except Belgium) was supposed to be placed within the first pillar of the EU (Woyke 1991/92: 301f.; Wester 1992: 172-174). As a consequence of the debates evolving about ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in several EU member states and in the wake of deliberations about institutional reforms necessary for EU enlargement, the general Dutch preference for supranationalism decreased (Kwast-van Duursen 1996; Soetendorp 1998, 2000). In spite of its generally more than merely supportive

¹² Apart from France, of all the states examined here only the Netherlands ever took unilateral military action in the context of the unsuccessful Dutch attempt to re-establish colonial rule over Indonesia in 1948. When West Irian seceded in 1962, The Hague did not seriously reflect the option of taking military action.

¹³ Furthermore, most recently the allegation was raised by the EU Commission that the Netherlands had distributed a large proportion of its share of subventions out of the European Social Fund in violation of relevant prescriptions of EC/EU law (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 4/5 August 2001: 8).

integration policy, Germany at least temporarily (in Amsterdam) fell back into the position of a "passive complier", whereas, in Nice, it could prove to be a "promoter" of further EU integration again (cf. Janning 1996; Harnisch/Stahl 2000).

3.7 Positions on the EU-enlargement

All in all, Germany and Denmark pursued the strongest pro-enlargement policies. Germany not only supported all former enlargements without reservations (cf. Katzenstein 2000: 77), but can also be regarded as a decisive "promoter" of the aspired Eastern enlargement (Freudenstein 1995: 111f.). Denmark, which itself joined the EU in 1973 in the course of the first Northern enlargement, also supported the Southern enlargements 1981/86 and was a decisive "promoter" of the Northern enlargement 1995. It also persistently stood up for the Eastern enlargement, in particular with regard to the Baltic states (Hansen 1996). Already before 1973, the Netherlands had supported the U.K.'s accession to the EC, and can therefore be regarded as a "promoter" of the first Northern enlargement (Riemersma 1989; Reef 1995: 70-85). On the other hand, The Hague remained relatively neutral in questions of enlargement thereafter and did neither impede nor support, lest promote, further enlargements, and the Dutch position vis-à-vis the aspired Eastern enlargement is not outright negative but sceptical (Harryvan et al. 1996: 116). France in general pursues a policy sceptical of enlargements. De Gaulle's veto impeded the first Northern enlargement for a long time, and only the Southern enlargements of 1981/86 were supported by Paris. Whereas France pursued a policy of "passive complier" during the second Northern enlargement (de la Serre/Lequesne 1994/95: 309, Guerin-Sendelbach 1994: 289), its attitude towards the aspired Eastern enlargement is even more passive, even though it is not obstructive (Deubner 1999).

3.8 Positions on the CFSP

The examined states' attitudes towards the development of a CFSP only partly reflects their "Atlanticist" or "European" preferences concerning security policy. This is because a security and defence dimension is not necessarily constitutive for the CFSP. Only Denmark remained sceptical towards the institutionalisation of the CFSP over all observation points, oscillating between "passive complier" and "obstructor", but mainly characterisable as "reluctant follower" as Copenhagen did not actively obstruct the development of the CFSP (apart from its referendum-caused opting-out in the context of the Maastricht Treaty). Over time, France changed from a "reluctant follower" (SEA) to a "promoter" (since Amsterdam) of the CFSP (Wagner 2001: 69-73). The Netherlands always supported the development of the CFSP –

though it long sought to exclude defence as far as possible (Coolsaet/Soetendorp 2000: 136f.). In contrast, Germany can be regarded as a CFSP "promoter" since the SEA (Wagner 2001: 63-69).

3.9 Positions on the CESDP

After France had come to support the establishment of the CFSP, it can be regarded as the decisive "promoter" of the CESDP. Since the CESDP emerged as a consequence of the Maastricht treaty, Germany indeed supported it but only, together with France, became a "promoter" during its Presidency over the European Council in the running-up to the Nice IGC in 1999 (Schmalz 2000: 228). As mentioned above, the Netherlands was very sceptical about the CESDP for a long time but did not actively obstruct it. Since about 1994, a gradual increase of Dutch support for the CESDP can be noticed (Pijpers 1996; Homann 2000), which was proved during the negotiations on the Amsterdam Treaty, in the course of which the Netherlands also changed its attitude concerning the integration of the WEU into the EU framework (Kwast-van Duursen 1996: 53-55). Denmark, which was an "obstructor" at the time of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, thereafter only reluctantly fell into line with the development of the CESDP. The CESDP is also covered by the "opt-out" sections that were passed as a result of the Maastricht referendum, and up to the present, Copenhagen does not take part in any military cooperation with a view to the development of the CESDP (Heurlin 1996; Larsen 2000).

3.10 Conclusion

This admittedly very cursory survey shows that there are indeed considerable behavioural differences between the four examined states concerning European and security policy. In addition, it appears difficult to subsume these differences under central orientations comprising all policy areas. Thus, the Danish example suggests at first sight that a preference for NATO in security policy corresponds with a general scepticism against EU integration. However, the Dutch example proves that this does not have to be the case. On the other hand, France's foreign policy behaviour indicates that a preference for a European security framework does not necessarily result in enthusiasm concerning EU integration. The specific behavioural patterns of the four examined states thus appear to be idiosyncratic to a great extent.

Despite a good amount of observable continuity, this survey shows that in some instances there also was considerable change. In security policy, there is a general trend

towards more "Europeanism" and – particularly in Germany – towards a stronger military commitment. In European policy, the states examined here appear to come closer together: Whereas France gradually (and apart from Nice) came to support EU integration, integration-sceptical tendencies have become stronger in Germany and the Netherlands. Denmark, however, did not abandon its integration-sceptical attitude, despite its convincing record with regard to implementation of EC/EU law.

In the next section, we attempt to further the understanding of these tendencies towards idiosyncratic behaviour in security and European policy by means of analysing policy area-specific discourses.

4. Comparing Foreign Policy Discourses in Europe

4.1 Discourse Structure and Main Discourse Participants

In general terms, foreign policy traditionally is of little public importance in the four examined countries. For a long time, foreign policy issues were mainly discussed and decided upon by elites, and this was institutionally embodied by means of the dominance of ministerial bureaucracies, in particular the Foreign Ministry. Since the 1960s, it was mainly two factors which brought about an increasing public relevance of foreign policy issues, even though in a different way: The first one was the Europeanisation of governments (Ladrech 1994: 70) by their lasting integration into the EC/EU system. The second factor was formative events in foreign policy. Naturally, the primary impact of the Europeanisation of national governments concerned European policy and led to an increase in number of institutionally integrated discourse participants. Only in the 1990s, however, wide public debates about European policy emerged, mainly caused by the referenda on the Maastricht Treaty. In security policy, by contrast, it was primarily formative events, such as wars or problematic alliance questions, which repeatedly led public debates on security policy, though without causing significant institutional changes of the bureaucracy.

4.1.1 Security Policy: Contested vs. Uncontested Identities

In all states examined here, the government remained the "privileged storyteller" in security policy, and the discourse structure remained rather restricted. Nevertheless, there were differences between the states. In France, only few broad security debates occurred. This suggests an *uncontested identity* inasmuch as security policy is concerned. In Denmark, there also were only few debates on security policy, while they were more frequent in the

Netherlands and in Germany. Thus, the existing security policy identity was repeatedly challenged in these countries, opening avenues for discursive changes in security policy.

Even though in Denmark, the parliament (*Folketing*) holds a strong position, foreign policy debates were marked by consensus. An exception was the so-called "footnote policy" during the 1980s, when the government was forced by the parliament to get NATO to approve exceptional regulations for Denmark's participation in the alliance (Tonra 2001: 147). But it is significant that the last debate on NATO membership took place a long time ago. In France, the President holds a dominant position in security policy because this foreign policy area is, in constitutional practice, treated as "domaine réservée". As an example, the Second Gulf War proves the very restricted French discourse structure: It was Mitterrand himself who announced French military action against Iraq among a small team of advisers. Only the Prime and Foreign Ministers had been consulted, the *Assemblée Nationale* had no possibility to discuss the topic, and the Defence Minister resigned because of the decision (Kimmel 1995: 26). Even though there were several public debates, e.g. about de Gaulle's NATO policy or the *force de frappe*, and even though the debates on the Bosnian Wars instigated intellectual discourses on French foreign policy (Howorth 1994), the restricted French security policy discourse structure remained unchanged (Blunden 2000: 34).

In the Netherlands, the public also generally showed little interest in foreign policy. The foreign policy elite is relatively small, and the Foreign Minister's formal supremacy over all foreign policy gives him an outstanding position within the institutional structure.¹⁴ Nevertheless, formative events occasionally led to heated public debates. Thus, for instance, the debates on the decolonisation of Indonesia, the Vietnam war, the deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles and the massacre of Srebrenica all contributed to an increase of public interest in security policy (Soetendorp 1989; Honig/Both 1997).

The example of Germany shows this increase in public awareness about foreign policy even clearer. The Gulf war and the pressure of the allies to join in military efforts aimed at the liberation of Kuwait provoked a debate on German participation in out-of-area operations which lasted several years. In its course, security policy was debated beyond its traditional institutions (Chancellor, Foreign Minister, Defence Minister) and found great resonance both in the *Bundestag* and in the public media. Historically, the 1950s debate on rearmament and

¹⁴ The Dutch constitution includes the department principle, which invests the Foreign Minister with supreme responsibility over the whole of foreign policy, and the cabinet principle, which prescribes that all important decisions in foreign affairs must be made collectively. In contrast, the Dutch constitution does not contain any principle such as the German principle of the Chancellor's directive competence (*Richtlinienkompetenz*), which invests the German head of government with final decision-making power in all policy areas, including foreign affairs.

(although not to the same extent) on *Ostpolitik* in the 1970s and the deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles in the 1980s indicate that such broad security policy debates are not unusual in Germany. The discursive power of the German Foreign Minister is significant due to his role as vice chancellor in a coalition government, but he is not as powerful as the Dutch Foreign Minister because in Germany, the Defence Minister, who belongs to another coalition party than the Foreign Minister, is relatively independent. Very conspicuous is the outstanding position of the Constitutional Court (*Bundesverfassungsgericht*), which had final juridical decision-making power concerning the out-of-area issue and even more concerning the ratification of the Treaty on European Union.

4.1.2 European Policy: Institutional Expansion and Pluralisation of Discourses

The development in European policy differs from that in security policy. Europeanisation did not only infect the member states' bureaucracies but had – due to institutional procedures such as the ratifications of the European treaties – a pluralizing effect on discourse structures. Elite discourses broadened because of the need to consult several ministries, organised interest groups and the parliament (in Germany also the *Länder* governments) and to link them with the respective EU institutions in Brussels and Strasbourg. Usually, this led to a strengthening of coordination organs such as the Dutch Permanent Committee for European Affairs or the French inter-ministerial general office (the SGCI) (Lequesne 1993: 98ff.). The highest increase of power of a coordination organ can be noticed in Denmark, where decisions of the Parliament's European Affairs Committee have more and more influenced governmental positions in European Council decision-making (Dosenrode 2000: 388). In Germany, where no such coordination organ exists, the gradual decrease of the power of the Foreign Ministry was accompanied by the increasing significance of other ministries (above all the Ministry of Finance) and the Chancellor's Office (Siwert-Probst 1998). This is also a consequence of the fact that the heads of government were generally strengthened at the expense of foreign ministers by the gradual enhancement of the status of the European Council over the last twenty years, not least as a result of intergovernmental conferences. Thus, even in the Dutch case, the participation of the Prime Minister in the European Council has not replaced, but at least reduced, the Foreign Minister's supremacy in foreign policy with a view to European affairs. In France, Mitterrand's habit of keeping important decisions concerning European policy secret as long as possible (Haywood 1993: 281) can be regarded as another indicator for a restricted discourse structure. However, in times of *cohabitation*, the government was able to emancipate itself to some extent from the President, a fact which led

to a double-headed French representation in the EU and to an increased significance of the government's Minister for European Affairs.

Ratification procedures required a stronger participation of national parliaments and brought about politicisation of European affairs (Luthardt 1993). In the Netherlands, where the coalition governments normally rest on a great parliamentary majority in Parliament and where the specific requests of 'single-issue groups' are considered by the government at an early stage of decision-making, this process went on rather smoothly, despite increasing Euroscepticism (Woyke 1992/93: 292-296).

By contrast, in Denmark, this process had drastic effects. Favoured by frequent minority governments, the *Folketing* generally has a strong position in European policy. Due to the constitutionally prescribed referenda, the discourse structure widened even more, and in the wake of the Maastricht referenda, the discourse on European policy spread throughout the whole of society. The result of the first referendum in 1992 revealed an extreme elite-mass split between the government, the parliament and the parties on the one hand, and the population on the other (Thune 1993/94: 315; Petersen 1999: 48). After the referendum, the extra-parliamentary anti-European movements ("*Folkebevægelsen mod EU*" and "*Junibevægelsen*") increasingly organised themselves, successfully establishing themselves as a powerful discourse participant outside the governmental system. This was evidenced by the referendum on the Euro in September 2000.

In France, the European discourse, which had traditionally been restricted to the governmental elite, was opened up in an unforeseen manner as Mitterrand decided to hold a referendum on the European treaties. As a result, the formerly nearly uninfluential Parliament was strengthened (Mazzucelli 1997: 228).

In Germany, ratification was unproblematic at first because the executive succeeded in co-opting the federal governments into the decision-making process by means of a constitutional amendment. Furthermore, the established parties were in agreement on the European issue. However, the constitutional amendment boosted the *Länder* governments' positions as powerful discourse participants. The referenda in the neighbouring states and the hesitant and troublesome ratification in the British House of Commons provoked an increasingly animated and critical debate which continued up to the late 1990s and was mainly concerned with the abandoning of the D-Mark.

4.2 Identity Elements, Argumentation Patterns, and Discourse Formations

4.2.1 Example 1: The French Discourse on Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty¹⁵

The account of the French discourse on ratification of the Maastricht Treaty will show how the conflict between contrasting elements of identity was argumentatively processed and settled. For this purpose, the ratification debate is especially suitable because the public discussion was vivid and included the whole of society (La Serre/Lequesne 1992/93: 315).¹⁶

The division line between the two large discourse formations went through all three main centrist parties, the Socialists (PS), the Gaullists (RPR), and the Centre (UDF), as well as the Greens (on the discourse participants, see Criddle 1993: 231ff.). In the following years, this schism continued to occupy the party system and led to frictions and initiatives for party mergers along the division line. Only the extreme parties, the Communists (PCF) and the Front National, were relatively united in voting against Maastricht. Among the Socialists (PS), President Mitterrand, European Minister Guigou, Bernard Kouchner and Jack Lang were successful in getting the majority of the party to vote in favour of Maastricht. Only the former minister of defence, Chevènement, and a small group of 'left-wing Jacobins' voted against it. The centre-right parties (UDF, CDS, PR, UDC) could also get large-scale approval of the Treaty among their membership, most of all because of the commitment of UDF head Giscard. However, UDF member de Villiers initiated a *combat de valeurs* against Maastricht. The Catholic Church and the industry were generally in favour of ratification. The Gaullists (RPR) revealed the deepest split. The party leadership (Chirac, Balladur) approved the Treaty rather dispassionately, but two former ministers (Séguin, Pasqua) were successful in gathering nearly half of the RPR supporters around them and in initiating a public counter-campaign. The Green Parties' positions were neither unambiguous. They avoided official statements on their respective party positions because the opinions of party members were too diverse (Appleton 1992: 9f.).

In this discourse, several elements of identities played a role and were argumentatively exploited equally by supporters and opponents of the Treaty. An important identity element in this discourse was the motive of preserving French uniqueness in the form of the *état-nation*. A second important element of identity was that of progress, modernisation and welfare which should be protected now and in the future. A third element was the French attitude vis-à-vis the "other", especially Germany, but also the U.S.. With a view to the relationship between French exceptionalism and the "other", the motive of the equilibrium (*équilibre*) was important (Larsen 1997: 123f.).

¹⁵ The following explanations refer to the intra-societal debate between 3 June 1992, when President Mitterrand declared to hold a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, and 20 September 1992, the day of the referendum.

Concerning the first element of identity named above, the main discourse participants were in agreement that the French state and the nation had generally to be preserved. But how this was to be guaranteed was rather controversial. The Maastricht opponents perceived the Treaty as a threat to French values and argumentatively exploited the term 'sovereignty' which would, in their view, be destroyed by means of EU citizenship and the European Central Bank (Mazzucelli 1997: 224). The supporters emphasised that French values were exportable and that the EU provided a perfect framework therefor. In this argumentation, the EU was portrayed as a vehicle for a *mission civilisatrice* (Holm 1997:133). In the course of the discourse, these two discourse formations were characterised as '*souverainistes*' and '*intégrationnistes*'.

The second element of identity – progress and modernisation – showed up in the Maastricht supporters' argumentation that the Monetary Union would strengthen the competitiveness of French industry. This element had already had some importance in earlier discourses on European policy, e.g. considering the integration of agricultural policy or Mitterrand's turnaround on economic policy at the beginning of the 1980s (Hoffmann 1987:301), and public opinion polls also verified the importance of this motive (Mazzucelli 1997:219). In contrast, the *souverainistes* – and especially the communists – viewed EMU as part of globalisation. Europe, thus their argument went, would become a technical-capitalist project which would cost France a lot of jobs.

Linked with this argumentation was the fear of U.S. cultural hegemony ('McDonaldisation') which would threaten French cultural independence (Ambler/Reichert 2001:33). Here, it becomes clear how several elements of identity, the belief in one's own progress and the construction of the "other" in form of the U.S., were linked with each other in this pattern of argumentation. The *intégrationnistes* used another reference to French sovereignty and its relation to the "other" in arguing that, on the one hand, the Euro would become an important counterweight to the U.S. Dollar and, on the other hand, a common Central Bank would end the dominance of the German Federal Bank and thus the 'asymmetry' in European monetary policy (Buffotot 1993:281). The question how to deal with Germany generally was of great importance in the debate; from the beginning, this issue had been a central motive for French European policy (Duchéne 1996: 28ff). The relevant discourse formations then differed as to whether a further integration or the balancing and containment of Germany would be the more successful strategy (Axt 1999: 468f.). Both argumentations emerged in the context of German unification and insecurity about Germany's

¹⁶ Kassim shows this in a more explicit way in arguing that the referendum provoked a 'crisis of the French

future foreign policy (Vernet 1992: 657f.). Whereas extremist opponents of the Treaty, such as the Front National but also the Gaullist Séguin, denounced a ‘Yes’ as collaboration with Germany, Treaty advocates such as former Prime Minister Rocard warned that a ‘No’ could cause a ‘second Munich’ (Stone 1993: 83). More moderate *intégrationnistes* such as Giscard d’Estaing foresaw at least the risk of a more unilateralist German foreign policy in the case of a French ‘No’ (Criddle 1993: 234f.). Finally, the historical “Rapallo motive” of a possible German-Russian rapprochement (Fritsch-Bournazel 1991) played a role which in this case favoured an integrationist strategy.

In the final result, 51.04 per cent of French voters supported ratification of the Treaty, ensuring a close victory for the Maastricht advocates.¹⁶

4.2.2 The Preservation of “the Self” and the Fear of “the Other”

In all states examined here, certain elements of identity are important which, however, differ in substance and importance. All states share with each other the element of national particularity, which is interpreted very positively in France (*‘exceptionnalisme’*), but also in Denmark (*pioneer country*). In Germany, this element is portrayed rather in negative terms (*‘Deutscher Sonderweg’*), a fact which causes a strong tendency towards multilateralism in German foreign policy (*‘Never alone!’*). Therefore, expectations of other countries are very important for debates about foreign policy in Germany, and these expectations are adapted and argumentatively exploited in German discourses in order to reject unilateralist argumentations. Accordingly, “Europe” appears in German discourses almost unanimously as a shared common destiny, a characterisation which is rather marginal in other societies.¹⁷ In contrast, the ‘fear of foreign rule’ and the ‘preservation of the self’ figure much more prominently in the three other states. As we have seen, this is the case with the French *‘souverainistes’* and the Danish Maastricht opponents by virtue of their argumentative linkage of these elements with the construction of sovereignty which must be preserved. The Danish anti-Europe movement constructed the EU as a threat to national values in the Maastricht debate; the EU thus is portrayed as an immoral and centralist bureaucracy. Interestingly, in the Netherlands, the fear of “foreign rule” expresses itself not as fear of Europe but as fear of the “big” EU member states. From this follows a strong Dutch preference for supranationalism and strong Community institutions: A strong European Commission and a

identity’ (Kassim 1997: 168).

¹⁶ On the evaluation of the result of the referendum, see Duhamel, O./Grunberg, G. 1992: „Référendum: les dix France“, in: *Le Monde*, 22 September 1992, pp. 1 and 7.

¹⁷ In France, for example, only parts of the centre-right parties (above all UDC, CDS) could be ascribed such a perception (Jung 1999: 91).

strong European Parliament, in this view, protect a “small” state like the Netherlands from being dominated by a “*directoire*” of the “big” EU member states.

4.2.3 Europe as market and vehicle

When Europe is constructed as “the other” and delineated from one’s own nationality, the question of the relationship between the two gains importance. Apart from a threat, Europe appears in all states as a vehicle for the propagation of nationally held values, such as the ideals of the French revolution for the the *intégrationnistes* in the Maastricht debate. Conversely, European integration has since the Treaties of Rome also been a means to modernise national societies and to make their economic institutions more competitive. In German discourses on European policy, the transfer of federalist structures to the European level and the tendency to export the German tendency to legalism figure prominently. The Dutch parties consensually share the view that Europe should be open and organised on the basis of free trade in order to keep Dutch economic prosperity. Through the European institutions, the Netherlands are furthermore able to pursue such ideas and values as the universality of human rights and the promotion of development which are closely connected with Dutch identity. Besides, there is the conviction that Europe is a civilising instrument for the peaceful balance between the formerly hostile European powers. In Denmark, a cost-benefit understanding of Europe is a nearly consensually shared element of identity among the political elite (‘Europe as market’). However, discourse formations differ in their view as to whether the Euro is necessary to keep Danish prosperity and whether CESDP is needed to improve European security. Over the last decade, the pro-Europeans have argued that the EU would help to export Danish values such as environmentalism, consumer protection, and social equality to the European level.¹⁸ Here, Danish ideas meet with that of French Prime Minister Jospin about a ‘social Europe’.

The future Europe usually is imagined as open and inclusive. This is most evident in the Netherlands and in Denmark where this idea correlates with a preference for free trade. Up to now, the idea of Europe as a shared common destiny is dominant in Germany as opposed to a rather utility-oriented partial discourse which seeks to condition future memberships more restrictively. Only in France, an exclusionist argumentation figures prominently (Wæver 1990: 481) as a result of the idea of “Europe as vehicle for own ideals”, allowing for a restrictive conditionality on accession by future candidates for membership.

¹⁸ Source: <http://www.dupi.dk/fmp4.0/web/en1111.html>.

4.2.4 Discourse Formations in Security Policy

In discourses about security policy, different images of Europe and the own state's position in the world can also be found. As an example for such an important discourse, the German debate on *out-of-area* operations shall be dealt with in more detail.

4.2.4.1 Example 2: The German discourse on participation in out-of-area operations

The course of the German discourse on the participation of German Armed Forces in combat missions outside the alliance territory (1991-1995) exemplifies how the conflict between opposing elements of identity was solved through their reconstruction.¹⁹ In this discourse, the fear of isolation and outside expectations on the part of the allies clash with the self-imposed restriction with regard to military missions outside the alliance territory.²⁰ Principally, two discourse patterns emerged in the 1990s, both of which are grounded in the discourse formation of Germany's special international responsibility as historical lesson of the Second World War. While one side argued that this lesson had to be self-restriction and multilateralism, the other side demanded an "appropriate" and "more determined" international appearance of Germany ("normalisation discourse", Hellmann 1997, 1999).

Even though the Federal Constitutional Court had formally ended the controversy about the constitutionality of a participation of the German Armed Forces in out-of-area missions by its judgement of 12 July 1994, the political discourse continued, mainly involving the political parties.²¹ In fact, large parts of the CDU/CSU and the FDP supported German Armed Forces missions in foreign countries whereas large parts of the SPD and the Greens rejected them. However, the argumentative division went across the parties (Müller 1994:134), especially the SPD and the Greens (Philippi 1997: 114, 127f). The oppositional sub-discourse reconstructed an element of identity which could be characterised as "Never again!". For a large part of the Greens, this meant "Never again war!", i.e. in their view, it principally proscribed any participation of German soldiers in military conflicts. Above all, it was Joschka Fischer who renewedly put this element of identity into question and, against the background of the massive violations of human rights in Bosnia, derived "Never again Auschwitz!" as the concomitant lesson of the past (Philippi 1997: 134). Subsequently, a discourse pattern emerged in which, with reference to the mentioned element of identity,

¹⁹ For detailed accounts of the German out-of-area debate, see Bach 1999: 119-146, Philippi 1997, and Müller 1994: 125-141.

²⁰ A comparison with the rearmament debate of the 1950s, however, shows how security policy issues have changed: The formerly prominent neutral discourse formation vanished and, after German unification, only appears in relics within the PDS.

²¹ At the beginning – before the background of the 1991 Second Gulf War– the discourse was also carried by a wider public in the form of numerous demonstrations.

missions of UN soldiers were propagated by several representatives of the Greens, while a part of the SPD even spoke in favour of combat missions under a UN mandate.

In the end, however, a majority of representatives of the CDU/CSU and FDP achieved hegemony in the discourse. Apart from a small part that insisted on a UN mandate and a constitutional amendment as a precondition for German participation in out-of-area operations, the majority argued in favour of unrestricted German participation in combat missions in cooperation with the allies. This argumentation was also anchored in the discourse formation of Germany's special responsibility and emphasised the necessity and moral obligation to maintain Germany's capacity and credibility as a loyal ally. Thus, they argued, Germany's responsibility commanded that Germany help the international community to succeed (Schönborn 1995: 9, Bach 1999: 133, 136). Closely connected with this argumentation is Germany's capacity as an ally; which proved to be a very effective instrument to fence off criticisms by the Social democrats. The allegation that everyone speaking against German participation in a mission endangered the efficiency of security alliances and made Germany untrustworthy and unqualified as an ally eventually overcame most reservations (Müller 1994: 131, Bach 1999: 138f). This argumentation was related to a second crucial element of the German construction of identity, namely, "Never alone!". From this, one can derive on the one hand Germany's tendency towards multilateralism, which was reshaped by representatives of the "normalisation discourse" in such a way that the Federal Republic, in proportion to its increased international importance, should take its seat among the other "normal" states and begin to play an active role in the alliance.²² On the other hand, this element of identity also expresses the fear of international isolation which also brought the critics within the SPD to concur with German participation (Philippi 1997: 122).²³ The pacifists also lost their argumentative power when CDU representatives referred to the soldiers not as mercenaries in a war but as policemen for the maintenance and restoration of international order, law and peace (Bach 1999: 167). Thus, according to this argumentation, everyone who was against the military mission in Bosnia and German participation therein was against peace and thus immoral.

²² Cf. e.g. Klaus Kinkel, Erklärung der Bundesregierung zur deutschen Mithilfe bei Friedensmissionen der Vereinten Nationen. In: Bulletin der Bundesregierung, 23.4.1993.

²³ In this context, representatives of the CDU and FDP introduced the terminology of the "new German special way" (*„neuer deutscher Sonderweg“*), which should be avoided in any case. This term generally has negative connotations in the Federal Republic. While it was understood as militarisation and expansion of German foreign policy during the Nazi dictatorship, the aspect of isolation received more and more importance in the course of the discourse. The term was even used by representatives of the opposition in intra-party discussions. This fact illuminates the reconstruction of an element of identity: By pointing at the danger of a "neuer deutscher Sonderweg" – i.e. isolation in international politics –, arguments in favour of German participation in military

The union parties and the FDP thus successfully employed terms which are related to basic elements of the German construction of identity and commonly have positive connotations such as responsibility and morality. Representatives of the CDU/CSU and FDP were able this way to gain control over the interpretation of the meaning of terms (linguistic dominance) and thereby over the discourse itself.

4.2.4.2 Denmark, France, Netherlands

After the shock caused by the failure of its neutrality policy during the Second World War, the Netherlands relied on the Atlantic alliance. The loss of its former status as colonial power did the rest to make the long-standing neutralist tradition of Dutch foreign policy disappear quickly and almost completely from discourses concerning foreign policy (Voorhoeve 1979: 45-49). At the same time, however, the Netherlands sought to continue its value-oriented foreign policy, especially in the UN, but this strong value orientation occasionally also influenced Dutch security policy within NATO. Thus, the Dutch discourse on the deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles shows a conflict between idealistic-international and alliance-loyal Atlanticist elements of identity (cf. Soetendorp 1989; van Staden 1985). Only after the Cold War, the fear that a closer European cooperation in security and defence policy would go at the expense of the transatlantic security-partnership was replaced by the conviction of Europe's role in world politics. In 1991, the idea that the EU could play a military role in the pacification of its direct periphery was first publicly stated by The Hague when it proposed an EC-based military intervention into the wars in former Yugoslavia (Honig 1994:142). Up to now, however, the Netherlands still attach priority to NATO over the EU in nearly all security and defence matters.

The weighing between U.S. security protection on the one hand, and the construction of European defence on the other, also was a prominent topic in the heated French debate about the European Defence Community (EDC) in the early 1950s. Other elements of identity, as they were described above in the analysis of the Maastricht discourse which took place nearly 40 years later, also showed up: the preservation of French sovereignty and the threat posed by Germany, linked with the "Rapallo motive" (Bjol 1966: 90ff). As is well known, the anti-integrationist position carried the day in this discourse.

The fear of Germany also plays a prominent role also in debates concerning security policy in Denmark. Traumatized by its defeat by Prussia in 1863, Denmark had to recognise again in World War II that it could neither expect aid from its European partners, nor could it

missions outside NATO territory were made. By contrast, in earlier times, it had precisely been such German

successfully maintain a neutral position. In the discourse about joining NATO after the War, the main Danish discourse participants preferred a “Nordic” security option. Only after this option had failed due to Norwegian-Swedish differences, Denmark turned to NATO as second-best alternative. Even though the internationalist and disarmament-oriented element of Danish identity occasionally clashed with alliance solidarity (such as in the case of the mentioned “footnote policy”), Danish security policy enjoyed increasing domestic support. As the discussions about a strengthening of the WEU in the 1980s and 1990s indicate, Denmark remains a convinced Atlanticist and is still sceptical about the development of European defence.

5. Conclusions: National identity, discourse analysis and the study of European Foreign Policy

Even though this paper, due to both its heuristic character and the yet uncompleted empirical analysis, could only produce some preliminary and cursory insights with a view to the usefulness of its theoretical and methodological approach, it has arrived at some encouraging results. Two points warrant special emphasis. The first concerns the usefulness of discourse analysis for the understanding of differences and idiosyncrasies in the foreign policy behaviour of different EU member states, especially with regard to foreign policy change. The second refers to the contribution of this approach to detecting the link between identity and behaviour in constructivist IR theory. After having discussed these two points in turn, we will conclude with some reflections about the possible contribution further research among the analytical lines which we have sketched can make to our understanding of the present and future European foreign policy.

The analysis of identity-based discourses can improve our understanding of the partially idiosyncratic behaviours of EU member states. Thus, understanding the particular problems and challenges of post-Cold War German security policy hardly appears possible at all without taking into account the discourse about the out-of-area problematique. Moreover, the analysis of the French Maastricht discourse has shown that identity-based patterns of argumentation are relevant in the deliberation and even more in the societal legitimation of certain foreign policy behaviours not only in security policy, but also in European policy. Discourse analysis thus sheds light on why states behave as they do in specific areas of foreign policy. This conclusion is supported by the problem-laden Danish European policy since Maastricht.

As became evident, discourse analysis as an scientific instrument for the investigation of identity-related contingencies of foreign policy appears to be especially promising where changes in foreign policy behaviour can be observed. The change in German security policy, as well as that in French European policy, reveal “contested identities” – elements of identity with controversial meanings which are then discursively reconstructed. If certain elements of identity are clear and undisputed, there normally occurs neither a discursive reconstruction of identity nor a corresponding change in foreign policy behaviour. This was the case for a long time with Dutch security policy and with German European policy. The concept of “formative events” has been of particular value for understanding foreign policy change. Formative events obviously can lead to communicative clashes about the prescriptive meaning of specific elements of national identity for foreign policy. Thus, with a view to Dutch security policy, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and especially the massacre of Srebrenica, with the inglorious role of Dutch UN troops therein, deeply influenced Dutch society with regard to its self-image concerning international security and probably even contributed to the change in Dutch security policy and the turning to CESDP. More precise and less speculative conclusions, however, are pending closer analysis of the relevant societal discourse in the Netherlands in the mid-1990s. But the importance of formative events has also become evident in the analysis of the German *out-of-area* discourse: Without the horrible atrocities in the former Yugoslavia, the debate would certainly not have had so much public impact, and the dramatic change observable in German security policy would probably not have occurred.

With regard to the issue of explaining the foreign policy behaviour of states by employing an identity-based approach, it must be stated very clearly that the concept of identity cannot serve as an approach to explaining foreign policy decision-making in specific situations. This is because an identity-based approach falls short of explaining in a strictly positivist sense concrete foreign policy behaviour. To use a metaphor which Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie (1986: 767) have used in another context: identity does not “cause” specific behaviours in the way in which a bullet through the heart causes death, but it provides a framework for societal discourses whose analysis can then indeed contribute to the understanding of foreign policy behaviour in specific situations. To use an example, the Danish self-downgrading to an observer status in the European Military Committee or the recent joint resignation of its Defence and Foreign Ministers can hardly be traced back to certain elements of the Danish identity. Yet, beyond any doubt the analysis of the Danish discourse formations and structures reveals the deadlock and legitimation trap any Danish government is confronted with for the time being. Thus, an identity approach in combination

with discourse analysis enable us to better understand and identify constraints and 'windows of opportunity' of European foreign policy on the basis of the communicative reconstruction of elements of national identity in societal foreign policy discourses.

By the same token, our approach can contribute methodologically and empirically to the ongoing debate about the Europeanisation of national identities or, put more boldly, the construction of a collective European identity. We are faced with most intriguing processes of the build-up of common politics and policies on the European level. At the same time, we know little about the development of a European identity (Risse 2000: 15ff.) and even less, it seems, about the Europeanization of discourses. Yet, these three issues are obviously closely intertwined. Discourse profiles may serve here as important tools for further research because they help to assess how far the process of Europeanisation of national identity has already progressed in different EU member states. Take the ongoing debate about the *finalité politique* of the Union in the around the post-Nice process: German activism to create a European debate is sharply contrasted by French reluctance to join the chorus, while Danish policy-makers remain aloof in complete silence. This does not come as a surprise when we consider the discourse formations and argumentation patterns which reveal that 'Europe' in Denmark largely remains a market project, while 'Europe' is primarily portrayed as a vehicle for the promotion of national values in French discourses on European policy. Both conceptions are hardly conducive to a vision of a politically united Europe. Discourse profiles thus help to understand in how far national discourses are already Europeanised and ready for the opening of a European public space in the long run.

References

- Aggestam, Lisbeth (1999). "Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy." *ARENA Working Papers* 99/8, pp. 1-25.
- Ambler, John S. and Shawn M. Reichert (2001). "France: Europeanism, Nationalism, and the Planned Economy." In: *The EU and the member states. Cooperation, Coordination and Compromise*, E.E. Zeff and E.B. Pirro (eds.), pp. 29-58, Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner.
- Appleton, A. (1992). "Maastricht and the French Party System: Domestic Implications of the Treaty Referendum." *French Politics and Society* 10, no. 4, pp. 1-18.
- Axt, Heinz-Jürgen (1999). "Frankreich in der Europäischen Union." In: *Länderbericht Frankreich*, Marieluise Christadler and Henrik Uterwedde (eds.), pp. 464-83, Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung.
- Bach, Jonathan P.G. (1999). *Between Sovereignty and Integration. German Foreign Policy and National Identity after 1989*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Baumann, Rainer (2001). "German Security Policy within NATO." In: *German Foreign Policy since Unification. Theories and Case Studies*, Volker Rittberger (ed.), pp. 141-84, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

- Bjøl, E. (1966). *La France devant l'Europe. La politique européenne de la IV.ème République*. Copenhagen: Munksgaard.
- Blunden, Margaret (2000). "France." In: *Foreign Policies of EU Member States*, Ian Manners and Richard Whitman (eds.), pp. 19-43, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Bretherton, Charlotte and John Vogler (1999). *The European Union as a Global Actor*. London: Routledge.
- Buffotot, Patrice (1993). "Le Référendum sur l'union Européenne." *Modern & Contemporary France* 1, no. 3, pp. 277-86.
- Coolsaet, Rik and Ben Soetendorp (2000). "Belgium and the Netherlands." In: *The foreign policies of European Union Member States*, Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman (eds.), pp. 128-43, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Criddle, Byron (1993). "The French Referendum on the Maastricht Treaty September 1992." *Parliamentary Affairs* 46, no. 2, pp. 228-38.
- Cruz, Consuelo (2000). "Identity and Persuasion. How Nations Remember Their Pasts and Make Their Futures." *World Politics* 52, no. 2, pp. 275-312.
- De La Serre, Françoise and Christian Lequesne (1992/93). "Frankreich." *Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration*, pp. 314-22.
- De La Serre, Françoise and Christian Lequesne (1994/95). "Frankreich." *Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration*, pp. 305-12.
- Deubner, Christian (1999). "Frankreich in der Osterweiterung der EU, 1989 bis 1997." *Politische Studien* issue 363, pp. 89-121.
- Dosenrode, Soren Z. von "Danish EU-Policy Making." In: *Denmark's Policy towards Europe After 1945: History, Theory and Options*, Hans Branner and Morten Kelstrup (eds.), pp. 381-402, Odense: Odense University Press, 2000.
- Duchêne, F. (1996). "French Motives for European Integration." In: *European Integration and disintegration*, R. Bideleux and R Taylor (eds.), pp. 22-35, London: Routledge.
- Eckstein, Harry (1975), "Case Study and Theory in Political Science." In: *Strategies of Inquiry. Handbook of Political Science vol. 7*, Fred I. Greenstein and N.W. Polsby (eds.), pp. 79-138, Menlo Park, CA, et al.: Addison-Wesley.
- Elgström, O. (2000). "Lomé and Post-Lomé: Asymmetric Negotiation and the Impact of Norms." *European Foreign Affairs Review* 5, no. 2, pp. 175-97.
- Elman, Colin (1996). "Horses for Courses. Why not Neo-realist Theories of Foreign Policy?" *Security Studies* 6, no. 1, pp. 7-53.
- Everts, Philip (1997). "Pays-Bas: L'innocence perdue." In: *La défense en Europe. Les adaptations de l'après-guerre froide*, Patrice Buffotot (ed.), pp. 171-83, Paris.
- Finnemore, Martha (1996). *National Interests in International Society*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
- Freudenstein, Roland (1995). "Die neuen Demokratien in Ostmitteleuropa und die Europäische Union." In: *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik. vol. 2: Herausforderungen*, Karl Kaiser and Hanns W. Maull (eds.), pp. 103-19, München: Oldenbourg.
- Frenkler, Ulf, Sebastian Harnisch, Knut Kirste, Hanns W. Maull and Wolfram Wallraf (1997). *Deutsche, amerikanische und japanische Außenpolitikstrategien 1985-1995: Eine vergleichende Untersuchung zu Zivilisierungsprozessen in der Triade*. Trier: University of Trier (<http://www.uni-trier.de/uni/fb3/politik/workshop/dfgfinal.pdf>).
- Fritsch-Bournazel, Renata (1991). "German unification: views from Germany's neighbours." In: *German Unification in European Perspective*, Wolfgang Heisenberg (ed.), pp. 70-87, London et al.: Brassey's.
- George, Alexander L. (1979). "Case Studies and Theorie Development. The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison." In: *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy*, Paul Gordon Lauren (ed.), pp. 43-68, New York: The Free Press.

- Grieco, Joseph M. (1995). "The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the Neo-realist Research Programme." *Review of International Studies* 21, pp. 21-40.
- Guerin-Sendelbach, Valérie (1994). "'Incertitudes françaises'? Die Entwicklung der Europäischen Union aus französischer Sicht." *Dokumente* 50, pp. 296-302.
- Hansen, Birte (1996). "Dansk Baltikumspolitik 1989-1995." In: *Dansk udenrigspolitisk årbog 1995*, Svend Aage Christensen and Ole Wæver (eds.), Copenhagen: Dansk udenrigspolitisk institut.
- Harnisch, Sebastian and Bernhard Stahl (2000). "Germany's Role in the Institutional Reform of the European Union as Viewed from Different National Perspectives." *German Foreign Policy in Dialogue* 1, no. 3, pp. 7-11 (<http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/publications/newsletter/issue03.html>).
- Harryvan, Anjo, Jan van der Harst and Hakan Wiberg (1996). "The Netherlands. Dutch Regime Values and their Basic Sources." In: *European Integration and National Adaptations: A theoretical Inquiry*, Hans Mouritzen, Ole Wæver and Hakan Wiberg (eds.), pp. 101-27, New York: Nova Science, Commeck.
- Haywood, Elizabeth (1993). "The European Policy of François Mitterrand." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31, no. 2, pp. 269-82.
- Hellmann, G. (1997). "The Sirens of Power and German Foreign Policy: Who is Listening?" *German Politics* 6, no. 2, pp. 29-57.
- Hellmann, Gunther (1997). "Jenseits von "Normalisierung" und "Militarisierung": Zur Standortdebatte über die neue deutsche Außenpolitik." *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 47, no. 1-2, pp. 24-33.
- Hellmann, Gunther (1999). "Nationale Normalität als Zukunft? Zur Außenpolitik der Berliner Republik." *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* 44, no. 7, pp. 837-47.
- Heurlin, Bertel (1996). "Denmark. A new activism in foreign and security policy." In: *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*, Christopher Hill (eds.), pp. 166-85, London: Routledge.
- Hill, Christopher (1996). "The United Kingdom and Germany." In: *Germany in Europe in the Nineties*, Bertel Heurlin (eds.), pp. 222-40, London: Macmillan.
- Hoffman, Arthur and Vanda Knowles (1999). *Germany and the Reshaping of Europe. Identifying Interests - the Role of Discourse Analysis*. Vol. 99/9, ESRC-IGS Discussion Paper. Birmingham.
- Hoffmann, Stanley (1987). "Mitterrand's Foreign Policy, or Gaullism by any other Name." In: *The Mitterrand Experiment. Continuity and Change in Modern France*, George Ross, Stanley Hoffmann and Sylvia Malzacker (eds.), p. 294-305, Oxford: Polity Press.
- Holm, Ulla (1997). "The French Garden Is No Longer What It Used To Be." In: *Reflective Approaches to European Governance*, Knud Erik Jørgensen (ed.), pp. 128-45, Basingstoke, London: MacMillan.
- Homann, Kees (2000). "A Dutch hope: Towards a greater coherence." In: *The Northern EU. National Views on the Emerging Security Dimension*, Gianni Bonvicini, Tapani Vaahtoranta and Wolfgang Wessels (eds.), pp. 183-93, Helsinki: Kauhana.
- Honig, Jan Willem (1994). "The Netherlands and Military Intervention." In: *Military Intervention in European Politics*, Lawrence Freedman (eds.), pp. 142-53, Oxford/Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- Honig, Jan Willem and Norbert Both (1997). *Srebrenica: Der größte Massenmord in Europa nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg*. Munich: Lichtenberg.
- Howorth, Jolyon (1994). "The Debate in France over Military Intervention." In: *Military Intervention in European Conflicts*, Lawrence Freedman (ed.), pp. 106-24, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Howorth, Jolyon (2000). "Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative." *Survival* 42, no. 2, pp. 34f.

- Jäger, Siegfried (1993). *Kritische Diskursanalyse*, DISS-Studien. Duisburg: Duisburger Inst. für Sprach- und Sozialforschung (DISS).
- Jakobsen, Peter Viggo (2000). "Denmark at War: Turning Point or Business as Usual?" In: *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2000*, Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen (eds.), pp. 61-86, Copenhagen: DUPI.
- Janning, Josef (1996). "Deutschland und die Europäische Union: Integration und Erweiterung." In: *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik. Bd. 3: Interessen und Strategien*, Karl Kaiser and Joachim Krause (eds.), pp. 31-54, München: Oldenbourg.
- Jepperson, Ronald, Alexander Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein (1996). "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security." In: *The Culture of National Security*, Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), pp. 33-75, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Jung, Sabine (1999). *Europa, made in France. Eine Analyse des politischen Diskurses Frankreichs zur Zukunft der Europäischen Gemeinschaft - von den Anfängen bis heute*. Nomos-Universitätschriften / Politik, Vol. 97, Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Kassim, Hussein (1997). "French autonomy and the European Union." *Modern & Contemporary France* 5, no. 2, pp. 167-80.
- Katzenstein, Peter J. (2000). "Gezähmte Macht: Deutschland in Europa." In: *Deutschland zwischen Europäisierung und Selbstbehauptung*, Michèle Knodt and Beate Kohler-Koch (eds.), pp. 57-84, Frankfurt.
- Kimmel, Adolf (1997). "Die institutionellen und verfassungsrechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen der französischen Sicherheitspolitik." In: *Die verhinderte Großmacht. Frankreichs Sicherheitspolitik nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts*, Hanns W. Maull, Michael Meimeth and Christoph Neßhöver (eds.), pp. 20-36, Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
- Kratochwil, Friedrich V. (1989). *Rules, Norms, and Decisions. On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs*. Vol. 2, *Cambridge Studies in international relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kratochwil, Friedrich V. and John Gerard Ruggie (1986). "International Organization. A State of the Art on an Art of the State." *International Organization* 40, no. 4, pp. 753-75.
- Kwast-van Duursen, Marja (1996). "The Dutch Debate: A Shifting Policy on Europe." In: *The 1996 IGC-National Debates*, Alexander C-G. Stubb, Laurent Cohen-Tanugi, Silvio Fagiolo and Marja Kwast-van Duursen (eds.), pp. 46-60, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs.
- Ladrech, Robert (1994). "Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France." *Journal of Common Market studies* 32, no. 1, pp. 69-88.
- Lapid, Yosef (1989). "The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist-Area." *International Studies Quarterly* 33, pp. 235-54.
- Larsen, Henrik (1997). *Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France, Britain and Europe*. London: Routledge.
- Larsen, Henrik (2000). "Denmark and the European Defense Dimension in the Post-Cold War Period: Opt-out or Participation?" In: *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2000*, Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen (eds.), pp. 87-120, Copenhagen: DUPI.
- Lequesne, Christian (1993). *Paris-Bruxelles. Comment se fait la politique européenne de la France*. Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationales des Science Politique.
- Luthardt, Wolfgang (1993). "European Integration and Referendums: Analytical Considerations and Empirical Evidence." In: *The state of the European Community. Vol. 2 : The Maastricht debates and beyond*, Alan W. Cafruny and Glenda Rosenthal (eds.), pp. 53-71, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Manners, Ian and Richard G. Whitman (2000). *The Foreign Policy of EU Member States*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

- March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen (1989). *Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics*. New York: Free Press.
- Maull, Hanns W. (1999). "Germany and the Use of Force. Still a Civilian Power?" *Trierer Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik* 2.
- Maull, Hanns W. (2000). "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?" *Survival* 42, no. 2, pp. 56-80.
- Mazucelli, Collette (1997). *France and Germany at Maastricht: politics and negotiations to create the European Union*. New York: Garland.
- Mead, George Herbert (1973). *Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus*. Frankfurt
- Milliken, Jennifer (1999). "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods." *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 2, pp. 225-54.
- Moravcsik, Andrew (1998). *The Choice For Europe. Social Purpose & State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
- Müller, Harald (1994). "Military Intervention for European Security: The German Debate." In: *Military Intervention in European Conflicts*, Lawrence Freedman (ed.), pp. 125-42, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Pagell, Saskia. *Souveränität oder Integration?: Die Europapolitik Dänemarks und Norwegens von 1945-1995*. Frankfurt: Lang, 2000.
- Paterson, William E. (1993). "Muß Europa Angst vor Deutschland haben?" In: *Der Vertrag von Maastricht in der wissenschaftlichen Kontroverse*, Rudolf Hrbek (ed.), pp. 9-18, Baden-Baden.
- Peters, Dirk (2001). "Making European Law Work: Why Member States (Fail to) Implement EC Directives.". Mainz.
- Petersen, Nikolaj (1999). "Denmark, the IGC 1996 and the Future of the European Union." In: *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1998*, Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen (eds.), pp. 43-59, Copenhagen: DUPI.
- Philippi, Nina (1997). *Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten Deutschlands*. Frankfurt
- Pijpers, Alfred (1996). "The Netherlands. The weakening pull of Atlanticism." In: *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*, Christopher Hill (ed.), pp. 247-67, London: Routledge.
- Pijpers, Alfred and Jan Rood (1997/98). "Niederlande." *Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration*, pp. 355-60.
- Preston, P.W. (1997). *Political/Cultural Identity. Citizens and Nations in a Global Era*. London et al: SAGE Publications.
- Reef, Johannes (1995). *Die Niederlande im internationalen System. Fallstudien zum Einfluß eines Kleinstaates*. Vol. 15. Münster et al.: Lit-Verlag.
- Riemersma, Riemke A. (1989). "No European military integration: the Fouchet Plan." In: *The Politics of Persuasion. Implementation of Foreign Policy by the Netherlands*, Philip P. Everts and Guido Walraven (eds.), pp. 175-88, Aldershot: Avebury.
- Risse, Thomas (2000). Nationalism and Collective Identities: Europe versus the Nation-State? Florence: EUI (<http://www.iue.it/Personal/Risse/rissedoc/jonesrhodes.pdf>)
- Rometsch, Dietrich (1996). "The Federal Republic of Germany." In: *The European Union and member states*, Dietrich Rometsch and Wolfgang Wessels (eds.), pp. 61-103, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Rüdiger, Mogens (1995). "Denmark and the European Community 1967-1985." In: *Adaptation and Activism. The Foreign Policy of Denmark 1967-1993*, Carsten Due-Nielsen and Nikolaj Petersen (eds.), pp. 163-88, Copenhagen: DJÖF.
- Saliou, Monique (1993). "La France et l'ONU: Des ambitions mondiales." *Politique étrangère* 58, no. 3, pp. 687-95.

- Schild, Joachim (1997). "Durchbruch in der deutsch-französischen Sicherheitskooperation." *Aktuelle Frankreichanalysen* 6, march 1997, pp. 1-12.
- Schmalz, Uwe (2000). "German ambitions and ambiguities: EU initiatives as a useful framework." In: *The Northern EU. National Views on the Emerging Security Dimension*, Gianni Bonvicini, Tapani Vaahtoranta and Wolfgang Wessels (eds.), pp. 216-36, Helsinki: Kauhana.
- Schönbohm, Jörg (1995). "Deutsche Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik vor europäischen und globalen Herausforderungen." *Unveröffentlichtes Papier, präsentiert bei der DGAP-Konferenz am 26.4.1995*. Strausberg.
- Searle, John R. (1970). *Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*. Cambridge.
- Siwert-Probst, Judith (1998). "Die klassischen außenpolitischen Institutionen." In: *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik. Vol.4: Institutionen und Ressourcen*, Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser (eds.), pp. 13-28, München: Oldenbourg.
- Soetendorp, Ben (1989). "The NATO 'double track' decision." In: *The Politics of Persuasion. Implementation of Foreign Policy by the Netherlands*, Philip P. Everts and Guido Walraven (eds.), pp. 149-60, Aldershot: Avebury.
- Soetendorp, Ben (2000). "The Netherlands' Perspective." *Neswletter -- German Foreign Policy in Dialogue*, no. 2.
- Soetendorp, Ben and Kenneth Hanf (1998). "The Netherlands: Growing Doubts of a Loyal Member." In: *Adapting to European Integration. Small States and the European Union*, Kenneth Hanf and Ben Soetendorp (eds.), pp. 36-51, London, New York.
- Stahl, Bernhard (1999). "When Values Meet: Recent European Experiences." In: *Changing Values in Asia. Their Impact on Governance and Development*, Han Sung-Joo (ed.), pp. 280-302, Tokyo, New York.
- Stavridis, Stelios and Justin Hutchence (2000). "Mediterranean Challenges to the EU's Foreign Policy." *European Foreign Affairs Review* 5, no. 1, pp. 35-62.
- Stone, Alec (1993). "Ratifying Maastricht. France Debates European Union." *French Politics and Society* 11, pp. 70-88.
- Stone Sweet, Alec and Wayne Sandholtz (1998). "Integration, Supranational Governance, and the Institutionalization of the European polity." In: *European Integration and Supranational Governance*, Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet (eds.), pp. 2-26, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Thune, Christian (1993/94). "Dänemark." *Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration*, pp. 313-18.
- Tonra, Ben (2001). *The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy. Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Townson, Michael (1992). *Mother-tongue and fatherland : language and politics in German*. Manchester, New York.
- Udenrigsministeriet (1993). *Principper og perspektiver i dansk udenrigspolitik*. Copenhagen.
- van Staden, Alfred (1985). "To deploy or not to deploy: the case of the cruise missiles." In: *Controversies at Home: Domestic Factors in the Foreign Policy of the Netherlands*, Ph. P. Everts (ed.), pp. 133-56, Dordrecht - Boston - Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Vernet, Daniel (1992). "The dilemma of French foreign policy." *International Affairs* 4, pp. 655-64.
- von Handel, Thomas. "Die dänische Ostpolitik in Bezug auf die baltischen Republiken und die russische Föderation.", Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel, 1997.
- Voorhoeve, Jorus J.C. (1979). *Peace, Profits and Principles: A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy*. Dordrecht: Nijhoff.
- Wæver, Ole (1990). "Three competing Europes: German, French, Russian." *International Affairs* 3, july, pp. 477-93.

- Wæver, Ole (1995). "Identity, Integration and Security. Solving the Sovereignty Puzzle in E.U. Studies." *Journal of International Affairs* 48, no. 2, pp. 389-461.
- Wagner, Wolfgang (1999). "Instrument nationaler Außenpolitik oder Beitrag zu einer europäischen Außenpolitik? Deutsche, französische und britische GASP - Politiken im Vergleich.". *Papier präsentiert auf der Nachwuchstagung der Sektion "Internationale Beziehungen" der DVPW, Arnoldshain.*
- Wagner, Wolfgang (2001). "Die Konstruktion einer europäischen Außenpolitik. Deutsche, französische und britische GASP-Politiken im Vergleich." Inauguraldissertation, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. (1993). "The Emerging Structure of International Politics." *International Security* 18, no. 2, pp. 44-79.
- Weller, Christoph (1999). "Kollektive Identitäten in der internationalen Politik." In: *Identität und Interesse*, Walter Reese-Schäfer (ed.), pp. 249-77, Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
- Weller, Christoph (2000). "Kollektive Identitäten in der Weltgesellschaft - Nationale, transnationale und regionale Identitäten im 21. Jahrhundert.". Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde.
- Wester, Robert (1992). "The Netherlands and European Political Union." In: *The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union. Institutional Reforms, New Policies and International Identity of the European Community*, Finn Laursen and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), pp. 163-76, Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration.
- White, Brian (1999). "European Challenge to Foreign Policy Analysis." *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 1, pp. 37-66.
- Williams, Shirley (1991). "Sovereignty and Accountability in the European Community." In: *The New European Community*, Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann (eds.), pp. 155-76, Boulder: Westview Press.
- Woyke, Wichard (1991/92). "Belgien, Niederlande, Luxemburg." *Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration*, pp. 300-09.
- Woyke, Wichard (1992/93). "Belgien, Niederlande, Luxemburg." *Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration*, pp. 291-98.
- Woyke, Wichard (2000). *Deutsch-Französische Beziehungen seit der Wiedervereinigung. Das Tandem faßt wieder Tritt.* Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
- Zartman, William I., (ed.) (1994). *International Multilateral Negotiation. Approaches to the Management of Complexity.* San Francisco.
- Ziebur, Gilbert (1997). *Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen seit 1945: Mythen und Realitäten.* Stuttgart: Neske.